

RELIGION IN LIFE

Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

A Christian Quarterly

OF OPINION AND DISCUSSION

CONTENTS

Christian Faith and Psychotherapy

LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD, SEWARD HILTNER, ALBERT C. OUTLER

Christian Faith and Existential Freedom.....	CARL MICHALSON
On Interpreting Christ to America.....	VAN A. HARVEY
The Bible After Twenty Years of Archeology.....	W. F. ALBRIGHT
Authority, Scripture and Tradition.....	RANDOLPH C. MILLER
The Military Establishment in a Democracy.....	ROBERT E. FITCH
Plagiarism and the Development of Originality.....	WEBB B. GARRISON
Karl Barth and the Jews.....	MARIA F. SULZBACH
Building New Nations in Africa.....	CECIL NORTHCOTT
The Use of the Bible in Public Schools.....	ZELDA J. RYAN
Book Reviews	
Book Notices	
Index for Volume XXI	

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CONTENTS

Christian Faith and Psychotherapy 483

LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD, SEWARD HILTNER, ALBERT C. OUTLER

Christian Faith and Existential Freedom	CARL MICHALSON	513
On Interpreting Christ to America	VAN A. HARVEY	527
The Bible After Twenty Years of Archeology	W. F. ALBRIGHT	537
Authority, Scripture and Tradition	RANDOLPH C. MILLER	551
The Military Establishment in a Democracy	ROBERT E. FITCH	563
Plagiarism and the Development of Originality	WEBB B. GARRISON	573
Karl Barth and the Jews	MARIA F. SULZBACH	585
Building New Nations in Africa	CECIL NORTHCOTT	594
The Use of the Bible in Public Schools	ZELDA J. RYAN	603
Book Reviews		613
Book Notices		635
Index for Volume XXI		638

"Life's Saving Tension"

HALFORD E. LUCCOCK

IN THIS DAY of psychology of all brands, good, almost good, and charlatan, the business of not worrying has been elevated into a national cult. The magic word is "Relax," more magical than "Open Sesame." We have it in a score of books every season: *You Must Relax; Overcoming Nervous Tension; How Never to Be Tired*—all of them aimed at a real and growing need; yet all of them contributing to the elevation of semiconsciousness to the place of a panacea for human ills. Many ministers have discovered the blessed word "relax," and have compressed the whole Gospel into it, like abbreviating an eighty-eight-note piano into one note. One man I know seems to have been preaching for years on "Peace, Poise, and Power in Perpetual Possession." They are almost on the verge of rewriting the Scriptures to read, "If any man will come after me, let him relax," or "Go into all the world and keep down your blood pressure." Something is missing. It is the tension of Jesus. I saw a sermon topic announced not long ago, "How to Live a Serene and Successful Life." Very attractive; but we have to remember that Jesus lived a very disturbed and unsuccessful life. He died on a cross.

—*Marching Off the Map*,
by Halford E. Luccock,
p. 75. Harper & Brothers,
1952. Used by permission.

Christian Faith and Psychotherapy

LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD

I

THERE CAN be no doubt that when our Lord sent his disciples forth, he gave them the joint commission to preach and to heal. They and their successors have carried out the first part of the injunction, but the second they have almost entirely relegated to the medical profession.

It is not difficult to understand why this dichotomy took place in the first instance. As the visible healing acts of Christ faded gradually in the memory, and as those who had been with him gradually passed away, the maintenance of a virile faith became increasingly difficult, as indeed Christ foresaw when he said, "Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed." So we notice that although healing persisted, it altered in a significant—one had almost written, sinister—way. Methods were adopted that demanded less of the healer and more from the patient. It was demanded that the patient should have "faith," and if he were not healed the failure was put down to his lack of "faith"; a situation which is largely true of so-called faith healing today. It is to be remembered that Jesus blamed not the patients, but the healers.¹

Further, scientific methods of healing were coming into greater vogue from Greek culture, and the methods of materialistic medicine were, and are, so reliable, demanding almost nothing from the healer and almost nothing from the patient, that it is little wonder that faith healing was swept to one side. The effect of drugs is almost immediate, clearly demonstrable, and often predictable with certainty. Men did not perceive that this method was also of God, but it was certainly effective. Drugs have the same result on the unrighteous as on the righteous. Clearly, medical science had come to stay.

Again, quack exorcists who made no reference to the power of Christ got similar results in the sphere of healing to those of the Apostles, and

¹ See Mark 9:19; Matthew 17:17; Luke 9:41.

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this surely must have confused people's minds. Deissmann quotes a long exorcism of Jewish origin into which a pagan exorcist had introduced the name of Jesus in order to strengthen the prescription. For all these reasons, in the atmosphere of a church with a diminished faith, the ministry of healing faded out almost entirely—says Harnack—by the middle of the third century. The gulf between the two parts of Christ's injunction, "preach" and "heal," widened. For a long time anointing with oil persisted, and in 1718 a serious attempt was made to revive this practice. Recovery was definitely expected after anointing. But this intention is sadly watered down in the present Anglican Prayer Book, where, in the Office of Ministration to the Sick, we find the words, "Grant that he may take his sickness patiently and recover his bodily health *if it be Thy gracious will.*"

As early as the thirteenth century it must have been very difficult for the ecclesiastics and the doctors to feel that they could co-operate in any way, for in 1215 Pope Innocent III condemned surgery, and in 1248 the dissection of the body was pronounced sacrilegious and the study of anatomy condemned. We note, then, the widening gulf. Religion and medicine went their separate ways. Preaching and healing were different arts and have never come together again seriously until the present day. Some of us think that we are living at a time when everything possible should be done to bring the two professions together.

There will be some, of course, who feel that faith in Christ should heal anything. They point out that the disciples were not physicians or psychiatrists, and it is certainly clear that when Jesus commanded the disciples to heal, he did not mean that they should study medicine.

This view, I think, can be countered by realizing that if men had sufficient faith, cures which would amaze us all would still take place. But the question arises as to how such faith can be called out. In the mental atmosphere of the first century it could be called out by the very presence of holy men of God. I am sure that in these modern days, when the mental atmosphere—if one may so describe it—is scientific, we cannot recapture the atmosphere of the first century, and we must be able to call forth faith as a projection from science, where faith in earlier days was a projection from credulity.

In other words, I can now produce faith in a patient by scientific explanation more powerfully than I can produce faith by asking the patient "to believe," *in vacuo*. Supposing a man comes into my study, suffering from some illness of mind or body, and I tell him that he is to kneel down and that I am about to lay my hands upon him. He, being a child of this century and brought up through a strictly scientific training, will

not believe that anything therapeutic is likely to happen. This may be my fault, or his fault, or it may be due to the fact that we are both the children of science. If, on the other hand, I listen closely while he pours out his story, and then tell him that, in my opinion, he is suffering from what is called an anxiety neurosis which has certain disabling physical symptoms, that by a psychological treatment which may last some time we can investigate the causes of his illness, and then adopt a treatment that will cure him, he is much more likely to have faith in recovery and in those who seek to make him well.

II

Surely this is where a co-operation between the minister and the medical psychiatrist should come in. At the City Temple I now have a team of eight or nine Christian medical psychiatrists, to whom I can turn over such patients as seek my help on account of either symptoms of the mind, or symptoms in the body which are believed to have a psychological origin. In a recent book,² I have set out my own thesis that a great many of even the physical troubles of the present day have their real origin in emotional states. Many, for example, are caused by a sense of guilt repressed into the unconscious parts of the mind. Here is one illustration of the statement.

A young married woman, who lived in the country, developed a rash across her chest when she went shopping in the town. The strange feature was that even a shopping expedition in the town did not *always* produce the rash. To make a very long story very short, it emerged that she only developed the rash if, while shopping in the town, she saw a certain kind of motor car. Without the "why" of it coming into consciousness at all, to see a certain type of car reminded the unconscious (in which, of course, *all* our memories are stored) of immoral incidents which had happened with a married man in the back of a similar car while her own husband was fighting overseas. The guilt was repressed, but had its revenge in the unsightly rash, making a person who would not face up to, and accept the fact of, a stained mind, compulsorily bear the stigma of a stained body. Subsequent to interviews with me, the patient promised to give up immoral relationships. She realized the fact of the forgiveness of God, of which I shall write later. She and her husband—who was told the whole story by his wife and who readily forgave her—reaffirmed their marriage vows together in my presence. And a stubborn rash, into which many ointments had been well rubbed, disappeared, and has never returned, though I am writing over six years after the incidents described.

It is also certain that the deprivation of love can cause physical illness,

² *Psychology, Religion and Healing*. The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. Reviewed in this issue.

the real motivation of which is a quest for a love-substitute such as pity, sympathy, kindness, and care. Here is a case of *anorexia nervosa* which illustrates my point.

Kathleen G. was a healthy girl of twenty, engaged as a typist at a garage near a country village. She became engaged to the curate. The date of the wedding was fixed. Kathleen was radiantly happy. Part of her happiness was derived from the thought that she would be no longer an unimportant typist in a menial job, but a lady of the manse, and, through her marriage, the social equal of anyone in the neighborhood. But the curate broke off the engagement. From that day Kathleen developed a curious habit. She simply could not be persuaded to eat. She would even put food into her mouth and then empty it into her handkerchief or serviette, and afterwards throw it away. She became pale, thin, hollow-eyed, and showed symptoms of anemia. Her doctor could only say, "You must make her eat." Her devoted parents did their utmost, adding tears and threats and entreaties, but all to little purpose. A visit was made to a London specialist, unfortunately not a psychotherapist, and he failed to recognize the case as one of *anorexia nervosa*. The specialist said, "There is nothing the matter with her if only she will eat."

At last, in desperation, hearing that I had had a similar case, they brought her to me. Her mother showed me earlier photographs of a plump and bonny girl. I could hardly believe they were of the same girl. For Kathleen, aged twenty-three, weighed some seventy-five pounds, and her body looked like that of an Indian famine victim. Any psychologist would have recognized the "self-immolation complex" functioning deep in the unconscious. Kathleen said quite simply, "I know I ought to eat, and I do try to, but all the time I feel there is a strong inward power which is telling me I must not eat." No words could have been more apt. The "inward power" was that of a morbid unconscious.

This unconscious, like the conscious, was stricken by the deprivation of love and hit on a terrible revenge against the curate. It argued—unconsciously, it must be repeated—"Don't go back to the garage or to menial work now you have lost face. Don't accept the humiliation of menial work again. Don't eat! Die of a broken heart! Offer yourself up as a sacrifice on the altar of unrequited love. Then, instead of people smiling as you resume a humble task, instead of their seeing you with broken pride and in a humiliating situation, people will be sorry for you. By dying you can get sympathy *in maximo*; see how sorry they are for you now because you already look white and ill! And, besides, see what a splendid

revenge you will have on the curate, how successfully you will ruin the happiness he is finding in your successor, and, furthermore, what a revenge you will have on your doctor, who told you bluntly not to be a little fool because there was nothing the matter with you."

Cases like this of *anorexia nervosa* have been known to lead to death. In the one quoted above, I am convinced that Kathleen was cured both by psychological investigation and subsequent religious synthesis. *First*, admittedly, a psychological technique had to be followed and causative factors in the neurosis brought from the unconscious to the conscious level. But thereafter it was through her religious faith that she became integrated.

Her mind began to run along the following lines: "Anyway, God loves me, cares for me, and has *some* purpose in my life. If B (the curate) is like that, it's a good job I found out before I married him. I'm not going to throw my life away because a man like that jilts me. I will hold my head up. I've done nothing of which I need feel ashamed. I'll live a day at a time, and show that my faith is not just a fair-weather, flimsy thing, but that it sustains me."

She did this, and entirely recovered. It gives me joy to add that she afterwards married a Methodist minister known to me, and has proved herself during the last twelve years his most able and valued helpmeet.

III

Where the deep mind, over a long period, holds in a state of repression an unhealthy emotion like worry, resentment, jealousy, hatred, envy, malice, and so on, I am quite sure physical or mental illness is frequently set up. Indeed, the chemical constitution of the secretions of the body is altered by the repressed emotion. Catabolic enzymes are produced which poison the system and produce disease.³

One of my friends who is working in this field has given me details of a case he treated, in which the emotion of the fear of exposure produced a strange effect on the skin. Every June the patient developed a painful skin rash which for weeks incapacitated him from work. It was found, by psychological methods, that in June, years before, the patient had seduced a girl and both had kept it secret. They drifted apart and no consequences followed, save that every June the uncleansed conscience set up dermatitis. Only when the patient saw the connection between guilt and rash, and accepted the forgiveness of God, did the month of June pass without the rash appearing. It never troubled the patient subsequently.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 364 *et seq.*

Cases of skin trouble, gastric and duodenal ulcer, asthma, coronary thrombosis, and hypertension are increasingly thought to have their origin in unhealthy emotional conditions in the unconscious mind.

I am sure that a great field of valuable work in the life of the church would open up if there could be a new co-operation between doctors and clergy. Let the trained medical psychiatrist do his analytical work by all means, but not only analysis is necessary. Synthesis is essential. Who will put Humpty Dumpty together again? The nonreligious psychologist seems to me to desert the patient too early. He frequently obtains a cure in the sense of rendering the patient symptom-free, but he leaves the house of personality swept and garnished and too often a prey to other prowling devils. Frequently, patients who have been thus treated, have asked me, "What do I do now? Where do I go from here?" And clearly, if the origin of the patient's trouble has been a repressed, unhealthy emotion, we are giving him a very poor deal if we leave him analyzed, but lost. *The forgiveness of God*, in my opinion, is the most powerful therapeutic idea in the world. Thousands of people are ill through repressed guilt; and to analyze the repression and make it conscious, then to say only, "Don't do it again," or, "Other people have done far worse things," is not to give a person the help to which he has a right. What a wonderful ministry the church has in being able to offer the cleansing forgiveness of God!

Further, in other cases hinted at above, the church can offer *the love of God*. In other words, a healthy, positive, cleansing emotion which can take the place of the unhealthy ones which have caused such injury to personality. Again and again, after treatment we find that the patient can be maintained in health by the effect that the loving community—which every church ideally should be—has upon him. Thousands of people are ill because they are deprived of love. The church should be able not only to mediate the love of God, but to give to the patient spheres of service, in which, because he shows love for his neighbor, he finds human love—in the New Testament sense—flooding back to his own heart. Literally by losing his life, he finds it. By loving, in terms of service, he finds love coming back to his own starved heart.

IV

When all this has been said, however, I do not believe we have even then recaptured what our Lord meant and practiced in the field of healing, though I think that what has been written above indicates the way forward. In my opinion, the church has lost what was a supernatural gift. The healing

miracles of Jesus I do not regard as therapeutic treatments. Modern psychology can throw light on the machinery of personality which was involved, but not on the power which used the machinery. It is as though I found all the electrical apparatus accounting for some wonderful electric phenomenon, but did not know how to switch on the power to reproduce the phenomenon. It is all very well to classify our Lord's miracles and say that this is a case of suggestion and that is a case of abreaction, and so on, but I am only describing the machinery. Whence comes the current? And I think the answer to the last question is that Jesus was at home on a spiritual plane to which we are strange as yet, and Jesus used those energies which belong to that plane.

It is as though two savages were talking together about the injury which one had sustained and asked the help of the other. Let us imagine that all the help that could be got was the licking of the wound and lying up waiting for it to heal. Supposing into such a situation a modern surgeon appeared who set a bone (if that were necessary), used penicillin, and bound up the wounded limb in antiseptic dressings. Then the resultant cure would be speedy and effective in a way miraculous to the savage. There would be no rupture of the reign of law, but there would be the impingement from what we would call, for the sake of illustration, another plane of being; the break-through, on to the plane of life familiar to the savage, of understanding familiar enough on the plane on which the modern surgeon lives. Christ's miracles do not illustrate any rupture of law. They are expressions of the wealth of those laws which operate on the plane on which he lived, and probably Christ's healing power was due to the quality of his spiritual life. One remembers his comment when the disciples expressed their own failure to cure the epileptic at the foot of Mount Hermon. "Why could not we cast it out?" they asked. Christ's answer amounted to this: "Your spiritual life is not of a high enough quality for the requisite energy to be released."⁴

When I poke a fire, only the tip of the poker need touch the glowing coal, but every atom in the poker is involved, and so is the strength of my arm. It seems to me that we need to follow closely the training which Jesus gave to the disciples. He welded them into a unity as strong as a poker: a poker, we might say, made of very different metals, and welded into an alloy, by his grace and love, stronger than any one metal was before. That united fellowship went out into the world to preach and to heal. The individual in that fellowship did not heal through any freak

⁴ Mark 9:14-29; Matthew 17:14-21; Luke 9:37-43.

endowment as a healer given to him as an individual. Where he healed he was the striking point of the whole poker. The whole fellowship was behind him and behind the fellowship was the supernatural power of Christ. Let it be remembered that the extension of the Incarnation is not the endowed individual, but the *koinonia*; where the individual heals, he has the power of that fellowship behind him, and behind that, and through that, the power of the living Christ. Until we undertake such discipline as the disciples knew and attain such unity as they had gained by Pentecost, we may do many useful healing acts and many co-operative valuable ministries with the psychiatrists and others, but we shall not regain the healing ministry of the early church which Christ meant his church to exercise.

To equate the healing power of Jesus with the methods of modern psychotherapy, to my mind, is to try to equate two things which belong to different categories. To compare the power released in personality by the slow, doubtful methods of psychotherapy with the power released immediately by Christ, is like comparing the power of rust which gradually eats its way through an iron bar with the power of an oxyacetylene flame. After some hundreds of hours of painful, distressing, and expensive analysis, we find that John Jones does not limp quite so badly. But the early church could say, "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk!"

V

Nor is the lost power of the church to be regained by studying the sporadic cures of so-called healers. I do not despise them at all, save those who exploit the ignorant for financial gain. There are healers with a power not yet understood. Some of them, like Mrs. Salmon in Africa, call it the healing power of Christ. Others, like Mr. Harry Edwards, the English spiritualist, believe that it comes to them from the spirits of men long since dead. For myself, I believe it to be a scientific energy not yet fully understood, but gradually coming into the purview of modern science.

For example, I know a doctor in the West End of London from whose hands comes an unmistakable power. It is impressive to watch him at work, and, having watched him, I can only say that if another had described what I actually saw, I should have found it hard to believe him. When he allowed the power to flow from his hands, he produced an effect on my bare shoulders, without touching the skin, which can only be likened to a hot poultice. The glow remained with me all day. His hands have brought healing to many. He does not call it the power of Christ, though he is a devout Christian. Nor does he believe that spiritualism has any-

thing to do with it. He believes that some individuals are channels through which this strange power operates, which Mrs. Salmon, Mr. Edwards, and scores of others possess, and he is busy trying to understand its nature and to adapt it in scientific treatments. Into his theories I will not now enter, save to say that here again is a power which is impressive, but which is not, in my opinion, a clue the following of which will bring us to what Jesus meant when he charged the early church with the ministry of healing. For this power that I have described is either possessed or not possessed. One has it, or has it not. Yet Jesus rebuked his disciples for not being able to heal, and suggested that it was their own fault.

These are days when the whole subject of healing is ripe for reconsideration. In England, the Archbishop of Canterbury has recently appointed a commission to make investigation. Let small groups of people within the churches study the whole question in the light of modern psychology and other branches of science, but let those groups not forget the value of intercession for the sick person, a ministry which I am convinced has immense possibilities. There are laws of prayer to be discovered and used. And let these groups also see if by their unity in Christ, their love for one another and their care for the sick, they cannot recover, in this twentieth century, that power of the Spirit which has never been withdrawn. There is no reason why the healing miracles described in the Book of Acts should not be repeated in England and America today. Nothing has been withdrawn. Faith healers have not much to tell us, I think. Psychotherapists do not possess the secret. But small groups of loving, devout, praying people may rediscover, in our day, that energy which two thousand years ago could make the blind to see, the deaf to hear, the lame to run.

From Seward Hiltner

AFTER HE HAD JOURNEYED for many days, the young man arrived in the far country. By the time he had found the home of his friends, his abdomen was painning him severely. No sooner had the first pleasant greetings been exchanged than he felt constrained to ask where he could find a good physician and a good hospital. The friends admitted that there was a fine hospital in the next block, which had on its staff several excellent surgeons. But they added, "Nevertheless, do not go there; for the doctors' faith is not what it should be."

The young man was puzzled. "It is indeed a shame," he said, "if the doctors do not have the faith we would wish. But are they good doctors, and is it a good hospital?" His friends conceded that this was true. "The surgeon will do a good job on your appendix," they said, "but he will not talk with you about the faith, he will not pray with you nor for you, and he will not ask what you intend to do with the body he helps to heal."

"You disturb me very much," replied the young man, now grimacing with pain. "I shall think no less of the faith for the surgeon's not talking about it. I shall pray no less because the surgeon does not. I shall walk in no worse ways because the doctor fails to ask me where I am going. I have a sick appendix. I need a skilled surgeon in a modern hospital."

His friends tried again. "You do not understand," they said. "You almost persuade us you are not of the faith. For if your appendix is successfully removed by an unbeliever, will you not be tempted to conclude that it matters little whether one is a believer or not? Will not your gratitude betray your faith?" The young man replied, "I count you my friends. But your reasoning is nonsense. I am off to the hospital at once."

The appendicitis operation was eminently successful, and in a few days the young man returned to the house of his friends. For days and weeks they watched him suspiciously for signs that his faith had faltered. But eventually they relaxed when they saw it was as firm as ever.

Pleasant days drifted by. Then one evening the young man spoke seriously to his friends. That day, he reported, he had again had a pain in his abdomen, and had gone to the surgeon about it. This pain, the surgeon

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had told him, was not like the first. There was nothing surgery could do about it. What was needed, the surgeon said, was a psychotherapist. He had recommended what he described as a "very solid man" on Oak Street. What, asked the young man, did his friends think of this?

"This is shocking," they said. "Don't you realize that this psychotherapist, in trying to cure you, will take your faith from you?" The young man asked, "How can that be? Is it not like the surgeon? To be sure, I regretted that he did not have the faith. But he removed the diseased spot so that I could function again as a whole person. Is not this what the psychotherapist would do for me now?"

"No, no!" his friends asserted vehemently. "You simply do not understand. This man, who is not of the faith, will dredge into your sex life—and who knows but that his view is that anything goes at any time? He will find secret hostilities about which you never knew; and if he fails to find them, may even put them there. You may conclude by regarding your father and mother as vipers. And you will assuredly consider your faith as an irrelevance to be shuffled off. Instead, you will have 'adjustment.' In truth, psychotherapy is the work of the devil. Stay away."

Pensive, the young man said in a musing tone, "But you predicted something similar when I went to the surgeon. And you were wrong." His friends conceded that he had not suffered apparent harm there, but added, "This is different. There your person and your faith were exposed only indirectly. Here you put them directly and helplessly into the therapist's hands."

"It is true," admitted the young man, "that there is a real difference between a diseased appendix and a personality problem. But the function of the psychotherapist, like that of the surgeon, is to help me find the wholeness which these conditions have impaired. It is not his job to create it, nor to impose something on me. If my faith should have disappeared by the time I finished psychotherapy, that faith would surely have been of little account all along. If he is a good therapist, I would expect that my faith would emerge strengthened at its roots, but perhaps with some of the withered leaves helpfully removed."

His friends shook their heads in despair of changing him. "Clearly," they said, "there is no hope. You appear incorrigible. This man will take away your faith, and will so deceive you that you will hardly be aware that it has gone."

"You have been good friends," said the young man with sincerity. "If I cast aside your advice, I will not do so lightly. But before you

finish, please tell me this. If you see such dire results in connection with the psychotherapist on Oak Street, have you another in mind?"

"Well," replied his friends, not without hemming and hawing, "you could say that we do and we don't. We admit that there is no one so justly famed for his skill in extracting the psychological poisons of life as the man on Oak Street. But we know a psychotherapist on Arch Street who is a godly man of the faith. Should you be tempted to stray—into fornication, for example—he would restrain you as forcefully as might be necessary. Should you find hatred arising from your heart, he would have you pray until the hatred were purged from your consciousness. Should your faith waver in any degree, he would be at you like a hound of heaven until it were quickened."

"I see," said the young man sadly. "In their time, such things as you mention may be of great importance. But this is not their time. What I need is help in puncturing the psychic abscess within me, not someone who will puncture me and my spirit. Before my faith can help my pain, I must know more about that pain. To this end, I need the greatest skill that exists. Surely concealment of this poison will not serve my faith. Let me keep your friendship, I beseech you, but I am off to the therapist on Oak Street."

The difficulty proved less simple than the diseased appendix. Besides, there was no anesthetic to blot out the periods of psychic pain, despair, and helplessness. Nor could the psychotherapist do the cutting from the outside, as the surgeon had done. But the young man persevered. With the therapist's help, he helped himself. His faith emerged stronger than ever, and purged of elements which had previously kept it from entering into the depths of his life.

When he returned again to his friends, they said at once, "Depart from us. You are no longer of the faith." Incredulous, the young man pointed out how his faith had been strengthened and deepened. They replied, "Not only do we not believe what you say, but we know you have altogether lost any power of sincerity. We regret this, but we can have no more to do with you."

For many days the young man mused sadly. He had lost his friends. True, they had been wrong; but he could forgive them easily enough for that. But if the friendship had continued, he finally asked himself, what would have happened? Would he not have had to expend his energies trying to prove the reality of his faith—just because the ways in which it had been deepened for him were not the same as the ways in which it had

been realized by them? But if that were so, were they not idolatrous—limiting the power, the depth, and the variety of channels chosen by God's Holy Spirit for the redemption of all sorts and conditions of men? For the sake of his former friends, the young man was sad.

SOME IMPLICITLY CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

It is to be hoped that the little fable presented above succeeds in telling its own story. One point is so basic, however, that it may also be presented descriptively. This is that the whole parable would break down unless both the surgeon and the psychotherapist recognized and respected and depended on a healing and integrating power not of their own making; and as a consequence saw their function as obstetricians to this kind of new birth, rather than as sculptors to impose their own mold on a plastic substance.

This is not the same thing as saying that the psychotherapist, in the fable, merely let the young man's religion alone. We may assume that matters about the young man's faith emerged, in his work with the psychotherapist, as naturally as did anything else; and that the young man, with the therapist's help, was able to disentangle the faith itself from some of the warped interpretations which his personality problem had wrapped around the faith. We could say that the therapist respected the inner potential genuine selfhood of the young man. But in so putting it, we are also implying that he respected the Holy Spirit in the young man. Unless this were true, the parable would be pointless.

It is my contention that, in a very broad and general way, this is the direction in which good psychotherapy has been tending ever since the days of its founding by Freud; and that, in so far as it does so, we can trust it on Christian grounds. As the following section will indicate, this does not mean that we can have the luxury of a naïve and unqualified trust in all psychotherapies or all psychotherapists. But it does attempt to present a kind of master criterion according to which the implicitly Christian rootage of the best psychotherapy can be seen—even if the psychotherapist himself does not understand it in these terms.

It is often said that modern psychotherapy is a child of science. In two senses of the term "science," this is true. It is true, first, in the sense that it was the method of constructing hypotheses, trying them in action, then criticizing and reconstructing the hypotheses in the light of the observations. It is true, second, in the sense that the founders of modern psychotherapy identified themselves emotionally with the "scientific enterprise,"

then dominated by chemistry, physics, and biology. Because of the latter point, early psychotherapists tended to take over the general *philosophy* of those who were known as scientists, thus tending to become positivistic, anti-metaphysical, and so on—regardless of whether their own work, in therapy itself, tended to imply such conclusions or not.

But psychotherapy was never merely a child of science in the sense that it could be detached from what it observed, or that it could deal with "facts" as if "facts" were utterly divorced from "values." Freud said more than once that he was attempting, through psychoanalysis, to help the patient get things to come together at the same *level* of psychic life. As we might say, he was concerned not to eliminate the value conflicts of life, but to facilitate them by helping the real antagonists to meet—instead of having one shadowy figure hiding in the cellar (Freud's Id) and the other in the attic (the Super-Ego).

In one of his early case reports, Freud was about to describe a psychotherapeutic story which involved certain sexual elements. He said he had no doubt that he would be criticized for presenting such information. When, previously, he had not given such indelicate facts, he added, he had been criticized for being unscientific. Poor Freud got hit both ways. If he told what he saw, he was a public enemy; if he failed to tell it, he was unscientific!

Freud wanted to be scientific. But if this meant listening to his patient, at the patient's own rate of speed, in any order the patient wanted to follow, and so on—then Freud would do this, even if it made the matter much more complex than would have been the case if he had merely asked the patient to answer a series of questions prepared by the therapist. Any conception of science which was not relevant to the therapeutic situation could not in fact be scientific.

But science, when conceived in this way, is much more than a method of investigation. What made Freud concerned to help the individual patient? The value of the individual person as contained in the Jewish-Christian heritage of Western civilization. Why try to find general laws of psychic healing? Ultimately, so that more concrete individuals could be helped. Why be concerned with truth, even if it has to be sought through what appear to be unpleasant channels? Because one relies on the humanistic heritage of Western civilization which respects what really is—the nature of being. How does one justify a faith that it is better to have two values fight it out openly, than to keep them walled off from each other? Because, due to the humanistic and religious heritage, one believes the better

value is likely to win in open encounter. One believes in the power of goodness, the importance of truth, the worthfulness of the person because of his humanistic heritage, ultimately traceable to the Jewish-Christian tradition.

Freud's first therapeutic endeavors were through hypnotism—which is, after all, a moving in on someone from the outside. But when he turned to the “free association” method, he was taking his leads from the patient in a way which had never been done before. This made psychotherapy inherently a nonmechanical kind of enterprise. In principle, it broke away from any therapeutic method which would rely on imposition or manipulation.

To be sure, the early therapeutic methods of Freud contained what would now be regarded as mechanical elements. But if one pursues the history of psychotherapy during the past fifty years, he will be astonished at the general upward trend toward respect for the patient on the patient's own terms, and at the general decline in manipulative methods from the outside.

We may also be properly impressed by certain other things which have received increasing attention in psychotherapy, and which have rootage in the Christian tradition. In psychotherapy one talks about unpleasant things, or negative feelings, as rapidly as he feels inwardly prepared to do. Very much like a Christianity which considers the acknowledgment of sin to be a necessary prelude to salvation, so psychotherapy considers that accentuating a positive is of little value unless it has confronted and dealt with the negative.

One sometimes hears modern psychotherapy condemned on grounds which would apply equally to Christianity if the critics knew it—that it is introspective. Psychotherapy has found that the one road to freedom from the tyranny of being obsessively preoccupied with one's own welfare is to explore directly what one is defending or protecting through that obsession. In my recollection, Christianity has never urged that men merely forget their sins, or consider them simply external.

As Karen Horney puts it, psychotherapists often find that the last enemy to be fought in moving toward freedom and integrity of personality is the “idealized image” of one's selfhood. Even if one has acknowledged that the self that is needs alteration, he may still cling to an idealized picture of what ought to be in such fashion that the real self cannot be transformed. This smells a great deal like pride in Augustine's sense.

As an actual procedure, psychotherapy is no mere onward and upward

business. Increasingly, it has moved toward a position like the Christian on the relation between love and judgment. Therapy is full of judgment, not judgment imposed by therapist on client, but emerging as the client can recognize the judgment on himself. But he can do this only in a context of love; or, in more prosaic phrase, when in a relationship where understanding is assured him. Judgment can be accepted only in love. But if there is love, then judgment is redemptive.

What has been said above is that modern psychotherapy, in what seems to me its basic tendencies, would be an impossibility unless the Christian elements which have been illustrated, but not exhausted, were implicit in it. There is not the slightest intention of asserting that these elements are the whole of Christian faith or life. But if the fundamental rationale of modern psychotherapy—and far more than most therapists realize—has this kind of implicit rootage, then the very least which Christians can do is to welcome its potential positive contributions, however much they may want to criticize the therapeutic enterprise in its detailed manifestations.

Before proceeding to suggest some of the weaker points of modern psychotherapy, a footnote may be added on who the therapists are. Professionally, they are psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, clinical psychologists, social workers, pastors, and others—all who attempt at any level to deal in a healing manner with personality as such. At a certain level of therapy, we pastors have an important counseling function to perform. But we are not necessarily any better therapists than someone else, just because we happen to be ordained or to have had a theological education of a professional kind. I sometimes hear people speaking of a "Christian psychotherapy" as if one had to be a clergyman to utilize Christian principles in his therapeutic work. This seems to me a violation of the doctrine of the universal priesthood of believers.

CHRISTIAN CRITICISM OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

Having commended as implicitly Christian what seems to me the main line of development in modern psychotherapy, I must now acknowledge those aspects of the development which it seems important for Christianity to criticize—toward the aim of a better psychotherapy, not its elimination.

It must first be noted that the mechanists have not disappeared, even though I believe they are now a defensive minority. It was interesting to see the ranks of all reputable therapists close unanimously a couple of years ago against that combination of fantastic nonsense and shrewd manipu-

lation which L. Ron Hubbard put forth as a system of "dianetics." The ultra-mechanistic character of the Hubbard therapeutic principles suggested that even the therapists I would regard as mechanical put severe strictures upon their mechanistic principles; in other words, they pay a lot of attention to people as people.

Nor are we through with the impositionists. I have found that even theological students would be (initially) pleased if they could get hold of some sure-fire mechanical techniques whereby they could help everyone who came to them. I am not convinced that the cases described by Leslie Weatherhead, in this issue, for instance, are entirely free of traces of impositionism. And if we can say this of one of our best pastoral counselors, we can hardly expect it to be wholly untrue of some in professions other than the ministry. We should be alert against its subtle but devastating effects wherever it appears.

Another charge which is often heard against psychotherapists is that they foster dependency in their clients or patients, as if the therapeutic procedure were to be literally interminable. No doubt there is an occasional therapist who, in failing therapeutically to help his patient achieve the independence he would desire, follows his conscience in continuing "supportive therapy," which looks like mere dependency to the outside observer. On the other hand, many therapists take the position that an occasional check-up over a long period of time may be very valuable—like getting the wrecked car repaired, but also thereafter taking it to the shop for a once-over every ten thousand miles. What Protestantism rejected was a compulsory and externalistic confessional—not the check-up principle. I sometimes wish that we clergy were as faithful about going around to get our own check-ups as most psychiatrists are.

Then there is money. Persons who give their full time to psychotherapy are relatively few in number; and as public understanding of the therapeutic function has increased, they have a "sellers' market." The general impression is that they charge every nickel which the traffic will bear. This is a very complex question. On the one side, the income of even the best-known professional therapists is a good deal less than that of men in disciplines requiring comparable training, like surgery, for a very simple reason—that a therapist has to give every patient an hour every time. Much excellent free or low-payment service is also given in clinics and hospitals. Psychotherapy, as a rule, also takes more contacts within a given period of time than is true of most other healing relationships. In committing himself to free or nearly free service to a particular

patient, the surgeon may be committing only three or four hours of his time. A psychotherapist who made the same commitment might be giving fifty or a hundred. There is a real difference.

On the other side of this financial issue is the fact that many (though not all) who do psychotherapy full time have tended to identify themselves financially with the surgeon social class rather than with the social worker, educator, or minister group. Whether they are right or wrong in this, it tends to hit hard the person with small means who needs and wants psychotherapy but cannot pay for it if minimum rates are fifteen to twenty-five dollars an hour. If the same person needed an appendectomy, he would borrow the money, pay it back, complain briefly about surgeons, but shortly forget it. With psychotherapy, financial problems have a more personal and durable coloring. Some day I hope the full-time therapists will ask themselves the basic financial question: Is it essential that we belong to the upper classes?

Perhaps the most widely voiced criticism of psychotherapy, from church sources over the last half century, has been on moral grounds. It sounded like this, though sometimes it has been stated in more subtle form: Freud overemphasized sex, psychiatrists recommend adultery, psychologists advocate a life of impulse, they ignore social obligations. More than once I have run some of the specific charges to the ground and found them baseless. What is now becoming increasingly clear is that any honest psychotherapy is bound to be against a legalistic moralism. Since Protestantism also claims to be against this, one can hardly criticize the trend in terms of basic principle. In addition, there is a growing tendency of psychotherapists to become positively explicit about ethical principles.

The most serious criticism which I have of many psychotherapists is in what seems to me their neglect of the intrinsic intellectual aspects of their own discipline. Because of its very nature, being existential as well as scientific, psychotherapeutic work should beget a theory which has philosophical, and perhaps even theological, implications. To be adequately rooted within the whole fabric of human knowledge, it needs to explore a wider context than has usually been done. As it is, we are only now beginning to have work done on psychotherapeutic theory which is also well versed in the thinking of modern philosophy and the philosophical aspects of the sciences in general. Such work is just as important, and ultimately as valuable in a practical sense, as is detailed scientific investigation of limited areas.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to maintain that most of the basic roots of modern psychotherapy are implicitly Christian, although Christianity is of course vastly more than those elements represented in psychotherapy. A broad view of the development of psychotherapy since the turn of the century suggests the gradually more explicit recognition of the principles which link it with the Jewish-Christian tradition. In its own forthright dealing with the pathologies of the human soul, in its willingness to study not only the sins ("original" and "stereotyped") of the patient but those of the therapist as well, in its attempt to bring honesty and integrity to psychic life rather than concealment—at these and many other points it could hardly exist were there not a Christian influence in the civilization which gave rise to it.

But it is young, well-to-do if not rich, occasionally a little brashly adolescent. It still has more than a few vestigial spots of mechanism, imposition, manipulation, and a general "wonder worker" aura. It is not yet institutionally stable, and its public relations are often poor. The various professions that do counseling or psychotherapy are co-operating better than they used to, but there is a long way still to go.

We can, I believe, aid the understanding among the professional groups, and on the part of the public, by indicating the great extent to which the basic trends in psychotherapeutic development rest implicitly upon our religious tradition. Yet we do well to be cautious about minimizing the tensions between the two fields. There is the wife who knows her husband is loving her even when he says, in fashion characteristic of him, "Wonderful—unburned toast!" But there is also the other little woman who insists that her husband come right out and say those three little words, "I love you!" The incidence of real harmony in the latter situations is small.

From Albert C. Outler

THERE ARE TWO basic proposals in Dr. Weatherhead's article of great interest and importance. They are both long-time concerns of his and everywhere they are increasingly attracting the attention of thoughtful Christian pastors. The first proposal is that a working alliance between the psychotherapists and the pastors should be established as standard practice. The second is that the Christian church should recover her lost power of healing through intercessory prayer. In his distinguished ministry in London's City Temple, he has achieved striking results in implementing these proposals. And in his extensive writings he has interpreted his theories and techniques to a wide and growing audience.

I heartily agree with both proposals. They bespeak an authentic Christian concern for health and healing as an authentic part of the Gospel's care for the whole man. I must confess, however, to an uneasy feeling that, for me, the issues involved in the proposals are not quite as clear-cut or definitive as they seem to appear to Dr. Weatherhead. As for the problem of healing through intercession, no Christian can deny the reality and power of such prayer—but there are still many urgent and complex questions about *the human use* of "that energy which 2,000 years ago could make the blind to see, the deaf to hear and the lame to run." And as for the *rapprochement* between psychotherapists and pastors, there is the question of the *terms* of the alliance, which still are far from settled to the mutual understanding and satisfaction of both parties concerned.

My comments here, offered as a part of what I consider an ongoing conversation, will focus on the problems of a valid working alliance between the psychotherapists and the ministers. A truly common cause requires that both parties retain their right and proper integrity and that their co-operation mutually enrich their respective theories and practice. Can psychotherapy and Christian thought make such common cause? If they can, as I for one devoutly hope, what would be the terms?

I

The first thing to notice is that a large and growing number of Christian ministers have already entered the alliance and are avidly seeking the help of psychotherapy—both in its theories and in its methods. They be-

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lieve that it is a vital resource for their life and work, perhaps the most important contribution that the new "sciences of man" have to offer us. There are some, of course, who cry "Beware!", and there are some who would disdain such alien aid, but these are few compared to the voices raised in praise and commendation. Indeed, as one surveys the now enormous bibliography of books and articles on pastoral counseling, one gains the impression that there are some in the Christian camp for whom psychotherapy appears as a new panacea—a welcome substitute for the traditional offices of pastoral care.

The large majority of books on pastoral counseling are intent on applying the principles of good counseling without any special reference to theological questions which are involved.¹ Most of the books on counseling are naturally preoccupied with practical matters. Very few undertake the critical examination of the basis of collaboration between psychotherapeutic doctrine and Christian thought. By far the best of this latter sort is David E. Roberts' *Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man*.² It is a book which quietly undermines secularism as a valid frame of reference for psychotherapy and, at the same time, offers valuable guidance to both minister and psychotherapist—a remarkable achievement! At all these various levels of interest, it is evident that the Christian ministry, as a group, is eager for the alliance and quite ready to receive instruction and help from the doctors.

But the second thing to notice is that the psychotherapists, for their part, approach the question of alliance with something less than ardor. It is not merely that the psychotherapist finds it hard to see in the Christian pastor a full-fledged professional colleague; this is more or less understandable, and often justifiable. It is, rather, that the psychotherapists appear to believe that they can operate without the collaboration of the Christian pastor, at least as far as theory is concerned. One looks in vain in the standard books for any significant recognition of Christianity as a needful perspective for psychotherapeutic theory or practice.

The reasons for this are various. One of the main ones is that psycho-

¹ Cf. Seward Hiltner's excellent *Pastoral Counseling*, The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1949, pp. 31-32, where he affirms a theological view which undergirds his counseling. But he also maintains that what he calls "the objective-ethical view" of therapy, which he regards as most adequate, "can be held . . . with or without theological assumptions supporting it." It is important to be reminded that psychotherapy must be free to operate without theological guidance in its clinical procedure, just as other branches of medicine, science, and technology. But we ought as readily to remember that psychotherapy does—as surgery does not—bring the persons involved up to the vital border between knowledge and faith. Here—since the whole person is the subject—the therapists' convictions about the root meanings of existence, of life and death and destiny, shape the form and use of their knowledge.

² Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950.

therapy has won its present place among the healing arts through its faithful effort to rely upon the scientific method and to eschew the folklore which hindered the old psychiatry. It is not as yet a stable science, as its strife of systems serves to show. But insofar as it is a science, it must obey the canons of scientific method and the criteria of scientific truth. Just as there is no such thing as "Christian chemistry," there is no specific direction which Christian wisdom can give psychotherapy inside its own limits of empirical operation. Moreover, psychotherapists rightly deplore the eagerness of some ministers to dabble and tinker in a field which calls for rigorous training and for sensitive and skillful ways with people. In the third place, psychotherapists see a good deal of unwholesome and non-productive religion reflected in their patients, and are somewhat too readily led to treat all religious ideas and feelings merely as psychological material, with scarcely ever a look at the truth-claims which are involved.

But, after all this is said, it remains that the main reason for their indifference to a possible *rapprochement* with Christian faith is that modern psychotherapy, beyond its science and its art, is also *a wisdom about life*. As such, it has become, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, an *alternative* to the Christian wisdom about life.

There ought to be nothing surprising in the discovery that any science-art which deals with the intimate issues of human character touches the ultimate issues of destiny and that it does so with presuppositions drawn from faith, basic faith which shapes one's view of the world and of human existence. But it is important that the different kinds of faith which can shape our life views be understood by all who practice psychotherapy and all who seek its aid.

The fact is that the prevailing faith of modern psychotherapists, taken as a group, is *naturalism*, in one or another of its versions. The typical psychotherapeutic account of human existence rests on a doctrine of human autonomy, and insists on making man the measure of all values: man by himself, man for himself. Dr. Erich Fromm is a representative witness on this score because, in addition to his own professional distinction, he is more articulate than most of his colleagues in a firm and earnest advocacy of a humanistic *religion* as the best base for a productive psychotherapy. He sees clearly that men must have a vital faith and a structured ethic in order to have a productive life, and he has written three books thus far in which he expounds that ethic and that faith. It is the faith of religious humanism, and that of a very high order (indeed, in many of its aspects, it looks very much like an enlightened, modern interpretation of the central ethical core of the *Mishnah*—with God dismissed!).

Fromm is quite definite in his contention that Christianity is an *authoritarian* religion, and, as such, is inferior to humanistic religion.³ Where Fromm is explicit, the vast majority of his colleagues operate in the same general naturalistic frame without argument, as if it were all settled and fixed. From such a standpoint, psychotherapy's indifference to a really mutual alliance with Christian thought becomes understandable. It is generally willing to offer its clinical resources—within proper limits—to Christian pastors, as to all others who work with individuals. But it is thus far unwilling, as a general movement, to bring its own humanistic faith under the judgment of the Christian faith.

II

When basic faiths clash on important issues, what then? One way, grimly popular among Christian theologians, is to plunge into polemics. *Exsurge, Domine!* Another way, more appealing to sophisticated tastes, is to disdain the conflict, as if the other position were not really worth a thorough understanding and testing. But there are still other ways—some of them better. One is to mark out the areas of common practical interest between the parties and to ask what actual agreement has, in fact, already been achieved. Another is to broaden the argument to reach out toward the ultimate issues on which any serious faith rests for its security. The clash of faiths cannot be settled by coercion—neither crass nor subtle—but it may be by persuasion. At any rate, both sides may come to understand the issues involved, and this is always clear gain. Finally, an agenda for study might be agreed on which looks toward further learning on both sides, and this in itself would push the discussion up onto a new level.

Whatever the discrepancy in their basic faiths, the psychotherapists and the pastors have much in common in respect of their practical interests and undertakings. They both begin with a frank recognition of *the human quandary*. Both would accept the dictum of Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan that "for the great majority of people . . . the stresses of life distort them to inferior caricatures of what they might have been."⁴ And both agree that this human quandary is not merely to be deplored or denounced, but faced, understood, and transformed. Over against this predicament in which man finds himself, however it may be explained, both psychotherapy and Christian faith see *the human possibility*, as a radical improvement, or even a conversion, toward a new level of life, the realization of man's true

³ *Psychoanalysis and Religion*. Yale University Press, 1950. pp. 35-55.

⁴ *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*. William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Washington, D. C., 1947. p. 27.

potential nature. The means and powers by which this true potential may be achieved are quite variously interpreted. But the immediate practical concerns of both therapist and pastoral counselor ought to rest back on these initial agreements as to human need and therapeutic opportunity.

Another level of common understanding in therapy and counseling is the increasing recognition of the extraordinary range of so-called "psychosomatic illness" among the troubles of mankind. Weatherhead and Alexander, to take a single example, are far apart in their basic faiths but in their accounts of the ways in which *psyche* affects *soma* their differences are mainly methodological.⁵ There are few human ailments left in which the health and virtue of the *psyche* is not as definitely involved as the chemical and physiological equilibria of the *soma*. This means, of course, that medical treatment must attend to the whole man. But where it does, it must perforce pass beyond the guarded borders of phenomenological analysis. For psychosomatic illness is a symptom of spiritual malaise, and its cure requires a theory of what constitutes spiritual health, as well as what makes for physical well-being. Such an inquiry cannot be launched without some prior commitments of mind and heart about the nature of mind and heart, and about the real context of man's existence. One must therefore *begin* with faith of one kind or another about man's right relation to God, or whatever else is taken to be truly ultimate.

A third area of increasing common interest to psychotherapy and Christian thought alike is the decisive role of *interpersonal relations* in the growth and misgrowth of selfhood and human maturity. Freud's epoch-making work stressed the biological vectors in man's behavior and his discontents. But, increasingly of late, even those who proudly call Freud master have moved beyond him toward a stronger and more constructive emphasis upon the social and societal factors in the making and unmaking of personality. This development has led, as Fromm has seen more clearly than most, to an increasing recognition of the ethical quality of the relations between persons, as providing a clue to the etiology of neurosis and as pointing the way to productive living. Most important of all, these cultural analysts are unanimous in their praise of love as the indispensable solvent and bond of society. Indeed, Harry Stack Sullivan's conception of love is surprisingly Christian in all save its name and reference. Interpersonal relations entail ethical issues and decisions which are themselves affected by our basic faith. And this brings us, again, beyond the boundary

⁵ Cf. Franz Alexander, *Psychosomatic Medicine*. W. W. Norton & Company, 1950, chapters VI-VIII, and Weatherhead, *Psychology, Religion and Healing*, 1952, pp. 318-99, especially pp. 376-99.

of strict objectivity, for ethics must always rest upon a world view and a world view always rises out of faith.

The Christian has very much to learn from psychotherapy in each of these areas of common interest. The psychotherapeutic accounts of how interpersonal relations get fouled up and how they may be unsnarled, the emphatic rejection of moralism as psychologically unwholesome, the consistent emphasis upon honesty, respect, and freedom as the crucial qualities of a permissive situation, the realistic view of man as a psychosomatic unity, and the devotion to human health and well-being—all these are significant enrichments or reinforcements of the Christian pastoral concern. It may be that the Christian will see many refractions here of the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition—and will rejoice at these signs that God's witnesses are more numerous than they themselves know.

III

But there are still many common questions between the psychotherapist and the Christian pastor, and these have to be answered quite differently, in the present state of our knowledge and understanding. Both psychosomatic theory and Christian theology are in dynamic flux and no impasse need be regarded as final. But if these two ways of seeing human life are to be joined in common enterprise, we must see how they work out in experience and critical thought. It may be useful, therefore, to list five basic issues which lie deep beneath the surface of all counseling situations and which, at the same time, affect the spirit and outcome of therapy, since they are concerned with the nature of the man to whom health is a value and a prize. A careful review of these issues might illuminate our problem of alliance between doctors and clergy from many new angles and might point out next steps in the progress of the discussion beyond the present uneasy interim. There is here neither time nor space for such a full review, but five main issues may be listed as a sort of programme for further analysis and comment by any who may be interested. They are:

1. The handling of guilt: the meaning of estrangement and reconciliation.
2. The estimate of freedom and power in the maturation of the human self and society. The problem of conditioned behavior and moral responsibility.
3. Self-denial and self-acceptance as basic modes of man's self-estimate and his relation to God.

4. The significance of *love* in the process of therapy and personal relations generally.

5. The basic reliance of therapy: the source of the *vis medicatrix*.

That these issues all are basic is clear from the fact that any case dealt with by any form of counseling or therapy involves some reference to these questions and requires some assumptions as to what the "right answers" may be. Moreover, these assumptions that must be made apply not only to the person under treatment, but to the doctor as well. And yet for the testing of assumptions of this order we must again appeal to our convictions which spring from our wisdom about life, itself rooted in our basic faith.

Both psychotherapy and Christian faith have much to say on each of these issues and the discussion reflects the basic divergence of their world views and the related doctrines of man. By and large, psychotherapy tends to interpret guilt and estrangement primarily in terms of *social* disapproval. Guilt is the fear of the threat of rejection, or loss of support, from persons or powers on whom one depends for real or fancied approbation. The handling of guilt, therefore, calls for a reappraisal of a person's relation to the judgment of society as this is mediated and accepted by his "super-ego" or "conscience" or "self-system." A successful analysis of these social factors often suffices to bring the guilt-ridden person victory over irrational censorship and self-disparagement. Guilt feelings are crippling and it is important to reduce them, not by a rejection of all moral standards but by a discrimination between rational and arbitrary moral values and the development of an honest and friendly self-estimate and self-concern.⁶ As guilt is alleviated a person can take a more relaxed and amiable view of himself and develop a more constructive program in respect of his remaining problems.

If Christian theologians had understood this general approach to guilt feelings, they would have been better able to distinguish between the *remorse* which often passes for repentance, but which does not issue in real forgiveness and reconciliation, and the *contrition* which does. It is often a puzzle to earnest Christians that a man may twist and turn in a veritable torment of self-reproach—and still find no peace or else gain a false one. What is worse, misguided Christians have been too often known to heap reproach on top of of disparagement and to measure the sincerity of

⁶ Cf. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, Rinehart & Co., 1947, pp. 141-72; F. Alexander, *Our Age of Unreason*, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1951, pp. 149-51. For a different analysis, in a Christian perspective, see L. J. Sherrill, *Guilt and Redemption*, John Knox Press, 1945, chapters III, IV. See also Weatherhead, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-47.

repentance by the violence of its self-rejection. This strikes the psychotherapist with horror, and he is inclined to conclude that Christian talk about forgiveness and "justification" refers to reaction-formations which produce a repressive reduction of guilt rather than a constructive release.

But the Christian knows of an ethical dimension beyond remorse and beyond fear of social disapproval. Man's essential estrangement is from God and his real guilt is before him. The reduction of guilt, then, must involve a new relation to God—an effective knowledge of God's love and acceptance of the sinner, guilt and all. This inner sense of God's acceptance cannot be effected by a conscious act of self-rejection. Christian repentance is neither an easy apology nor a morbid self-denunciation. It is the acknowledgment of the reality of God, the relevance of his claim upon our lives, and our honest dismay at knowing the real truth about ourselves. It is also the awareness of the honesty and love by which God has shaped his judgment of us. Above all, it is the acceptance of God's judgment as the truth about ourselves, to be offered back to God for his redemptive love to work on. Reconciliation is not the stifling of freedom—it is new life in a larger room, in an atmosphere now suffused by an unsentimental love, which God has disclosed and made uniquely effective in Jesus Christ.

But language like this is almost certain to be "psychologized" by the psychotherapist and left at that! The casual expression of a faith in God as real, and other than the sum or entelechy of natural processes; the ready use of the symbols of interpersonal relations as the best analogy for our understanding of God's dealings with his children; the insistence on man's freedom as a function of his right relation to God; the interpretation of forgiveness as the human appropriation of God's redeeming love—all these are incredible as truth-claims because they contradict the root premises of naturalism and the faith which it generates about human values and human destiny. An honest alliance between the psychotherapist who knows the harm of self-castigation and the Christian pastor who knows the need of man's reconciliation to God, would have to seek the common ground of both accounts of guilt and their point of meeting in God's grace.

IV

We can indicate in only the briefest way the main aspects of the other issues we have listed. Freedom is a basic issue—perhaps more complicated than any other. Christians have had their share of misconceptions about it. They have had their theories about good will and bad will, but have rarely understood concretely what the psychotherapist sees as the blocked or

fettered will of the neurotic. The psychotherapists, on the other hand, even when they have argued for determinism, have worked with neurotics in terms of the disabilities which have been fashioned by misguided choice, and they know better than any others that patterns of wrong willing cannot be changed directly by conscious effort and resolution. But the liberation of the blocked or fettered freedom which is accomplished by successful psychotherapy is not the same as the restoration of a good will toward God. The deeper conflict lies in the notion of what man's true freedom is.

For the Christian, man's freedom is the finite power of God's creature, the power to *participate* in God's creative and redemptive action. Hence, his true liberty lies in his service of God's will and his active love of neighbor. Fromm has put the case for humanism sharply and well in *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, where he argues, in sum, that Christianity stultifies the only kind of freedom that is psychologically healthful for man because it involves a conditioned freedom, a freedom conditioned by man's obedience to God.⁷ Is this charge true or false—and by what criteria of truth and falsehood could it be judged? I believe the charge to be false and grounded in a superficial conception of the meaning of freedom and the relation between finite and infinite. But, in any case, to collaborate even on the practical problems of *unfreedom*, psychotherapist and theologian will have to agree to plumb the question of freedom much further than has yet been done.

Psychotherapy has taught us much about the need and propriety of *self-acceptance* as a precondition for right relations with others and the world. All the schools and theories have agreed that health must be grounded in self-knowledge and in the courage to be and to assert one's self. Against this stands the Christian ethic of *self-denial*, which is so essential in the Christian tradition that it cannot be abandoned without changing the whole character of the Christian wisdom. It has often been supposed, on both sides, that self-acceptance, in the psychological sense, and self-denial, in the Christian sense, are simply disjunctive—and many Christians have been embarrassed by the necessity of a choice between them.

I believe it would be possible to show that there is a conflict here which is irreducible in the terms of naturalism, but which is fruitfully intelligible in the light of the Christian faith in God and the finite creature. If I assert by implication that my self is infinite ("ye shall be as gods") I fall into sin. To deny that my self is infinite is the decisive step toward an acceptance of my self as finite creature of God, and therefore to my acceptance of God's acceptance of me. My accepting this is faith. Could not

⁷ Chapter III.

some such notion as this be fitted into the presuppositions of a psychotherapy which is not inveterately naturalistic?

It has seemed to me that the time is fully ripe for the psychotherapist and the Christian theologian to undertake a synthesis of their respective concepts of the reality and power of *love* as the life-blood of both healing and redemption.⁸ There have been many scandalized protests against Ferenczi's dictum that "it is the love of the analyst that cures the patient"⁹ but it still remains as an inescapable part of the truth about the mystery of cure and healing. We have already spoken of the primacy of love in Sullivan's therapeutic doctrine and it would be easy to add illustrations from almost every quarter of the field. We Christians, for our part, ought to be embarrassed in this area because some of us have hopelessly sentimentalized the concept of *agape* and some of us have hopelessly theologized it. Still, the biblical teaching about God's love and man's remains to reprove and instruct both theologian and psychotherapist in their further explorations in what they both agree is the heart of the matter. But the Christians would have to insist that it is *God's* love which generates and sustains man's love—and here the issue of basic faith pops up yet again.

Perhaps the simplest way to focus the difference between psychotherapy and Christian thought in their respective concerns for health is to ask the question, Whence comes health? The psychotherapists are inclined to answer: *vis medicatrix naturae*. The Christian is convinced that it is *vis medicatrix Dei*. It is important for both to recognize the residual power of health in men, however ill, and to rely upon *that* power as the mainspring for any healing. Both find that no person, however ill, is really the "patient"; he is the *actor*, whose activity and inner resources contain the dynamic possibility of his cure. But which is the true origin of this power?

The Christian would be wrong to claim that the healing energy of God works through other than natural means; this is to flirt with pious superstition. But the psychotherapist is quite as wrong to claim the self-sufficiency of nature and its processes. Nature is God's handiwork and man is God's child, created in the image and similitude of his Creator. The psychotherapist may be ever so rigorous in his demand that the Christian thinker pay more attention to man's fit and misfit in the realm of nature. But he needs, in his turn, to acknowledge man's origin and destiny in the creative, redeeming, and consummating power and love of God.

⁸ A very significant beginning from a composite view of therapy and theology is Paul E. Johnson's *Christian Love* (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951). See also the significant section in Weatherhead, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-61.

⁹ Cf. the celebration of this viewpoint in I. D. Suttie's *The Origins of Love and Hate*. London: Kegan Paul, 1935.

V

We have outlined a formidable budget of difficulties which are involved in the proposal that the doctors and the clergy collaborate in the Christian concern for human health. Some will say that they are unreal or irrelevant, since they are theological matters which are notoriously non-empirical and subjective (an interesting prejudice, itself in need of analysis). Others will claim that Christian faith is self-evidently superior to any other—if our faith were strong enough we might dispense with secular psychiatry and also decline the debate with unfaith. But at least a few may agree that psychotherapy needs the Christian wisdom as its perspective and that the Christian concern for health needs the technical aid of psychotherapy.

If the two have common interests and are in need of each other for their full effectiveness, then there must surely be a way further forward toward an honest *rapprochement*.¹⁰ Christian thought must set itself to the discipline of understanding psychotherapeutic doctrine and Christian theologians to profit from psychotherapeutic diagnosis and analysis of the human quandary. At the same time, the Christian church has a great contemporary mission to the doctors! Dr. Weatherhead deplores the fact that the Christian clergy have declined our Lord's commission to "heal" as well as "preach." One may eagerly agree that "the whole subject of healing is ripe for reconsideration" and that the office of intercession for the sick should be restored. But we ought not to forget that one reason why the church "relegated" the healing arts to the "doctors" was her belief that the doctors could also be Christian healers and could practice their knowledge in the light of their Christian wisdom.

It is a tragic failure of Christianity, in this respect, that the modern psychotherapists have not been more fully challenged and mastered by the love and wisdom of Christ. There is, of course, no such thing as "Christian medicine," but there *are* Christian doctors, who are as truly commissioned to heal in the name of Christ as the clergy are to preach. Let the church then set her mind and heart to win back the lost province of healing as a Christian vocation, converting the doctors and seeking out talented young men and nurturing them in Christian faith and understanding, even as they are being trained with the utmost scientific rigor. One of the first evangelists was a good physician. We could do with a host of them today.

¹⁰ Cf. the brief but illuminating discussion of this in Weatherhead, *op. cit.*, pp. 469-81.

Christian Faith and Existential Freedom

CARL MICHALSON

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT about the nature and destiny of man owes more to the word "freedom" than to any other word. Yet no word from the lips of philosophers and theologians is more productive of what the Frenchman, Parain, has called "the giddy sensation of the inexactitude of speech." Theology's ambiguous exposition of freedom can largely be attributed to the ill-fitting instruments of definition it has had at hand. Now, theologians have generally turned to philosophy for the tools of definition. The liability in this alliance has been that philosophy designs its words to fit its own concerns. Because philosophy's concerns have not always been theology's concerns, its definitions have not always been theologically ample. It is an intellectual event of major importance that theology is now turning for its definition of freedom to existentialism, for there philosophical and theological concerns have come together in a way unprecedented in Western thought.

In the Greek tradition, for instance, philosophy defined man's problem as deliverance from the realm of necessity called nature. Plato outlined a solution in a philosophy which built a case for man's independence from nature and called this independence freedom. This freedom was achieved by man's rational affiliation with an abstract realm of essences which were themselves beyond and independent of nature. Only the human body was considered a victim of nature's necessity. The human reason, transcendent of the body, was free from nature.

The reason, however, was not in itself free. To be rational was instinctively to know the essences—the true and the good. Nor was the will free, for it was the necessity of the will automatically to do what the reason knew. That is why in the realm of morals "to prefer evil to good is not in human nature" (*Protagoras* 758 C). Man does no evil voluntarily. Sin stems from an ignorance for which one is not culpable. The body, a foreign agent, subverts the reason. Knowledge is virtue (*Gorgias* 468, *Timaeus* 86, *Law* V, 731). Greek philosophy, while it understood that

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man was free from "doing what comes naturally," nevertheless delivered human nature into another kind of necessity, the necessity for doing what comes rationally. Escape from the causes of nature was achieved by subjection to the necessitarian logic of essences.

To be just to the lively sense of freedom in experience, the Greeks devised a concept of "free choice." In the last analysis, however, "free choice" meant simply the sense for alternative ways of doing what it is finally necessary to do. Free choice, the prisoner of reason, "mimics freedom by pacing round and round in his cell" (Helmut Kuhn).

In the German tradition man's problem was not so much the problem of escape from nature as it was the problem of justifying moral responsibility. Motivated by this shift in the problem, Immanuel Kant took it upon himself to by-pass the thousand-year-old philosophical anachronism which defined freedom as rational determinism. The *will* is free, Kant said. It is possible for a man to say either "yes" or "no" to what he knows to be the good, the right, and the true, for reason is shot through with will. Descartes had hinted at this. When man acted in his ignorance, Descartes did not blame the body, as Plato did, for disfiguring the reason; he blamed the will for acting in the absence of a clear idea. This was the only basis on which it seemed possible, according to Kant, to keep morality alive. Unless one is free to choose either good or evil, he is not responsible, and no merit or guilt attaches to his choice. Freedom makes man accountable and makes either merit or guilt imputable.

Further to enhance this responsible moral freedom, Kant transplanted the heaven of ethical ideals, with its hierarchical dominion over man, into the human reason. Man, then, could be his own law-giver. Thus in the eighteenth century autonomy became a synonym of freedom. Autonomy did not mean antinomianism or anarchy, for the law within is as universal and irrevocable as if it were the law above. Autonomy simply avoided the causal and necessitarian implications in an alliance with either nature or a realm of essences. The law is not the cause, of which moral living is the inescapable effect. It is possible for man to obey or disobey it. One ought to note, however, that the law of good, before which the will decides, is as rational for Kant as it is for Plato. The good is the rational. To that extent Plato survives in Kant. The major difference is that for Kant the will, though *obliged* by the rational, is not *compelled* by it. Freedom of the will, a voluntaristic indeterminism, thereby supplanted philosophy's long-standing definition of freedom as rational determinism.

The Kantian philosophy of freedom is the confluence of two intellectual

streams. Greek philosophy's concern for the superiority of the rational over the natural merges with medieval Europe's Latin-Germanic concern for moral responsibility. The Christian freedomists, whose major theological concerns were merit and guilt—Pelagius, Thomas Aquinas, Erasmus, and the seventeenth-century Jesuits—are in Kant's philosophical family tree as truly as are Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, whose philosophical concern was the rational. The twin requirements of the Kantian moral philosophy were rational insight into moral truth and the deliberate decision of the will. These were the very materials in the making in Western thought since the birth of the Christian movement.

There is another intellectual stream, however, which is represented by Augustine, the voluntarists of the fourteenth century, the Reformers, and the Jansenists. No matter how dependent this stream may have been upon Greco-Roman thinking, when it came to problems involving freedom it found this line too slack to hold the Christian faith. How talk of rational insight into human destiny when the Sovereign of history is the hidden God who reveals himself at will? How talk of moral responsibility in a man whose entire life is under the fate of sin and whose Christian hope is a destiny that lies beyond history, a destiny whose operation is so free that it is unconditioned by the acts of man? The predestinarian categories of the Augustinian tradition clash with both the rationalistic and the moralistic categories of the Greek and Roman traditions. The fact that contemporary theology is built upon this uneven tripod of traditions surely helps to account for "the giddy sensation" in the contemporary use of the word "freedom."

I

Meanwhile, a species of philosophy has developed that is rapidly breaking up these unsteady historical alternatives and retooling the instruments for defining freedom. It is a cluster of vitalisms, pragmatisms, and existentialisms. Despite important differences among these new philosophies, they agree on two points: first, that "existence precedes essence"; and second, that this precedence is the rudiment of freedom. Living is given priority over thinking; the whole of one's life, which is existence, is given priority over that partial function of life which is reason. Rational reflection is a delayed reaction to the perpetual forward motion of one's entire life. "Existence precedes essence," and that is basic freedom. As Sartre has said, "The essence of the human being is in suspense in his freedom."¹

¹ Sartre, J.-P., *L'être et le néant*, Paris, 1948, p. 61.

A list of the recent pioneers in the concept of freedom would include Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky; Marx, Freud, and Dewey; Bergson and (in a limited way) Whitehead; and a growing list of contemporary existentialists—the so-called atheistic Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, and Simone de Beauvoir; the theistic Jaspers; and the very theological existentialists—Jewish Buber, Roman Catholic Marcel, and Orthodox Berdyaev. All of these philosophers seem agreed at the two points which place them beyond Plato and Kant, beyond rationalism and moralism.

In the first place, these recent philosophers do not fear, as the Greeks did, that nature will thwart freedom. An almost biblical anthropology animates their thought. The human body is believed to be organic with the total self rather than hostile toward it. Moreover, a kind of biological evolutionism is affirmed which sees in nature a continuous process of agile adaptation more suggestive of freedom than of necessity.

The real enemy of freedom, it is believed, is not nature but reason. Reason is an excellent instrument for insight into past necessities, but it falters in what John Dewey calls "foresight into possibility" or what Whitehead calls "advance into novelty." "Transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary for dealing with the unforeseen, for progress, for excitement."² When "existence precedes essence" a new kind of history comes into being in which "the past loses its unique precedence" (Heidegger),³ and future possibilities overshadow accomplished facts.

Reason, moreover, is an indispensable agent in the analysis of life, but it is the misfortune of reason that when it analyzes it must "stop and think" and thereby miss the many-splendored moving scene. Cocteau once complained in a letter to Maritain that he was so busy writing *The Parade* he never got to see one. Van Gogh deplored having to kill the butterfly he wished to paint. One cannot sketch life from death. But it is inseparable from the operations of the reason, so these vitalists believe, to take "a snapshot of the mobility of the inner life" (Bergson). "The letter killeth," and the reason deals in letters. How, then, shall reason live with the spirited mobilities of art, of love, of religion? "We are free," said Bergson, "when our acts spring from the whole personality."⁴

In the second place, these contemporary philosophers are not, as Kant was, enamored of moral responsibility. That is, they have no taste for what Romano-Germanic culture calls responsibility, accountability, and the im-

² Whitehead, A. N., *Modes of Thought*. The Macmillan Company, 1938, p. 108.

³ Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit*. Halle, Germany, 1927, p. 391.

⁴ Bergson, H., *Time and Free Will*, tr. F. L. Pogson. Allen & Unwin, 1910, p. 172.

putability of moral guilt. Irresponsibility in the newer sense is not a moral or a legal notion, it is a personal notion. It does not denote a fault to be imputed; it is a default of responsibility. One ought not ask, therefore, "Was his act conscious and deliberate?" One ought to ask, "Was his act *whole*?" Wholeness is an attribute neither of consciousness nor of rational deliberation, but of the hidden unity and destiny of the personality. Irresponsibility, then, is a sickness and responsibility is its opposite: personal wholeness and health and responsiveness to one's vocation.

For a fact, the sickness of the personality is often incurred by its very conscious and deliberate effort to conform to the rational and the moral. Nietzsche and Freud contribute stunning evidence of this. The bad conscience, they say, is a disease the personality contracts. It is a "reaction-formation" (Freud) that follows when its instinct for freedom is "forced back, trodden back, imprisoned within itself and finally only able to find vent and relief within itself" (Nietzsche). The bad conscience is the sense of oppressiveness in a life whose proper vitality is stifled by codes that have no necessary relation to the emerging needs of the human spirit but which, for the proprieties and emotional loyalties that surround them, compel the spirit to hypocritical submission. "The soul whose will is cloven in two within itself" says to itself, "I am sick of myself!" "The *sick*, then are the great danger of man," said Nietzsche, "*not* the evil."

Whatever freedom is, then, it is believed there are aspirations associated with man's freedom toward which the reason is unsympathetic. The intellect, as Karl Heim once said, is "an archive director." But man is a history-making, not simply a history-recording animal. Life and desire and the quest for authenticity, better known to religious tradition as faith or salvation—these supersede the restrictions of mere correctness.

You see, gentlemen, reason is an excellent thing, there's no disputing that, but reason is nothing but reason, and satisfies only the rational side of man's nature, while will is a manifestation of the whole life, that is, of the whole human life including reason and all the impulses. . . . Reason only knows what it has succeeded in learning . . . and human nature acts as a whole, with everything that is in it, consciously or unconsciously, and even if it goes wrong, it lives.

So Dostoevsky writes in his *Notes From the Underground*.⁶ Ordinarily one's choices will conform to what commends itself to consciousness as rational. But there is a point at which one may even will to be stupid, "in order," as Dostoevsky says, "not to be bound by an obligation to desire only what is sensible."

⁶ Dostoevsky, F., *Short Novels*, Dial Press, 1945, p. 147.

This Russian wildness is reminiscent of Tertullian's *credo quia absurdum*. The famous phrase is apocryphal, but Tertullian has said what amounts to the same. *Certum est, quia impossibile est.*⁶ These words are generally translated to read, "The fact is certain because it is impossible." Actually, *certum* means just the opposite of certain. In Roman law—and Tertullian was a lawyer in the Roman tradition—*certum* means "resolved." It pertains not to a certainty but to the kind of action one must take in the absence of certainty. *Certum* is a rhetorical parallel for *credible* in this very passage. When one does not know "for certain" and the issue is crucial, one must resolve. The faithful man is not the rational man but the resolute man, and resolution takes place in freedom. That which is impossible to reason is possible to freedom.

What, then, shall one say of moral responsibility, should one decide to enter into an affiliation in the absence of rational certainty and transparency? Descartes and Kant would answer, "Immoral, the antithesis of freedom." Tertullian gave an answer in his *Prescription against Heretics*: "There is impunity in erring if there is no delinquency." Tertullian knew what the skeptics of the Middle Academy at Athens knew: significant action ought not to wait upon rational clarity, if in fact the things that matter most cannot be rationally penetrated. The so-called modern Tertullian, Kierkegaard, speaks similarly.

If only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true. . . . The truth is precisely a venture which chooses an objective uncertainty. . . . If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe.⁷

Moral responsibility which presupposes the consciousness of clear and distinct ideas is utterly appropriate to matters involving the true and the false, the good and the evil, the right and the wrong. How does it fare, however, where one's whole life is involved, his loves and hates, his loyalties and lies, his humility and his pride, his life and his death? When one's whole existence is at stake, "there is impunity in erring if there is no delinquency." In the spirited resoluteness of freedom there is a talent that ranges beyond the level of conscious and deliberate choice. "The free act is," as Sartre says, "absurd, beyond all reason."⁸ "Existence precedes essence" as resolution precedes reflection and love precedes calculation.

⁶ *On the Flesh of Christ*, 5.

⁷ Kierkegaard, S., *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, tr. David F. Swenson, Walter Lowrie. Princeton, 1944, pp. 178 and 182.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 559.

II

What is this "freedom" which these recent philosophies set up against previous philosophical definitions? Five elements in the existential view can be singled out.

1. Freedom IS the human existence. Man is not a "something" with the attribute of freedom. Man *is* his freedom. There is no attribute or function of man that can be equated with man's very being. It may be said that man thinks, wills, and feels; but it ought not to be said that man IS thought, will, or feeling. As Jaspers has stated it, "In the resolve I experience the freedom in which I decide not merely about something but about myself. . . . *I myself am the freedom of this choice.* Pure choice appears only as a choice between objectivities; but freedom is as the choice of myself."⁹ Or, as Kierkegaard has said, when one does not choose, one withers away in consumption.

2. But, according to existentialism, freedom is nothing. One experiences a "vast and pointless sense of freedom" (Sartre) when contemplating the world about him. Pascal knew the sensation when he contemplated the infinity and absurdity of the universe which seventeenth-century science had uncovered. The seventeenth-century preacher John Donne knew it when he exclaimed of the universe, "'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone." Wordsworth knew it when he referred to this same universe as a nothing in which one is "forlorn" but for some creed. In the words of Pascal,¹⁰

When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened, and am astonished at being here rather than there; for there is no reason why here rather than there, why now rather than then.

Sartre described the sensation in his first novel, *Nausea*. A young man sitting on a park bench contemplates the root of a tree. It blurs, fades, and otherwise illustrates evanescence, and the young man becomes sick. The clue to his sickness is his discovery that existence is radically contingent, that is, that there is no reason for existence. There is nothing *in* existence that explains it. A fundamental difference between the ancient and the modern views of the world is thereby marked. The ancient was alternately annoyed by cosmic necessity and edified by cosmic orderliness. The modern is sickened by cosmic contingency. The more comforting cosmology of

⁹ Jaspers, K., *Philosophie*. Berlin, 1932, Volume II, p. 182.

¹⁰ Pascal, B., *Pensées*, No. 205.

antiquity is thus replaced in modern times by an intense life-feeling which Wilhelm Dilthey has characterized as a "feeling incapable of being solved by demonstration," an "insoluble metaphysical void at the bottom of every consciousness."¹¹ This void, this nothing is man's freedom. As Sartre puts it in his novel, *The Reprieve*, "Inside, nothing, not even a puff of smoke, there is no inside, there is nothing. Myself: nothing. I am free, he said to himself, and his mouth was dry."

3. Yet, it is believed that freedom is possibility. The "nothing" of freedom is a "lack" (Sartre), but a "lack" is a possibility. To classical philosophy, "possible" meant "noncontradictory." To contemporary existentialism "possible" means a lack to be filled. "Nothing" is a possibility in existence, which accounts for the striving, desiring, and seeking by which human life is constantly attempting to fulfill itself. The complement of the sickening sensation of being tied to nothing, of swimming over 70,000 fathoms (Kierkegaard), is the fascinating possibility of going somewhere and being something. Freedom is "a vibrating needle" (Buber), a "viscosity" (Sartre), an urge toward unforeseen possibilities, an indefinable sense of being "for the sake of" something (Heidegger).

4. Hence, freedom is a burden. Man feels "condemned forever to be free" (Sartre). As freedom, the human existence is the one point in all reality where being is most apt to fail. Man can choose himself as nothing or as in relation to some possibility beyond himself. He can reach beyond himself to some relationship which may confer a meaning that is not intrinsic to his existence. "Freedom is not an indifferent will but the possibility of being free for something."¹²

The risk of freedom, however, is that it is possible for one to relate himself to that which itself participates in the nothingness, contingency, and absurdity of existence. Religion calls this idolatry, and philosophy calls it nihilism. Neither atheistic nor theistic existentialism knows of an ultimately secure relationship, though both know that man is haunted by a desire for a fulfillment he is never able to achieve. Atheistic existentialism sometimes leaves the possibility open and remains wistful (as in Heidegger), sometimes rejects the possibility and becomes Stoical (as in Sartre). That one must make this choice is the burden of one's freedom. That he must do it without the certain knowledge that there is any actual basis for his choice makes the burden poignant.

¹¹ Dilthey, W., *Gesammelte Schriften*. Leipzig, 1914, Volume I, "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften," p. 364.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

But such a choice is equally burdensome to the theistic existentialist, for when he chooses a relation to the transcendent, noncontingent reality he calls God, he chooses what he does not know but simply believes or hopes. This is his freedom. As Jaspers says, "I am free because I do not know," or as Marcel says, freedom is to "decide . . . without any appeal."

5. Freedom is, then, a terrifying burden, a burden of a desperately serious lack, a burden so terrifying it has become the source of an endemic human sickness recognized in life today as *anxiety*. As freedom, man may choose either to be what he is or to affiliate with sources of authenticity beyond himself. This freedom is not simply the ability to choose but the inability not to choose (Simone de Beauvoir). The choice is between contingency and loyalty, between a dying independence and a living dependence, between hopelessness without obligation and hope with obligation. One desires existence on his own terms but fears that if he "bows down to nothing he cannot bear the burden of himself" (Dostoevsky). One fears to pledge himself, yet desires the authenticity which right relationship confers. The collision of fear and desire is the friction in freedom which we know to be anxiety, the rubbing together of nothingness and possibility. Anxiety is a condition that paralyzes action and obscures whatever transparency man has at the very moment he needs it the most—the moment in which his destiny, his very being, his life and death is being determined. The predicament of man is a predicament born of freedom, a sickness, what Balzac called "a tetanus of the soul."

The widespread practice of deploring any reference to sickness as a symptom of pessimism is on the wane. Circles that deal in the therapy of the mind know that nothing so obstructs the therapeutic process as a fictitious sense of health. "Anxiety is the ground of hope" (Jaspers).¹³ The *human* ground, to be sure, and of a hope that is by no means determinative: one can learn, as Byron said, "to love despair," for "in despair there are the most intense enjoyments" (Dostoevsky).

Nonetheless, it remains true as Kierkegaard understood it that the possibility of this sickness is "man's advantage over the beast." "It is the greatest misfortune not to have had it,"¹⁴ for it is the initial impulse toward recovering health and authenticity. Nietzsche understood it this way when he compared the sickness of the spirit to a pregnancy. You can get over it and have something to show for it beside. John Calvin seems to

¹³ Jaspers, K., *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*. Zürich, 1949, p. 193.

¹⁴ Kierkegaard, S., *Sickness unto Death*, tr. Walter Lowrie. Princeton, 1941, pp. 20 and 39.

have understood it this way when he says in the opening lines of the last edition of his *Institutes*, "Our poverty conduces to a clearer display of the infinite fullness of God. . . . Nor can we really aspire toward him till we have begun to be displeased with ourselves."

III

The implications of the existential notion of freedom have already begun to effect a ferment in theology. A few of the strategic areas must suffice as illustrations.

1. The *image of God* has generally been believed to be some fundamental likeness man has to God, some such resemblance as one would expect to see between a father and his son. This resemblance has usually been located in man's rationality. But theology has been embarrassed to find the sense of the likeness between God and man inspiring self-satisfaction rather than filial loyalty and responsibility. Moreover, there has been a restlessness in theology respecting the way in which affirmations of man's likeness to God disregard the irreversible structure in a relation that exists between Creator and creature.

In protest against this genetic definition of "likeness" the theologian has urged that the image of God is to be found in one man only, in God's Son. What, then, of the image of God in other men than Christ? The image of God in man is the human possibility for man's relationship to God. That possibility is freedom, and *freedom is responsibility, or the ability to be at God's disposal*. Not freedom, then, as Aristotle defined it when he said "a man is free . . . who exists for his own sake and not for another's." Not even freedom as, for instance, Philo defined it when he regarded freedom in man as a quality that most resembles God, the power of interrupting the laws of nature. Ours is a freedom which is not at all like God's because it is a freedom for dependence, a burdensome and restless freedom, a freedom which fulfills itself only in dependence upon God. "Existence precedes essence." The doctrine of the image of God in man means that the desire to relate oneself to God precedes even the knowledge that there is a God. He hath made us out of the nothing of freedom, and our souls are restless until they choose themselves in him.

2. The doctrine of *original sin* has been retained in contemporary theology as a mythological key to the gravity of human life. It is difficult, however, in doctrines of original sin for theologians to satisfy the demands both of morality and of personal realism. Generally, whatever the original sin is, no one is expected to assume personal responsibility for it, inasmuch

as it was precipitated without one's own conscious, deliberate choice. It is a Kantian requirement that an accountable act be voluntary and conscious, but this requirement suggests two problems.

The first problem is that our destiny-determining acts are so profound that we cannot subject them to analysis. We can only presuppose them. As Balzac has said of our wounds, "we cannot examine them, they hurt too much." Or, as Sartre has said, "Conscious deliberation is always faked. . . . When I deliberate the die is already cast. . . . The decision has already been taken."¹⁵ Original sin is the spiritual tension at the root of our lives that vitiates all our acts—rational and voluntary—without either our knowledge or our choice. This is what Luther and Augustine meant by the bondage of the will. It does not mean we are not free. Man *is* freedom. It does mean our freedom is sick, an anxious freedom. Ever since the Apostle Paul it has been known by the Christian tradition that the problem of freedom is not the problem of choice but of ability, not legislation but execution, not ends but energy.

The second problem in a moral definition of original sin is that guilt is denied to original sin because such an original act was not freely, that is, consciously and deliberately committed. Hence, responsibility for the declivity in one's life is also abrogated. What if guilt, however, were not something legally imputable, as if the person were a criminal whose aberrations could be traced to specific acts of offense? What if guilt were a condition of being, a condition of deep, personal irresponsibility, a default of vocation? Formally, guilt is the disproportion between what one is and what one ought to be. Actually, what if guilt were not simply the failure to achieve recognized moral ends, but the condition of being at odds with one's spiritual destiny? What if guilt were not a result but a condition of doing wrong? That is, not a doing wrong at all, but a being wrong?

"Being guilty," says Heidegger, "does not result originally from a fault; faults originally become possible on the basis of an original guilt."¹⁶ "Guilt" is no more legal or moral a concept than is "righteousness." "Being guilty" is a sickness of freedom; not a fault to be condemned but a sickness to be cured. There is a responsibility in sickness, but not a legal or moral one. One is not blamed for being sick, but he is expected to *assume* responsibility for it as the first step to a cure. For a long time now the story of Adam has dawned on men with the abruptness and lucidity that comes when one "suddenly remembers where he left his glasses" (T. S. Eliot).

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 527.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 280.

3. The *grace of God* in Christ is a therapy. It is not the effect of a transaction, legal, moral, or commercial. "Satisfaction" for sins was an expression Luther associated with moral philosophers, jurists, papists, and hangmen. There is no more effective therapy for the sickness of freedom, however, than love. Love casts out anxiety. Love does not blame, it heals; love does not exact, it confers. Love is not weighed, it is received. Love is not subject to bargaining, it is subject only to gratitude. Love has no reason, it can only be trusted. God chooses to love us in Christ, and "we can only choose our being chosen" (Barth). "*Libertas sine gratia nihil est*" (Augustine). Freedom without grace is nothing. But grace is the medicine of salvation; it heals the sickness of freedom. The story of God's faithfulness in Christ is good news for the spiritually sick which makes them whole again, and this wholeness is "the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free."

To say that the predicament of man is the sickness of his freedom is not to infer that this sickness is a weakness. It is rather an imbalance of one's powers, more often inordinate than weak. Spiritual anxiety expresses itself with a violence which the Christian tradition has long associated with rebellion and pride. In the words of Byron:

There is a very life in our despair,
Vitality of poison,—a quick root
Which feeds these deadly branches . . .

Augustine called it the *libido dominandi*. Luther called it *Anfechtung*, or temptation, by which he meant not the kind of appeal which petty vices have for the morally weak, but the dreadful sense of infinite possibility one gets in the presence of holy things. So deep-seated an illness of the spirit will not yield to just any religious homeopathy. Christian doctrines of the atonement, while they can stand being stripped of their mythological trappings, conserve one persistent element. It is the sense of an almost violent aggressiveness in the love of God, which, in collision with man's own violent freedom is productive of a therapy as though by shock.

4. *Christian ethics*, then, becomes the articulation in action of the spiritual health in one's life. That is to say, Christian ethics is subordinated to no law but the law of liberty. The Christian existence precedes moral essences. As Dostoevsky believed, "the possibility of being able to place the question of right *after* the meaning of one's existence is the greatest and most ultimate freedom of man."¹⁷ Theologically, this means man's free-

¹⁷ Lauth, Reinhard, *Die philosophie Dostojewskis*. Munich, 1950, p. 146.

dom is a freedom primarily to choose himself in relation to God, and only secondarily to choose between good and evil. The Christian's ethical responsibility is to evolve the morality consistent with this theological destiny. Sartre's phrase, "You are free: choose! That is to say, invent!" if given Christian baptism would read, "Love God and do as you please." The irresponsible man is the man who evades the responsibility of determining God's will by retreating into some pre-established moral structure. To do so is, both in existentialism and in psychoanalysis, to adopt an infantile morality. But "how can we know what is God's word, and what is right or wrong? . . . You must determine this matter for yourself," said Luther, "for your very life depends upon it."

5. *Theism* suffers most at the hands of the maxim, "existence precedes essence," though it probably deserves to suffer. Christian philosophers have expanded the seed of the Christian faith into trees of wisdom in which a man may lodge without existing. Theisms create a world view out of what requires a decision, a science out of a faith.

There is really a quantitative paucity of truth in the Christian gospel. It is, as the Westminster Confession rightly says, sufficient "for salvation," but it is scarcely sufficient for cosmology and metaphysics. The Christian truth is the Christ, to know whom is to be free. There is a life-and-death difference between possessing truths about Christianity and being true in Christ. The one is a technological achievement and the other is a condition of personal freedom.

When contemporary existentialists avow their atheism it is not in hostility toward God but toward Western philosophy's opinions about God. Theistic philosophy has constructed God in man's image without in the first place being correct about man. The effect has been to destroy in man all consciousness of what Camus has called "vertical transcendence." When Augustine finished his treatise on the Trinity he recognized that silence might have been preferable, for the very sound of one's own voice, though he talk about God, is apt to lull one to sleep. Even Nietzsche, when he pronounced that "God is dead," was only informing against God's murderers, not burying God.

Heidegger's philosophy is a philosophy of openness toward the future—which is freedom. But God, who is eternal, is in the future, and freedom is waiting for God. Sartre's atheism is considerably less remediable. There is a stubbornness about it. The Christian God about whom he knows the most is the God of French Catholicism, who, though he is in the future

as an eternal God, is in the future only as he was in the past. Literally, he is the same, yesterday, today, and forever, for his essence *is* his existence. His mind is made up. The Roman Catholic theism sponsors the idea of a God who is at once rational and static. Protestantism, with its biblical revolt against this kind of Aristotelianism, avows the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the acting and passionate God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. This God is dynamic and irrational: he is free. Even in him, existence precedes essence. There is an "atheism" in Protestantism which repudiates ideas of God which do not give to God a life as good as man's, a free life. "Even truer than our freedom and truer than the wretched truth of our *servum arbitrium*, is the heartening truth that God is free."¹⁸ And what is freedom? Not the ability to do only what the rational structure of one's nature allows. That is Scholasticism. God is free to do whatever his passionate heart chooses. God is the Creator—even of his own nature. That is to say, he *is* free.

The Christian faith, then, in these and other areas, is being expressed anew with the help of this new notion of freedom. It is a notion which has progressively eluded rational determinism and voluntaristic indeterminism in favor of the consciousness of a spiritual possibility. This sense of freedom leaves man's life dry with the thirst for God. On some other occasions when theologians have asked philosophers for bread, the philosophers have returned them a stone. Today, in the philosophy of freedom, they have given us yeast.

¹⁸ Barth, Karl, *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*. Zürich, 1948, III, 2, p. 43.

On Interpreting Christ to America

VAN A. HARVEY

CHRISTIANS have always faced the difficult task of preaching the gospel in terms their hearers could understand. At the same time they have had to be careful lest these same hearers pervert this gospel by simply accommodating it to the prevalent symbols and beliefs. The problem is perennial, how to make our faith intelligible without vitiating its integrity. The early Church had to distinguish its Lord from the countless number of other lords, its Savior from the popular Saviors of the mystery cults, its rites from pagan baptismal rites, its love feasts from the orgies of the Eastern religions. Christians are always called upon to distinguish between Christ and culture.

Our generation has witnessed a new concern with this old problem. Whether the task is that of proclaiming the message to men who pride themselves on thinking scientifically, or of communicating the attractiveness of Jesus to teen-agers whose hero is Superman, the question is the same: how do we make the symbols of our religion relevant to an age that possesses symbols some of which are antithetical to our own? This is a theological question, the relation of our faith to our culture.

As a matter of fact, all of us have previously answered this question. We have already interpreted the gospel in some fashion or other. We have long since poured into the traditional symbols meanings that are our own. When we heard that we were all "sinners," that word was given some content, some image came to our minds. Perhaps we were convicted of lascivious thoughts, of smoking or drinking. But maybe sin meant racial prejudice, political irresponsibility, nationalistic isolationism. When we listened to the preacher say, "Jesus saves," what came to our minds? Was Jesus that clean-cut, white-robed figure looking piously off into space, the one who speaks as if through a long tube on the radio each week? Whatever we mean when we say "sin," "Jesus Christ," is our answer as to how Christ is related to our culture. It is the way we in the twentieth century understand our faith.

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The question that the theologians raise, "How is Christianity to be related to culture?" is largely academic. It is academic in the sense that we cannot wipe off the present answer and say "let's start all over again." It is not as if we were missionaries headed for a pagan island which had never heard the gospel before, and we were asking ourselves, "Shall we say our God is the one they already worship, but wrongly?" or "our God is a new God, but the one and only God?" No, American Christianity already has given some kind of answer, however nebulous, unconscious, and false. The real problem is, "Is it a good answer?" "Good" means in this case, "Has it interpreted the gospel to this culture without falsifying certain recognizable elements in the Christian faith as it is rooted in the Bible?" A bad answer, for example, would be one which equates the biblical notion of fellowship with the good-will spirit of a business man's luncheon. Another would be the identification of the comfort of the Holy Spirit with a superficial peace of mind. These are bad answers, because they falsify the content of the biblical symbols.

One of the tasks of theology is to discover and interpret the meaning of the biblical symbols and to reveal their relevance for the lives of those in the church. But the members of the church, and the theologians, are also members of the culture. It is not as if the culture were "out there" and we were "in here," our minds pristine and pure. We are in the culture and the culture is in us. *Only if we recognize and understand what the gospel is and what our values are and to what extent these two are consistent or antithetical, can we understand ourselves and the relevance of the Christian faith to our lives.* When we understand the culture, then we are understanding ourselves.

The American Christian must be concerned about his civilization, its values and ideals, for these two reasons:

1. By understanding the culture he more clearly understands himself.
2. By understanding the culture he more clearly understands those to whom he is to preach.

SELF-UNDERSTANDING

There is a reason for the use of the strange term, "American Christian." It is not because he is a different order of *Christian* from a German or a Hungarian Christian. It is because the American Christian has problems these other Christians do not have. He lives in a different society, with different goals and different problems. His faith, therefore, is understood and applied in other ways than those of other cultures. There is no

universal answer to the question of the relation of Christianity and culture which can be anticipated in advance. Our particular question is, how do we respond to our situation, given the kind of answers that we have made?

American culture has this one peculiar problem: certain of our values and ideals are rooted in the same soil from which our religious faith has sprung. The Protestant Reformation, by its implicit and sometimes explicit individualism, prepared the way for the political theory of the Enlightenment which found its embodiment in our Constitution. As Christians we affirm some of these ideals and values even though they are held by most in separation from any conscious Christian foundation.

There are other elements in the American heritage, on the other hand, we would have to deny were Christian, unless, of course, we were to hold that this tradition was perfect. The most confusing state of affairs, however, arises when both Christians and non-Christians have to affirm the same propositions, but for contrary reasons. Both Christians and non-Christians presumably would defend individual liberties and the responsibility of the government to the governed. Usually the non-Christian bases his defense of these concepts on political theory rooted in John Locke and the social-contract thinking of the Enlightenment. The Christian might affirm individual liberties and the responsibility of government to governed on his theological convictions about the governing activity of God and the responsibility of persons for each other in a world under God. The non-Christian is talking about "natural rights," the Christian about responsibility. Both are supporting the same reality for different reasons. This makes for confusion, particularly for the Christian. So it is frequent that we as Christians find ourselves defending "our rights" and the "infinite worth of the individual" quite apart from any relation to our theological convictions. The theologian has the difficult task of reconstructing the interpretation of a fact about which Christian and non-Christian agree only as fact. This is part of the task of self-understanding.

Our Christian religion and our cultural values get all mixed up. The distinction between religion and culture, however, is not really a clear one. Many of our cultural values have a religious character. Many of these values and beliefs have all the power and dynamism of theological convictions. In fact, they are theological convictions, convictions about the nature of man, his destiny, the meaning of history, and what is of ultimate meaning in his life. These beliefs are often held with a passion that excels anything we tend to call "religious." It does not take a sociologist, for example, to discover that the zeal with which some defend "free enterprise" is some-

thing not entirely unreligious in character. The enthusiasm with which some swoon over the "American way of life," as if all history culminated in our era, reveals more about their "religion" than do their verbalized beliefs. It is their religion because their decisions, their lives are founded on that conviction. These values have for them all the evocative power of traditional religious symbols.

Most of our resistance to a more inclusive definition of religion stems from the fact that we are accustomed to delimit religion to a conscious manipulation of certain traditional symbols: crosses, choirs, open prayer books, folded hands, and the like. But a man's real religion is better revealed by his crucial decisions and his actual goals in life than by his verbal profession of faith. If one wants to know the real religious beliefs of a certain prominent politician and businessman, we would do well to question his pious articulation on the radio and the Sunday Supplements, and examine the meanings and direction of his life as revealed in his voting record, the political groups in which he participates, his business habits, his relation to his employees and their representatives, his entertainment, the organizations to which he belongs. In whatever a man finds his meaning and in the light of which he accepts himself, this is his religion.

In America we face the momentous possibility and susceptibility of equating whatever we mean by the phrase "our way of life" with the Christian faith. This is why a bright young man can write a book scourging a great University in the conviction that Christianity and "free enterprise" are virtually identical. This also accounts for the peculiar situation in which a certain segment of liberal Protestantism which violently opposes the authoritarianism of the Roman Catholic Church in all its expressions can, at the same time, make common cause with the authoritarianism of the Catholic author of this book.

The plea for Christian theologians and ministers to understand their society, its history and its values, is therefore not an unimportant one. It is necessary that they do so for the sake of the integrity of the gospel. Just as it is necessary for ministers to know biblical theology and its relation to the culture of biblical times, so it is necessary for him to arrive at some comprehension of his own cultural presuppositions if he would not pervert the gospel message more than can be helped. The Christian, in order to understand himself, must understand the biblical faith and its normative character and the culture in which he lives and which has conditioned his view of the biblical faith. Such a comprehension at least would make it more difficult for a minister to say with a straight face that the parable of the talents

was Jesus' blessing on "laissez-faire capitalism," just as he would not quote the parable of the laborers in the field as a sanction for an employer to pay all his workers alike regardless of the effort and time expended.

The understanding of our society and its institutions is self-understanding. This self-understanding could be the occasion for the acknowledgment that our highest values are sinful, distorted, and highly relative. Perhaps we would realize that our professed religion (Christianity) is only a sort of transcendental stamp of approval on cultural beliefs we have adopted as our own. We would be shown how one religion had simply lent its weight to another "religion" of very recent vintage. Such a confession would also be the reiteration of the doctrine that our sin is total in nature, total in the sense that even that with which we think and value is sick. We would be in the Reformers' tradition in this sense also, that self-knowledge is repentance, for to know ourselves is to know that we are sinners.

UNDERSTANDING OTHERS

Although the values of the culture condition and even become identified on occasion with the values of the Christian faith, this does not mean that there are not certain recognizable motifs in the church's message which judge and condemn secular values. Even though the doctrine of love often assumes a sentimental and perverted form, yet even at its worst it retains a certain absolute character. The church still has an autonomous message as long as God continues to raise up prophets who protest against a simple identification of Christ and culture.

If the church is acknowledged to have a transcendent faith, the plea for Christians to understand their historical situation and work-a-day values might take this additional form: understand your society in order to understand those to whom you are going to preach. If the gospel is to have any real relevance it must be proclaimed out of a knowledge of the faith of the hearers (and they all have one). We must understand the context in which they make their decisions and form their opinions, and why it is that they do not see what bearing the message of Jesus Christ has upon their lives except in highly individualistic terms.

Any pastor, for example, can tell us that it makes a difference whether he says "God is love" to a group of teen-agers, a young married couple, a Rotary Club, or the Ladies' Aid. The difference does not lie solely in their respective ages, but in the kind of "world" in which each one of these groups live. But these "worlds" are *not* full of "values" floating around in some kind of disembodied way. The "values" have power because they

are molded and made concrete in the institutions which make up the societies and subsocieties of which these people are parts. The teen-agers' interpretation of love only makes sense within the framework of his school, his secret society, his fan clubs, comic books, and entertainment patterns. The young married people can only be understood fully in terms of their place in the corporation hierarchy, the magazines that fill their homes, their colleges, and the social classes to which they belong.

This is, of course, "old stuff" to sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and the like. Somehow it is recognized by our churches only in the most nebulous way. For if the church were really concerned with the totality of men's lives, their ultimate loyalties and how these are expressed, it would begin to re-examine its own polity in relation to the other institutions which really make our world go round and which in turn help to make our congregations what they are. All our preaching presupposes a context of interpretation of meaning present in and around our hearers. This context is not formed in a vacuum but largely in the social structure of which we all are a part.

The advice that we give to the minister, i.e., to understand his culture, strikes his ear as being visionary. The local man of God after a few years becomes so engrossed in the problems of his own congregation that he almost inevitably fails to see the wider significance of each single problem. If a marriage is a failure he is probably more apt to blame it on an ungrateful wife and a too-idealistic husband, without asking where the husband acquired his "idea of a perfect marriage" or what in the woman's social situations drives her toward "prestige." If someone walks into his office and tells him he is lonely, even though he has a lovely wife and three children, perhaps it is not that he lacks friends or a religious experience, but because he is caught up in a system that creates loneliness.

Furthermore, the minister knows that he does not have time to delve into contemporary sociological analyses, even if he had the inclination. It takes all his moments just keeping his finger in the dyke. He is busy burying, marrying, and baptizing people. His life is in the preparing of sermons, keeping the scandal in the choir from blowing the top off the church, mollifying the organist, finding the janitor. He feels that he has to look to others for insights into this new book or that.

Who are these others to which he looks? There is only one group that has the potential qualifications—the theologians. They are the only ones whose vocation it is to abstract the theological significance of the social sciences. The pastor fails to look, because he has an anti-intellectual distrust

of theologians. This distrust is in part justified. For the theologians are not even asking the same questions and consequently are not receiving the answers that matter—to the pastor. For the most part they are writing articles and books which will be read chiefly by other theologians, who in turn will write reviews which will be read by the first theologian and a few ardent disciples. There will be counter-reviews. The interest will be in eschatology, soteriology, and the meaning of history. The pastor suspects that even if he could understand the untranslated Latin phrases they wouldn't be directly relevant. Theology, which should be the servant of the church, does not fully serve it.

There is a further problem. Theologians have their own special and legitimate spheres of interest: biblical theology, apologetics, systematic theology, etc. To ask them all to be sociologists is to misunderstand their essential function. But the church does need men who are trained in the social sciences and who are also theologians. She needs men who will wrestle with the empirical problems that face the church in making its gospel relevant to the culture, ethicists who can communicate their thinking on subjects of real political and economic importance, that is to say, of a controversial character. If the church needs such men, she also needs the courage to allow these men to speak with some authority without fear of reprisal from those in the churches who happen to differ. But the Protestant church has not formulated the theological basis for such an authority. Consequently she is voiceless.

Theology exists for the sake of the church; but if the church itself, fearful of controversy, afraid to call into question the status quo, too identified with a conservative ideology, fails to allow its theologians to speak in any significant way, then it betrays its irrelevancy to those whose lives are won and lost in the complex social and political battles of our time.

Perhaps what we have been saying about institutions may shed some light on this problem. It will also illuminate the extent to which the role of the pastor has been accommodated to the patterns of the culture, how the "shepherd" has become a "driver." We should ask ourselves, "What is it about the institutions, in this case the colleges, churches, and seminaries, that contribute to this condition?" In the first place, all three of these put a premium on the "bright young man" going places. The Protestant congregation demands a *young* personable minister with an attractive wife who can "bring in the young people." The college fraternities and sororities tap only the "good guys" and the "leaders." The seminaries look for these "leaders," and instead of examining the candidates to see if they have the sensitivity and con-

cern which will lend depth and substance to the ministry, are often more concerned to see the offices he held and whether or not he has those qualities making for a "successful minister." Once in the seminaries the curriculum and other factors soon separate the more "intense ones" (the brains) from the "personalities" (the all-around American boys) and the bifurcation between the theologian and the pastor is created. The result is the American phenomenon in which theology constitutes one profession, the pastorate another. Pastors have some trouble communicating with theologians and theologians have trouble talking to each other and, of course, to the pastors. There is little interchange, and sometimes even the pastor gets caught up in an existence that is broken into fragments. He cannot communicate to others the meaning and wholeness of life because even his own life is essentially compartmentalized, and the parishioner gets the strange sensation that even his minister doesn't know who he is and what is the meaning of it all.

A STARTING POINT

Provided that we see the need for some kind of understanding of our culture, the problem is, where do we start? One possible point of departure is the prevalent, almost overwhelming sense of meaninglessness that seems to characterize our age. The poignant, recurring question that rises on every side, if we have eyes to see it, is "who am I?" The social psychologist, the cultural anthropologist, the psychotherapist, and even the evangelist have recognized it. They call it in varying ways the "feeling of alienation," of "lostness," of "estrangement from oneself and others."

This alienation is not due simply to the lack of religion. Many devout young men in our seminaries experience it. It is a feeling of meaninglessness growing out of the atomization that characterizes all our lives. With no perspective by which to make sense out of our lives, we wish to retreat into the kind of isolation which only our technological culture can provide in such abundance. With a flick of the wrist the silky voice of the radio announcer can fill our silence and soothe us with the false security that the world is after all continuing on its way, and that our feelings of loneliness are merely the products of temporary nervous fatigue. We are assured by a voice which is its own vindication that those "little pills" have restored thousands like ourselves to a life of vitality and radiant happiness. Our real problem is that we have no framework which gives content to what we are doing, our work, our play, and our lives.

The immediate solution that comes to many minds is the "conversion experience." If only a man will make his peace with Christ he will find

all the meaning he can contain. But what if a man's basic problem is not eternal life? What if he just doesn't see the point in going on living? What if he feels no sense of sin in the evangelist's sense? For him, life is just "one damn thing after another." His life is so compartmentalized that his conversion experience just adds another compartment to the present series—work, entertainment, love, and now, religion. It is just one more loyalty, claiming more ultimacy than the others, to be sure, but somehow not vindicating its claim.

For a while he may believe that life has taken on a new buoyancy. But if he is an auto worker his hand still travels the same number of yards each day in the same perpetual motion. If she is a filing clerk she must go back to the thousands of files and the endless stooping and bending. The salesman must wear the same artificial smile, suffer the same slaps on the back, eat the same greasy restaurant foods, tell the same stupid stories. After two or three months it is hard for our new convert to believe that he ever made such a significant decision. He begins to wonder what happened to him after all. Back again comes the same unfulfilled desire, hardly articulated, for a loyalty that is not contentless, some great love that gives meaning to the whole of his life, his work and play, his marriage and his club. Is it too much to ask? He will be satisfied with nothing less.

This is not to pump for an intellectual framework into which the pieces of life will fit neatly like a puzzle. It is simply to ask for an imaginative understanding of our lives, a position of depth, a point of view which gives coherence and structure to an otherwise trivial existence, some meaning which can incorporate and shed light even on the meaninglessness of our daily tasks.

What I have said here might imply that there is no existing principle of interpretation at all. This is not the case. We already have provisional interpretations of our existence and these interpretations are given to us largely by our newspapers, magazines, entertainment, and advertising agencies. Because we can find no meaning in our work we use the symbols given to us by these media to handle the remoter aspects of our lives, to give them some form. Here is where we get, in part, our views of the family, of marriage, of love, of government. It is in our leisure that we find our humanity. If we think of the family, our mind flips to the billboard with the youthful-looking parents and the two blonde, blue-eyed youngsters, the daughter dressed exactly like the mother. Adolescence does not connote a child made anxious by puberty, but the bumbling nonsense and nasal twangs of the Henry Aldriches and the Corliss Archers. The priest is supposed to

look like Bing Crosby or Barry Fitzgerald, and all the married couples become elderly and uninteresting at the age of forty.

Someone has to correct these images, to cast out the false ones and to build new ones. Someone has to give them some kind of coherent meaning. They have to be interpreted in the light of the gospel. If the Church could only articulate how these images are false, how they contribute to a perverted understanding of the world, how they inculcate a false religion, then, by understanding how they are false, they would take on a meaning that they did not previously have. Negative meaning is still meaning.

When the believer comes to understand, however dimly, the sources of his own feelings of impotence and loneliness, when he comes to understand that he can order his world from the standpoint of his faith, then the impersonality of his social life becomes a challenge rather than a source of despair. He begins to see how he can participate in the healing of the body politic. In short, he is beginning to have a perspective. His life begins to take on some meaning, some wholeness.

It is this perspective that modern man lacks and which the Church potentially has. She can have it in actuality only when she grasps the meaning of her confession that Christ is Lord of all of life, when she embarks upon the task of consciously striving to relate the gospel to the culture, when she has obeyed the biblical injunction to "take all thoughts captive to Jesus Christ."

The Bible After Twenty Years of Archeology

(1932-1952)

WILLIAM FOXWELL ALBRIGHT

PERIODICAL STOCK-TAKING is a necessity in all progressive fields. The more recent the development of any scientific or scholarly field of investigation, the more necessary does such stock-taking become. What is a commonplace in nuclear physics or genetics should also be taken for granted in any archeological field. In biblical archeology the past generation has been revolutionary in every sense of the word. In 1951 the present writer contributed to a symposium two chapters on the progress of the archeology of Palestine and surrounding Bible lands in the thirty years from 1920 to 1950.¹ Just twenty years have elapsed since he published his first book intended for the general reader: *The Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible*. The advance made since that book was written is almost incredible; it easily dwarfs the sum of all relevant discoveries during the preceding century in its total impact on our knowledge of the Bible.

I

In surveying the most important discoveries since 1932 which bear on the Bible it is hard not to include all archeological finds in Bible lands, since the greatest achievement of archeology during this period has been to consolidate fragmentary materials into a synthesis of the history of ancient Eastern civilization, in which the Bible appears in its true historical perspective. However, if one must choose, one may suggest the following subjects as particularly important: (1) stabilizing the chronology; (2) the tablets of Mari and Ugarit; (3) new documents bearing on the exilic and

¹ In *The Old Testament and Modern Study: A Generation of Discovery and Research*, ed. H. H. Rowley. Oxford University Press, 1951.

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postexilic periods, especially the Lachish letters and new Aramaic papyri and ostraca from Egypt; (4) the Dead Sea Scrolls and similar finds in Palestine; (5) the early Gnostic and Manichean codices from Egypt.

Stabilizing ancient chronology may not seem very important, but it is impossible to understand the course of events or the history of civilization unless one can set events and cultures in correct time relation. Twenty years ago the archeological chronology of Palestine was still in a state of chaos, with scholars differing in their dates by centuries in the Iron Age and even by thousands of years before the second millennium. At that time there was no agreement on the correlation of Babylonian, Egyptian, and Syro-Palestinian chronologies before about 1500 B.C. Now we have many cross-checks, both documentary and archeological, on the relation between successive cultural stages in these countries; we also have much more abundant information for the political chronologies of Mesopotamia and Egypt, checked by astronomical data. Above all, radiocarbon dating has developed since 1947, and we now have many approximate dates for archeological materials of organic origin, covering the last 8,000 years of Near-Eastern history.

Second (in chronological order) come Mari and Ugarit. The excavation of Mari began in 1933, under the direction of André Parrot. Situated on the Middle Euphrates, Mari was one of the most important centers of the Northwest Semitic life of Patriarchal times. In 1936, M. Parrot unearthed many thousands of cuneiform tablets dating mostly from about 1700 B.C., which are now in course of being studied and published. These tablets throw direct light on the background of the Patriarchal traditions of Genesis.

Four years before the commencement of the Mari excavations, C. F. A. Schaeffer had begun excavations at Ras Shamrah on the coast of northern Syria, finding rich remains from the wealthiest of all Canaanite cities immediately before the Mosaic Age. He started almost at once to find tablets, and by 1933 he had unearthed extensive fragments of a whole temple library. The cuneiform alphabet of Ugarit was deciphered in 1930, and the first recovered tablet of the great Baal Epic was published by Ch. Virolleaud at the end of the following year. In 1931, several scholars took up the study of the new texts, which were not long in yielding most of their secrets. By 1940 it was possible for C. H. Gordon to publish an admirable pioneer grammar of Ugaritic, which was revised and expanded in 1947. The excavation of Ugarit, interrupted in 1939, was resumed by M. Schaeffer in 1948, and we look forward to continuation of this most

important undertaking. The remains of three epics, which had been composed previously in Phoenicia, have survived in copies made not long before the great earthquake of c. 1360 B.C.; the light they shed on the earliest poetical literature of the Bible has completely revolutionized our approach to it.

Third in our brief survey we mention the new documents from the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. which have come to light since 1935. In 1935 the late J. L. Starkey discovered the Ostraca of Lachish, consisting chiefly of letters written in ink on potsherds. Together with several additional ostraca found in 1938, they form a unique body of Hebrew prose from the time of Jeremiah. Further light on the time of the Exile comes from the ration lists of Nebuchadnezzar, found by the Germans at Babylon and partly published by E. F. Weidner in 1939. Other new evidence will be discussed below. Somewhat later but of decisive value for our understanding of the history and literature of the Jews in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah are the continuing finds and publications of Aramaic papyri and ostraca from Egypt. Four large groups of this material are being published, and their complete publication will more than double the total bulk of such documents available twenty years ago.

In 1947 some Bedouin made a discovery south of Jericho which could not have been foreseen by the most optimistic specialist—a cave containing many scrolls of leather covered with Hebrew and Aramaic writing, to say nothing of over 600 fragments. News reached the world in the spring of 1948 and publication began a few months later. In early 1949 the cave was rediscovered and cleared by G. L. Harding and Père R. de Vaux, the most competent archeologists in the Kingdom of Jordan. The first lot of manuscripts went partly to the Syrian Archbishop, Athanasius Yeshue Samuel, and partly to E. L. Sukenik at the Hebrew University. John C. Trever was responsible for recognizing the approximate date and importance of the Syrian collection; Sukenik had previously recognized the age and value of the manuscripts in the Hebrew University, but did not announce his acquisition until later. In early 1952 new caves containing fragments of later scrolls in Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek were discovered, and the announcement of this find was followed by news of the recovery of additional scrolls in still another cave.

The discovery of the original group of these scrolls was followed by a series of fantastic onslaughts on their antiquity and even on their authenticity, over the signatures of some well-known scholars in America and Europe, both Christian and Jewish. Only in Palestine, where the

finds were too well known to be suspect, was there virtually unanimous agreement about their general age. It is true that such sensational discoveries are always challenged, but in this case the data are so well substantiated that the attacks must be connected with the fact that the new finds disprove the already published views of the attacking scholars.

Here we have threefold evidence in support of a date for the Dead Sea Scrolls well before A.D. 70. The vases (over forty of which were found) in which the scrolls had been placed, as well as lamps found with them, are Hellenistic and cannot have been manufactured after the time of Herod the Great (37 B.C.—A.D. 4). The linen in which the scrolls were wrapped has been dated by radiocarbon count to the period between c. 175 B.C. and A.D. 225 (in round numbers). The forms of letters used by scores of different scribes over a period of more than a century are intermediate between the known script of the third century B.C. and of the Apostolic period. All competent students of writing conversant with the available materials and with paleographic method date them in the 250 years before A.D. 70,³ and most are divided between dates for the sealing of the cave between about 50 B.C. and just before A.D. 70; the writer's own preferred date for nearly all the Scrolls remains in the last century B.C. Subsequent finds date partly (when coming from the first cave) from the same period and partly from the second century A.D. (when coming from later caves). These latter fragments are in considerably later script, bridging the gap between the Dead Sea Scrolls and the earliest previously known papyrus and parchment fragments in Hebrew from the third and fourth centuries A.D.

The contents of the new scrolls are partly biblical (two scrolls of Isaiah, one of which is complete, most of the first two chapters of Habakkuk, etc.), and partly intertestamental. Their historical and philological importance is very great indeed, and they are already revolutionizing our approach to the text of the Old Testament and the background of the New Testament.

Our last category of outstanding discoveries carries us down into the Christian era and may seem too late to be of significance for biblical studies. First comes the discovery in 1930 of seven Manichean codices composed in part by Mani, founder of this Gnostic sect, in the third century A.D., translated into Coptic soon afterwards and copied for us by fourth-century scribes. The publication, chiefly due to the talent of H. J. Polotsky, began

³ There is still disagreement among specialists as to the date of the fragments of Deuteronomy in a script intermediate between old Hebrew cursive and the earliest Samaritan.

in 1934 and was interrupted in 1940 by the war. Before this our only first-hand knowledge of Manichean literature came from fragments translated into Central-Asiatic languages and discovered in Turkestan by German explorers before the First World War. Now we have a mass of original material, which, among other things, establishes the secondary character of Mandeism in relation to Manicheism; the former has been regarded by many scholars as in part older than the Gospel of John.

In 1947 a second, even more remarkable, discovery of Gnostic books was made in Egypt, this time a lot of some forty treatises bound together in codices, at Chenoboscium (Chenoboskion) in Upper Egypt. These books are also in Coptic; the extant copies date from the third and fourth centuries and the original Greek works from which they were translated must go back to the second and third centuries. We have here for the first time the original writings of the strange early Gnostic groups called the Barbelo Gnostics, the Ophites, Sethians, and others, as well as several Hermetic treatises. At last we can control and expand the information given us by Hippolytus, Irenaeus, and Epiphanius about these early Gnostics and their beliefs. The new documents will have extraordinary significance in connection with the debate about the alleged Gnostic affinities of the Gospel of John. Fortunately all (or nearly all) of these codices have been acquired by the Egyptian government, and it is to be hoped that they will be published before long. Meanwhile we have very reliable information from the first student of these texts, Jean Doresse.

II

It is just as hard to select biblical books and periods of biblical history for illumination as it is to choose between discoveries. The scope for eventual choice is too wide and there are too many interesting matters on which the finds of the past twenty years have thrown light. We shall take (1) the Patriarchal traditions of Genesis, (2) the early poetry of Israel, (3) the contrast of Israelite faith with Canaanite religion, (4) Exile and Restoration, and (5) the Gospel of John.

In 1932 the writer gave much attention in his book, *The Archeology of Palestine and the Bible*, to the way in which Patriarchal tradition had been confirmed by archeology. That was before the discoveries at Mari, which we have sketched briefly above. Now we can speak even more emphatically, and with a wealth of additional detail. For example, the "city of Nahor" which plays a role next to Harran in the Patriarchal stories (Gen. 24:10) turns up frequently along with Harran in the Mari

documents from about 1700 B.C. The name of a prince of Mari, *Arriyuk*, is evidently the same as the "Arioch" of Genesis 14. "Benjamin" often appears as a tribal name at Mari. And so on. Other parallels have come to light with G. Posener's publication of many new Egyptian texts cursing Palestinian chieftains of the late nineteenth century B.C.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the accounts of the Patriarchs go back largely to early narrative poems transmitted orally into Israelite times and then written down in shortened prose paraphrases of the poetic originals. In no case are these Patriarchal stories mere reflections of the life of Israel in the Divided Monarchy, as used to be held by most literary critics; they actually do go back almost a thousand years to the Middle Bronze Age. Of course, in the process of oral transmission there has been a good deal of refraction and rearrangement of materials, with changed emphases and modernizations. These phenomena are characteristic of oral transmission of such materials, and they are more than balanced by the gain to the pedagogical and ethical content of the narratives. Written records of tribal warfare would be of less significance to the historian and of immeasurably less value to our day than the moving stories of Abraham, Jacob, and Joseph.

III

The recovery of the Ugaritic epics, briefly described above, provides us with many thousands of lines of Canaanite verse, antedating the time of Moses and the emergence of Israel as a people. These epics contain innumerable close parallels to the poetry of the Hebrew Bible, especially to the earliest poems but also in less measure to later biblical verse. The parallels are stylistic, grammatical, and verbal; they include whole verses, phrases, and single words. We find that the earliest poetry of the Bible abounds in verse forms which are characteristic of the Canaanite poems of Ugarit, such as the pattern of repetitive parallelism called *abc:abd* by H. L. Ginsberg, who was the first to recognize it. For example, in Ugaritic we have many such three-unit (tricolon) verses as the following, from the Epic of Danel (the Danel of the consonantal text of Ezek. 14:14, etc.):

*Ask for life, O youth Aqhat,
Ask for life, and I will give (it) thee,
Eternal life, and I will grant (it) to thee!*

Compare this with a similar three-unit verse in the Baal Epic:

*Behold thine enemies, O Baal,
Behold thine enemies shalt thou crush,
Behold thou shalt crush thy foes!*

This tricolon has been preserved with only minor changes in wording and a major transformation in theological meaning in Psalms 92:10:

*For behold thine enemies, O Yahweh,
For behold thine enemies shall perish,
All doers of evil shall be scattered!*

Among far-reaching parallels in style we have no fewer than forty pairs of parallel synonyms documented from both biblical and Canaanite verse. All eighty words are the same. In view of the limited amount of Canaanite literature yet available to us and of the relatively late date of most biblical poetry which has been preserved, this similarity between the two literatures is very striking. We also have a great many close parallels in grammar. It is remarkable how many apparent anomalies in early Hebrew verse, which have been explained away or emended by scholars, turn out to be accurate reflections of Canaanite grammatical peculiarities which were forgotten long before the time of the Masoretes, who vocalized the consonantal Hebrew text of the Bible in the seventh to ninth centuries A.D. These grammatical peculiarities grow fewer and fewer in later Hebrew verse and are scarcely to be found at all in our latest biblical poetry.

With this new independent criterion for dating it becomes possible to push back the dates generally accepted for many early Hebrew poems. The Song of Deborah (Judg. 5) has always been dated early by the great majority of scholars, but most emendations of its text by textual critics must now be discarded. However, the Song of Miriam (or of Moses, Exod. 15), which resembles the Song of Deborah so closely in style and meter that they should never have been far separated in time, has usually been dated after the building of the Temple of Solomon, or even after the Exile. The key reason for such a late date has been verse 17, with its reference to "the mountain of thine inheritance, O Yahweh," which has quite naturally been referred to Mount Zion and the Temple. However, we have the very same expression used in the Canaanite Baal Epic, where Baal speaks of "the mountain of mine inheritance," referring to the partly terrestrial, partly celestial mountain where he resides in the far north. Biblical scholars had inferred long before the discovery of the Canaanite literature that ancient phraseology which applied originally to the cosmic mountain in the far north had been utilized in poetic descriptions of Zion. It now becomes absurd to use the verse as an argument for such an improbably late date of the Song of Miriam. This beautiful triumphal hymn, which may rightfully be termed the national anthem of ancient Israel, must now be pushed back to Israelite beginnings, substantially per-

haps to the time of Moses in the thirteenth century B.C. The Oracles of Balaam (Num. 22-24) also go back to the thirteenth century B.C., or perhaps in part to the following century. Similarly, the Blessings of Jacob (Gen. 49) and of Moses (Deut. 33) cannot be later than the eleventh century B.C.

In harmony with the earlier date which must be assigned to Penta-teuchal poetry, we must date many of the Psalms back to early Israelite times. We find that early Psalms contain so much Canaanite material that they may safely be treated as Israelite adaptations of pre-Israelite hymns to Baal. Psalm 68 turns out to be a catalogue of early Israelite hymns and lyric poems, apparently all composed between the thirteenth and the tenth centuries and swarming with archaic expressions, only recently explained by Canaanite parallels. This Psalm has often been attributed to the Maccabean period (second century B.C.), in spite of the fact that the Jewish scholars who translated it into Greek in the same century did not understand it any better than the Masoretes a thousand years later. This is typical of the utter absurdity of much so-called "critical" work in the biblical field. A rapidly increasing number of scholars today deny any Maccabean Psalms and doubt whether any part of the Psalter is later than the fourth or even fifth century B.C.

IV

Until the Ugaritic tablets were published, it was impossible to make an effective contrast between the early faith of Israel and the religion of ancient Canaan, since we had scarcely any original Canaanite literature on which to base such a contrast. Before the discovery of the Ugaritic epics the present writer had emphasized that the leading Canaanite deities, such as Baal, were "high gods," not merely vegetation spirits or local deities. This was proved conclusively by the Ugaritic texts, where Baal plays a role closely comparable to that of the Homeric Zeus, who was "father of men and of gods" and whose authority was limited only by the boundaries of the world. The first scholar after the publication of the new material to stress the impossibility of the views of Wellhausen on the evolution of Israelite religious culture was, strangely enough, no conservative theologian, but a leading French agnostic and anticlerical, René Dussaud.

The days when Yahweh was thought to have won a victory over Baal because he was chief god of a whole tribe, whereas Baal was merely a term designating a host of local deities, each ruling only in a single town and its vicinity, are over. We now know that the followers of Yahweh and of

Baal both considered their own gods as cosmic in power; the main difference between them was that Baal was storm-god, head of a whole pantheon of deities, while Yahweh was sole God of the entire known universe, with no pantheon. The gods of Baal's pantheon included relatives and even foes; neither the gods nor the world were in general his creation. Yahweh, on the other hand, was creator of all that existed. This is not the place to describe the total breakdown of Wellhausenism under the impact of our new knowledge of antiquity; suffice it to say that no arguments have been brought against early Israelite monotheism that would not apply equally well (with appropriate changes in specific evidence) to postexilic Judaism. Nothing can alter the now certain fact that the gulf between the religions of Israel and of Canaan was as great as the resemblance between their material cultures and their poetic literatures.

V

The period of Old Testament history beginning with Joiachin in 598 B.C. and ending with Ezra and Nehemiah less than two centuries later, was regarded two generations ago as the cornerstone of Old Testament history. Then in 1895 and 1896 W. H. Kusters and C. C. Torrey began their onslaughts on postexilic history, followed by S. A. Cook and others. Torrey started by denying the authenticity of the Ezra Memoirs and went on to reject that of the Book of Ezekiel and finally that of the Book of Jeremiah. Continuing with remorseless logic (given his totally unacceptable premises), he denied that there had been a thoroughgoing devastation of Judah and Jerusalem by the Chaldeans in the time of Nebuchadnezzar, that there had been any real Exile or Restoration, and that there was an Ezra. The figure of Nehemiah he regarded as obscure and unimportant.

In 1923, G. Hölscher, followed twenty years later by W. A. Irwin, with a train of scholars holding mediating positions, reduced Ezekiel, previously considered as the most solid foundation of the Wellhausen structure, to a tiny nucleus of allegedly authentic verses, all the rest of the book being treated as much later than the sixth century B.C. Torrey, of course, rejected Ezekiel entirely. The theological implications of these views are very extreme. Having eliminated this major series of crises in Old Testament history, the predictions of the Prophets are automatically nullified, with respect both to the coming doom and to the consequent Restoration of Israel. The Old Testament loses most of its majesty, and its meaning for our day is reduced immeasurably.

The views of these scholars have been categorically disproved by the archeological discoveries of the past twenty years. Excavation and surface exploration in Judah have proved that the towns of Judah were not only completely destroyed by the Chaldeans in their two invasions, but were not reoccupied for generations—often never again in history. This is solidly demonstrated by the evidence of pottery (which serves the archeologist as fossils serve the geologist in dating periods), confirmed by a steadily increasing number of inscriptions from the last years of the Kingdom of Judah. Vivid light is shed on these events by the Lachish Ostraca and other recently discovered documents.

For instance, several stamped jar handles bearing the name of "Elia-kim, steward of YWKN," have been found in the ruins of the last occupation of two towns of Judah before the final catastrophe. YWKN was at once identified with King Joiachin, in spite of certain apparent difficulties in the form of the name. A few years later (1939) E. F. Weidner published several ration lists of Nebuchadnezzar excavated by the Germans at Babylon, in which one of the recipients appears repeatedly (in the year 592, six years after Joiachin had been exiled to Babylon) as "Yawkin, king of Judah." It would be difficult to find more clear-cut evidence of the time of the destruction and the authenticity of Joiachin's exile in Babylon. Incidentally, Torrey asserted that no Jewish *gardeners* can possibly have been taken as captives to Babylon—but we have in these same ration lists, among other captive Jews, a Jewish *gardener*! The attempt by Torrey and Irwin to show that there was no Jewish dispersion in Babylonia to which Ezekiel can have preached—assuming that he existed at all—has collapsed entirely. That neither language nor content of the Book of Ezekiel fits any period or place outside of the early sixth century B.C. and Babylonia, has been proved in detail by C. G. Howie (1950).

If we turn to the Book of Ezra, recent discoveries have vindicated the authenticity of its official documents in the most striking way. Here again Torrey and others have insisted that the language of the book is late, dating from the third century B.C., after Alexander the Great. The publication of the fifth-century Elephantine Papyri (1904-1911) from a Jewish colony near Assuan in upper Egypt had already made Torrey's position difficult, but subsequent discoveries by Mittwoch, Eilers, and others have dealt it the *coup de grâce*. For example, Torrey insisted that certain words, among them *pithgama*, "matter, affair," were of Greek origin and could not, therefore, have been taken into biblical Aramaic before 330 B.C. In the last twenty years these very same words have turned

up in Egyptian Aramaic and Babylonian cuneiform documents from the late fifth century, that is, from the very time of Ezra! The forced Greek etymologies which he proposed are now mere curiosities. The great ancient historian, Eduard Meyer, fifty-five years ago insisted on the substantial authenticity of the Persian decrees and official letters preserved in Ezra; during the past twenty years strong additional evidence for them has been published by H. H. Schaefer and Elias Bickerman. If it were practicable to quote from still unpublished Aramaic documents from fifth-century Egypt, the weight of factual evidence would crush all opposition.

Archeological data have thus demonstrated the substantial originality of the Books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Ezra and Nehemiah, beyond doubt; they have confirmed the traditional picture of events, as well as their order. Of course, there are minor modifications; it is probable that Nehemiah preceded Ezra instead of following him, and it is certain that Nehemiah's foes, Sanballat and Tobiah, were not pagans and were regarded by some of their contemporaries as being as good, if not better, Jews than Nehemiah. The picture of more than 40,000 Babylonian Jews leaving soon after the Cyrus decree in order to return to the land of their fathers is quite unjustified by the facts of tradition and it has now become incredible. The Jews actually returned in smaller groups, and the census list in question belongs to the third quarter of the fifth century, a century after the Decree of Cyrus.

VI

Passing from the end of the Old Testament period to the New Testament, we immediately encounter the problem of the Gospel of John. Since the School of Tübingen in the first half of the nineteenth century and the Dutch School in the second half of the century, radical critics have placed John's Gospel about the middle of the second century A.D., or even a little later. There was a reaction over a generation ago against this extreme view, which is now excluded by striking finds of Greek papyrus fragments of the Gospel itself and of a secondary compilation based partly on it (both published in 1935), both of which must date before about A.D. 150. At present, however, it is safe to say that most "liberal" New Testament scholars date the Gospel between A.D. 90 and 130. Many insist with R. Bultmann on its alleged Gnostic background. All these scholars, even including many moderately conservative students, separate the Gospel from the authentic tradition which is believed to underlie the Synoptic Gospels, and treat it as an essentially apocryphal document of interest only to historians of later Christianity and systematic theologians.

There can, of course, be no doubt that the Gospel of John is largely independent of the Synoptic tradition and that early Christian tradition dated it later than it dated them. Nor can there be any doubt that the Gospel of John was a favorite book of many Gnostics, including particularly the Valentinians. Yet this is no more a reason for regarding the Gospel itself as coming from a Gnostic milieu than for treating Plato as a Gnostic because Valentine's metaphysics was strongly influenced by him.

But the recent discoveries of Gnostic books in Egypt have completely changed the picture with respect to Gnosticism. We now know that the Church Fathers did not appreciably exaggerate their accounts of Gnosticism, and that the gap between Christianity and any form of second-century Gnosticism was tremendous. The efforts of recent historians of religion to picture a Gnosticism which resembled the Gospel of John more closely than anything known from Patristic tradition have been nullified by the discoveries at Chenoboscium, briefly described above. And Bultmann's attempt to derive the thought of John's Gospel from the Mesopotamian Gnostics known as Mandeans has been disproved by the demonstration of a late date for Mandeism (fifth century A.D. and later) by E. Peterson, F. C. Burkitt, and H. Lietzmann. The *coup de grâce* to the Mandaean hypothesis came after the publication of three Manichean codices in 1933-1940, as described above. Yet there remains a faint suggestion of Gnostic ways of thinking in our Gospel, which will be discussed below.

A very important step forward in the historical interpretation of the Gospel of John was taken when several Semitic scholars recognized that the Greek of this Gospel reflects an Aramaic background. It is not the vernacular (*Koine*) Greek of the contemporary papyri discovered in Egypt, but a vernacular Greek with very strong Semitic coloring, both in vocabulary and in syntax. Few would go as far as C. C. Torrey, who insists that it is a *translation* from a written Aramaic original. But every scholar with comparable knowledge of both Greek and Aramaic has recognized the Aramaizing quality of the language. Hence Torrey makes the Gospel earlier than the Synoptics, and he was followed in this respect by the late A. T. Olmstead, who maintained in his *Jesus in the Light of History* (1942) that the narratives of the Gospel were written *before* A.D. 40, while the "sermons" were later (though not as late as believed by other New Testament scholars).

In the writer's *Pelican Archeology of Palestine* (1949) he demonstrated with numerous examples that the references to places, persons, and things in John went back to before the First Jewish Revolt in A.D. 66-70, which ended with the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of the Chris-

tians from Western Palestine. It becomes hypercritical to insist on a second-century date for material which goes back so clearly to Aramaic informants in Palestine before A.D. 70.

In 1945, Erwin Goodenough, Yale historian of religion and authority on Philo, the great Jewish contemporary of Paul, pointed out with great emphasis that there is nothing specifically Gnostic in John's Gospel. On the contrary, Goodenough held, it is "a primitive Gospel," going back to the very beginnings of Christianity. He pointed out that the currently accepted critical order, Paul's Epistles, the Synoptic Gospels, and John, does not do elementary justice to the fact that there is much more in common, in some respects, between Paul and John than between either of them and the Synoptics. Goodenough did not touch on the linguistic or archeological aspects of the question, but limited himself to ideas and their development.

There remained, however, a serious weakness in the position of Goodenough—there was no extant literature illustrating the climate of ideas assumed by him as antecedent to John's Gospel. Nor could the present writer's earlier position (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 1940) be directly confirmed, that there were proto-Gnostic influences behind John's Gospel, which, without being in any way specifically Gnostic, provided the soil in which Gnosticism could grow in the second half of the first century A.D.

With the publication of the Dead Sea Scrolls since 1948, this is entirely changed, and we now have remarkably close parallels to the conceptual imagery of John in the new Essene documents from the last century and a half before Jesus' ministry. To be sure, parallels had been noted in the earlier sectarian Jewish literature from intertestamental times, such as the Book of Jubilees, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and Enoch, probably all dating in the main from the early decades of the second century B.C. But in our new scrolls we have much closer contacts with both John and Paul, especially with the former. Most striking is the simple cosmic dualism common to both: God against Satan; light against darkness; "truth, right," against "falsehood, deception, error"; "good, holy," against "evil, wicked"; "flesh" against "spirit," etc. On the other hand, the Gospel of John does not reflect the use of "mystery" and "knowledge" (*gnosis*) which is common to the Dead Sea Scrolls and to Paul. As A. D. Nock has lately shown, the use of these concepts in the New Testament has little in common with the conceptual world of the mystery religions or

Gnosticism; it goes back to intertestamental literature. The new scrolls confirm and illustrate Nock's demonstration.

In other words, the thought content of John's Gospel reflects the Jewish background of John the Baptist and Jesus, not that of later times. Sayings and deeds of Jesus, narratives and sermons are all of one piece and cannot be separated from the person of our Lord. To be sure, the order in which the memories of the Beloved Disciple were transmitted to posterity by a pupil or secretary is no longer historically exact, and the boundaries between happenings in the flesh and events in the spirit have sometimes been dissolved, but the Gospel of John carries us straight back to the heart of Jesus. No valid distinction between a suprahistorical Christ and a historical Jesus can be made on the basis of misleading historical assumptions, and there is no room for existentialist *Entmythologisierung* in the manner of Bultmann. There is no reason to date the Gospel after A.D. 90; it may be earlier.

VII

In conclusion we emphasize the fact that archeological discovery has been largely responsible for the recent revival of interest in biblical theology, because of the wealth of new material illustrating text and background of the Bible. As the reader will have seen from this article, new archeological material continues to pour in, compelling revision of all past approaches to both Old and New Testament religion. It becomes clearer each day that this rediscovery of the Bible often leads to a new evaluation of biblical faith, which strikingly resembles the orthodoxy of an earlier day. Neither an academic scholasticism nor an irresponsible neo-orthodoxy must be allowed to divert our eyes from the living faith of the Bible.

Authority, Scripture, and Tradition

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

THE RELATIONSHIP of Scripture and Tradition is variously interpreted by the churches. In this article we shall see that the Eastern Orthodox communions place Scripture and Tradition on the same level. The Roman communion holds Tradition to be superior to Scripture. The fundamentalists assert the verbal infallibility of the Bible. The left-wing liberals believe reason to be superior to any historical revelation. Classical Protestantism, in this case represented by the Anglican communion, accepts the authority of Scripture and treats Tradition with great respect.

I

The approach of the Orthodox is dual and is expressed as follows: "We derive our knowledge of the teaching of the Christian Religion from Holy Scripture and Sacred Tradition, which we therefore call the sources of our religion."¹ Thus both Scripture and Tradition are embedded in the Orthodox Church, which is held to be the unerring bearer and teacher of all truth. To the Orthodox, there is no Bible or Tradition without the Church, so that the Church is actually prior to its authorities.²

Revelation is defined by the Orthodox as "that which God Himself has revealed to men, in order that they might rightly and savingly believe in Him, and worthily honor Him."³ Knowledge of God is possible through natural means, but such knowledge is of value only as it serves to prepare for faith. The dogma of the Church stems directly from a sphere of revelation centering in the Bible, the early Ecumenical Councils, and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed. This creed is considered "a full

¹ *Orthodox Catechism* of Balanos, Athens, 1920; quoted by Gavin, *Greek Orthodox Thought*. Morehouse-Gorham Company, 1923, p. 17.

² Cf. Zankov, *The Eastern Orthodox Church*. Morehouse-Gorham Company, 1930, p. 75.

³ *Catechism of the Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church*, 1901, p. 4.

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and complete confession of orthodox faith."⁴ The Orthodox Church claims that its faith has not been changed and that it reflects the dogma of the primitive Church through the first eight centuries. There have been more explicit formulations of doctrine since that time, but no real changes have taken place.

The Bible is not conceived by the Orthodox as explicitly containing all things necessary for salvation. "The Holy Scriptures, from their avowed purpose, neither were written nor purported to be a full and systematic presentation of the Father first imparted by a living voice."⁵ Much else has come down to us from the *secret apostolic tradition* and from the practices and customs of the true Catholic Church.

The Orthodox Church treats the Septuagint with the same reverence as Rome gives the Vulgate. Although emendations are accepted on the basis of the Hebrew text, the Septuagint has canonical standing and no new translations into modern Greek are accepted.

The Holy Scriptures are said to be "inspired" but not to be "literal" in their authority. No modern criticism can destroy this inspiration, for it depends on the energizing power of the Holy Spirit in the writers and in the Church. The rule of interpretation is "the mind of the Church," as Hippolytus said. The Bible taken alone may be entirely misleading to the individual.

It is here that the oral Tradition comes to the rescue. The New Testament arose from this oral Tradition, and the latter remained more detailed than what was reduced to writing. Thus the Tradition "written not with pen and ink upon parchment but in the hearts of the Faithful by the Holy Spirit, may more properly be called the first canon of Faith."⁶ Oral Tradition is the original instrument. Nothing was written until Moses' time. Jesus wrote nothing. Tradition speaks to all men, while books are available to only a few. The Holy Spirit is the author of both Scripture and Tradition. Heretics have always cast Tradition aside, because anything can be proved by Scripture but men are bound to the truth by Tradition.

There is some question among Orthodox theologians as to which elements in the Tradition are binding, although even here there are two elements to be noted: if the findings of a later Council or Synod add nothing new to the original Tradition, they are valid; and if the seal of acceptance of one Synod through "the mind of the Church" is given to new

⁴ Zankov, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵ Androutsos, in Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁶ Rhôsse, quoted by Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

findings by subsequent Synods, they also become valid and binding. This provides for development in doctrine and dogma, although not for the evolution of entirely new concepts.

This line of reasoning is made abundantly clear in a statement by St. Basil the Great, as quoted in one of the Catechisms:

For were we to dare to reject unwritten customs, as if they had no great importance, we should insensibly mutilate the Gospel, even in the most essential points, or rather, for the teaching of the Apostles leave but an empty name. For instance: let us mention before all else the very first and commonest act of Christians; that they who trust in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, should sign themselves with the sign of the cross; who hath taught this by writing? To turn to the east in prayer; what Scripture have we for this? The words of invocation in the change of the Eucharistic bread and of the Cup of blessing; by which of the Saints have they been left to us in writing? For we are not content with those words which the Apostle or the Gospel records, but both before and after them we pronounce others also, which we hold to be of great force for the Sacrament, though we have received them for unwritten teaching. By what Scripture is it in like manner that we bless the water of Baptism, the oil of unction, and the person himself who is baptized? Is it not by a silent and secret tradition? What more? The very practice of anointing with oil; what written word have we for it? Whence is the rule of trine immersion? and the rest of the ceremonies at Baptism, the renunciation of Satan and his angels? from what Scripture are they taken? Are they not all from this unpublished and private teaching, which our Fathers kept under a reserve inaccessible to curiosity and profane disquisition, having been taught as a first principle to guard by silence the sanctity of the mysteries? For how were it fit to publish in writing the doctrine of those things, on which the unbaptized may not so much as look? ⁷

While to the Protestant this argument may seem to stand the truth on its head, the Orthodox writers contrast their position with those held by Protestants and by Rome. Rhôsse writes that Protestants "are incapable of having the Faith which was taught throughout the years, for they deny in principle the equal validity of Tradition as a source of Christian Truth, and reject the Church as the supreme interpreter of Holy Scripture."⁸ Homiyakov shows in brilliant fashion how the Protestant view is inadequate from the Orthodox perspective:

Protestants call the Bible Holy Scriptures, but with what justification? Why do they ascribe such an absolute authenticity and authority to a book which is nothing more than a collection of separate writings, ascribed to different authors of whose very names we are not always certain? Does the authenticity come from the historic authenticity of its content? But such an authenticity, even if exactly proved by criticism, which is not at all the case, could have significance only for the historical part, which is only a very small portion of the Scriptures, and would be no guarantee for the dogmatic, by far the most important section. Or is it the names which give

⁷ *Catechism of the Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church*, p. 8.

⁸ Quoted in Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 43 note.

this guarantee? But those names are very often unknown or doubtful, and there is no shadow or foundation for believing the names of St. Mark or St. Luke or St. Apollos to be more reliable than Papias or St. Clement or St. Polycarp. Yet the writings of these latter are not recognized as having Biblical authority. Does the authenticity arise from the pure doctrine expressed in the Book? But then there must exist a norm for this doctrine, which is before the Bible and stands as a standard of its sanctity. The Canon, only the Canon, confirms the Bible as Holy Scriptures, and here not even the finest logic can undertake to separate the Canon from the Church. The Canon rests on the confidence of the Church. To accept the Holy Scriptures is to accept the irrefutable authority of the Church.⁹

While the Protestant view of Scripture is rejected, Zankov feels that there is a closer affinity between Orthodoxy and classical Protestantism, especially as illustrated in Lutheranism and Anglicanism, than between Orthodoxy and Rome, primarily because he believes that Rome has rejected the authority of the Bible while Protestants take seriously both the Bible and the early Councils and writings of the Fathers. He does not minimize the differences, but he feels that there is no hope of reunion with Rome, while there is hope in the Ecumenical Movement. Liberalism and Rationalism are suspect, and it is classical Protestantism in which he has confidence. He believes that Rome has a proper theory of development, but distorts it in practice by promulgating novel doctrines without regard for either Scripture or Tradition. In the last analysis, only the Orthodox Church has kept both the full Tradition and the full teaching of Scripture, backed by the supreme authority of the true Church.

II

We have been dealing with the position of the Orthodox Church in some detail as a frame of reference for the remainder of this article. We turn now to the position of the Roman Catholic Church. A group of English Roman Catholic Bishops once referred to Tyndale's translation as "a certain heretical and damnable book called the New Testament."¹⁰ While this is not the official view of the Roman communion, often the Bible seems to be treated as having no doctrinal or authoritative value whatever. Technically, the Roman Church accepts a fundamentalist view of the Bible, but it is very careful to keep the interpretation of the Bible subject to the Church's authority. Here are the pertinent quotations from the *Catholic Encyclopedia*: "The Bible, as the inspired record of revelation, contains the Word of God; that is, it contains those revealed truths which the Holy Ghost wishes to be transmitted in writing. However, all revealed

⁹ Quoted in Zankov, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

¹⁰ Scott, C. Anderson, *Romanism and the Gospel*. Presbyterian Board, 1946, p. 159.

truths are not contained in the Bible; neither is every truth in the Bible revealed, if by revealed is meant the manifestation of hidden truths which could not otherwise be known." Yet, as the Vatican Council says, "having been written by inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author. . . . The inerrancy of the Bible follows as a consequence of this divine authorship."¹¹

The line of argument is much the same as that proposed by the Orthodox, who agree that Rome has a proper theory of development. The Roman view, however, goes beyond that of the Orthodox emphasis on "the mind of the Church," to a hierarchical view of the authority of the Church which centers in the Pope. It was the Church, says Rome, which existed before the New Testament, wrote the New Testament, and decided the Canon of the New Testament—which means that the Church already had a standard of faith and an authority superior to the New Testament in order to accomplish this. But it means also that the unwritten, secret Tradition still exists in the teachings and liturgy and councils of the Church.

The Orthodox and Rome agree that it is not obvious, as Protestants are supposed to believe, that the Scriptures are inspired or inerrant, "save in a Divine testimony, not being contained in the Holy Books with sufficient clearness and amplitude." Even the "scholar who is only a scholar" cannot recognize any necessary warrant, unless it is "brought by a Divinely attested authority, as is, according to Catholics, the authority of the living magisterium of the Church."¹²

When Cardinal Newman attempted to justify dogmas such as the Immaculate Conception and the Infallibility of the Pope, both obviously non-Scriptural, he wrote:

It is a first strong point that, in an idea such as Christianity, developments cannot but be, and those surely divine, because it is divine; a second that, if so, they are the very ones which exist, because there are no others; and a third point is the fact that they are found just there, where true developments ought to be found—namely, in the historic seat of Apostolical teachings and in the authorized home of immemorial tradition.¹³

It is clear that once we grant the possibility of development of Christian doctrine, on terms either of the Orthodox or of Rome, we run into almost insurmountable difficulties in refuting their claims. Why should we stop with one, or five, or seven, or seventy councils?

¹¹ *Catholic Encyclopedia*, 1907, Vol. II, p. 543. The Orthodox Church has no such fundamentalism and no "Bible Commission" to dictate findings of biblical scholarship, but rather compares itself with Anglicanism in its completely free use of scholarship from within the Church. Cf. Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 25-28.

¹² *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XV, p. 7.

¹³ *Essays on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, Longmans Green Company, 1949, III, 120.

From the Protestant point of view, Hanson and Fuller summarize the Roman claim as follows:

If you grant that the Roman Catholic Church is the only representative of the Catholic Church, whatever it believes must be right, because the only test of rightness is—what it believes. It is not Scripture, it is not even tradition in the strict sense that is the test of belief, but “the sense or sentiment of the Faithful,” “the instinct,” the “present thought of the Church,” “the intention of the heart,” “the feeling” of the faithful. Within certain very broad limits and under given conditions, in matters doctrinal, what is, is right—because it is.¹⁴

The Protestant is aware that traditions grew up in the life and worship of the primitive Church. Traditions continue to develop in all parts of the Christian Church today. But there is not a whit of evidence for “the survival of an oral, unwritten, doctrinal tradition after the Scriptures have appeared and have begun to circulate.”¹⁵ There are many sources of information other than Scripture about the early Church in the writings of the Apologists and the Fathers, and Protestants admit that much of value may be found there; the Apocryphal New Testament also enlightens some aspects of biblical understanding, although it often proves offensive to Christian faith. But it is exactly at this point that those who take the authority of Scripture seriously have a basis for rejecting much that was false in those crude and primitive days.

The Protestant rejects the Orthodox and Roman claim for the authority of such an oral Tradition, because the Protestant does not believe that such a Tradition exists. There may be much that is good in the customs listed by St. Basil, such as the sign of the cross and anointing with oil, but the Protestant would at the least place these at the periphery of his beliefs and practices. Furthermore, the Protestant rejects the Orthodox and Roman views of the authority of the Church, although this leaves him in a difficult position when it comes to defining heresy or providing for a sound theory of development.

III

We turn now to three Protestant views, those of the fundamentalists, the left-wing liberals, and classical Protestantism. The fundamentalists agree in theory with the Orthodox and Roman Catholic positions that the Holy Scriptures are infallible and without error. In 1923, the Presbyterian Assembly passed a resolution which affirmed faith in the infallibility of the Bible, in the virgin birth of Christ, in the substitutionary atonement on the cross, in Christ's bodily and physical resurrection and ascension,

¹⁴ Hanson, R., and Fuller, R., *The Church of Rome: a Dissuasive*. S.C.M. Press, 1949, p. 69.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

and in his mighty miracles. Frequently, there is added to this list faith in the imminent second coming of Christ, with a thousand years of Christ's leadership, followed by a final state of bliss under the direct supervision of God himself.¹⁶

The fundamentalists insist on the verbal inspiration of the writers and on the Old and New Testaments as the only infallible rule of faith and practice. No principle of interpretation is assumed. Biblical scholarship is restricted to textual criticism, where men like J. Gresham Machen have made genuine contributions, for most fundamentalists insist that only the original documents are infallible. The King James translation is held in the highest regard, but is open to further investigation and textual study.

This position fails to provide a procedure by which the Bible can come to terms with modern knowledge, especially in the field of science, as the trial in Tennessee showed when John Scopes was convicted of teaching the theory of evolution. There is no principle of development, as in the Orthodox and Roman communions, whereby traditions may illuminate biblical passages and new knowledge may make the Word of God more relevant.

Furthermore, the strict biblicism of the fundamentalists is not consistent. There is a principle of interpretation which seems to other Christians to provide a means of selecting certain doctrines to the exclusion of equally significant ones. They insist on the virgin birth as a biological fact, which means that belief in the Incarnation turns on this one historical question. They interpret the Atonement in terms of satisfaction and substitution, and do not allow for other theories which have existed throughout the history of the church. They insist in a bodily Resurrection and Ascension as the only interpretation of the biblical evidence. They affirm that the miracles of Christ were always a working superior to the laws of nature, thus eliminating any act of God in the natural order.

So the biblical literalism of the fundamentalists may be seen as colored by theological presuppositions. The Orthodox and Roman query of where these prior assumptions come from is impossible for them to answer on their own grounds. It would seem that here is an unwritten Tradition within Protestantism that guides the fundamentalist in his interpretation of the Scriptures.

The extreme literalism of the fundamentalists has placed them outside the main stream of classical and ecumenical Christianity. While churches

¹⁶ Cf. Rian, Edwin H., *The Presbyterian Conflict*, Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1940, p. 34; Machen, J. G., *The Christian Faith and the Modern World*, pp. 32-86; Riley, W. B., in Charles Braden, *Varieties of American Religion*, pp. 11-26.

containing fundamentalists are found within the ecumenical movement, the sectarian groups which are officially fundamentalist do not seek the ecumenical fellowship on either the local or the international level.

IV

The opposite extreme from the position of biblical inerrancy is that held by certain left-wing Christians. Normally they are not organized and often they disagree among themselves, so that no statement of their position may be considered definitive. The position is not a new one and antedates fundamentalism by at least a century. The attitude toward the Bible was expressed in 1819 by W. E. Channing:

Our leading principle in interpreting Scripture is this—that the Bible is a book written for men, in the language of men, and that its meaning is to be sought in the same manner as that of any other book. . . . We indeed grant that the use of reason in religion is accompanied with danger. But we ask any honest man to look back on the history of the Church, and say, whether the renunciation of it be not still more dangerous.¹⁷

Using the canons of philosophical reasoning as a basis for interpreting Scripture, it was natural that the presuppositions of a liberal culture should color the meaning of the gospel. The optimism of liberalism's doctrine of the goodness of man and of the love of God became a subjective element in the interpretation of both Scripture and history. Biblical scholarship frequently reflected the assumptions of modern anthropology and of the philosophy of inevitable progress. This left-wing type of liberalism, significant as it was in opening men's eyes to knowledge of new facts, was often incapable of letting the facts speak for themselves. When Albert Schweitzer flashed across the horizon with his theory of Jesus' consistent eschatology, men like Dean Inge were convinced that Jesus could not have thought in such a way because certainly no English gentleman would believe such a thing.

What had happened, just as surely as in the Orthodox, Roman, and fundamentalist approaches, was that a foreign element became more important than the internal meaning of Scripture itself. A theory of development overran the basic authority, and Scripture was forced into a strait jacket of the assumptions of left-wing liberal optimism. But whereas other positions we have considered were held by official groups and churches, the left-wing position was expressed only by a few small churches such as the Unitarian and among individuals who maintained membership in other churches or

¹⁷ Quoted in Ferm, V., *Encyclopedia of Religion*. Philosophical Library, 1945, p. 443.

no church. The position was influential because it forced other Protestants to face certain facts which otherwise might have been obscured; and therefore what was significant in this position has found a place in the current thinking of classical Protestantism.

V

Somewhere between these two extremes of Protestant thinking, and also showing a contrast to the Orthodox and Roman views, is the attitude maintained by a large majority of Christians in the major Protestant denominations. Derived from Luther, Calvin, Hooker, and others, this point of view has been attained at a great sacrifice of effort and often at the cost of mental and spiritual torture. It is a position that has come to terms with biblical scholarship, modern science, and cultural values without losing the insights and convictions of evangelical Christianity. As an example of main-line Protestantism which is still aware of a Catholic heritage, the position of the Protestant Episcopal Church may be taken as representative.

The Reformation in England was a declaration of independence from arbitrary authority and the replacement of it with a persuasive, moral authority which rested in the acceptance of obligations by the individual. The Prayer Book was strictly scriptural in its interpretations, and what was scriptural in the inherited Catholicism was retained along with the newly rediscovered Protestant insights.

The Protestant Episcopal Church agrees with the Lutheran and Calvinist communions that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation," but this is not an acceptance of any kind of infallibility or inerrancy. In 1785, some portions of Scripture were deleted from the lectionary with the reason, quaintly put, that they "were inexpedient to be read in mixt assemblies."

Within the Bible, however, is to be found the unique, true, final, and saving revelation of the one true God. This is the indisputable claim made by all Protestant Christians. The Bible *contains*, that is, has within it as an essential and discoverable element, what is *necessary* for salvation, for it is the record of the mighty acts of God in history. It tells the story of God's relationships with man in a drama of redemption through the creation of the universe, the coming of the law, our salvation through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the establishment of the Church as the means of giving Christ to the world, and the promise of a final judgment of God on his creation.

This conclusion is drawn from the character of the books of the Bible.

In spite of the Orthodox and Roman claims that the authority of the Bible must be buttressed by the Church, "the Bible possesses authority for Christians on the ground that it is the classical literature of that progressive revelation of God in history which culminated in Jesus Christ," say the competent Englishmen who wrote *Doctrine in the Church of England*.¹⁸

These same writers claim that only a broad principle of interpretation guides us. The authority of Scripture does not preclude any findings of biblical scholarship, of modern science, of levels of spiritual values, or of new thought forms. The standard is very real. It is "the Mind of Christ as unfolded in the experience of the Church and appropriated by the individual Christian through His Spirit."¹⁹ Allowances must be made for discovering the actual words of Jesus in the Gospels, and yet "it remains true that the religious and moral teaching of the Gospels conveys faithfully the impress made upon the Apostolic Church by the mind and personality of Jesus, and thus possesses supreme authority."²⁰ The use of the term "mind of Christ" as a means of judgment lacks the clarity of legal and literal renderings of authority, but it provides a perspective in terms of basic attitudes by which the remainder of the Bible can be understood. The doctrine of "the mind of Christ" has the objectivity of the teachings of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, but it also includes the insights provided by history and by the subjective elements of the individual's own choice. This solution does not provide an absolute authority, but it makes room for the principle of development based on Scripture which is much more reliable than the other theories we have considered.

In a very real sense, the Scriptures are part of the Tradition of which the Orthodox and Roman communions speak. There is always a developing tradition within the experience of the Church. The sound test of this development is always Holy Scripture, and thus tradition is subservient to Scripture. The authority of the Church, therefore, is always inferior to Scripture. There is a suspicion even of the General Councils, for errors crept in at least within the first three centuries.

The claim of the Orthodox and Roman Churches that because the Church created the Scriptures it has primary authority, is easily exploded by the classical Protestant view, for the true foundation of both Scriptures and the Church is Jesus Christ. In so far as the Church may be said to

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31; cf. pp. 27-31.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33. Cf. Dentan, Robert, et al., *The Holy Scriptures*. National Council, Protestant Episcopal Church, 1949, pp. 5-24; Pike and Pitinger, *The Faith of the Church*, pp. 16-20.

have written the New Testament, it made itself subservient to the revelation recorded in the total Jewish-Christian tradition. Thus, the Church is subject to the Word of God, or the Holy Spirit does not reside in the Church; but the Church is not limited to the Scripture, for the Holy Spirit resides in the Church.

In controversies of faith, according to the Articles of Religion of several Protestant Churches, the Church has authority to declare positions heretical. This is primarily a matter of jurisdiction or discipline, but it leads to the restriction of doctrinal anarchy. The test is always in terms of Scripture. "Although the Church be a witness and keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree anything against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce anything to be believed for necessity of Salvation," say the Articles of Religion.

The communions which maintain creeds or credal affirmations see the creeds to be of value as clarifying or representing scriptural truths. There is a remarkable passage on the use of symbolic language in *Doctrine in the Church of England*: Statements in the creeds which cannot be accepted literally may "have value as pictorial statements of spiritual truths, even though the supposed facts themselves did not actually happen. . . . It is not therefore illegitimate to accept and affirm particular clauses in the creeds in this symbolic fashion." This statement is immediately qualified: "It is, however, in any case essential to hold that the facts underlying the Gospel story—which story the creeds summarize and interpret—were such as to justify the Gospel itself." In the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth we must believe that "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us."²¹

Classical Protestantism, with its faith based on Scripture, allows for the right of private judgment. The individual in the Church must use his reason and must work out his own faith. He "ought to test his belief in practice, so far as his ability and training qualify him, to think out his own belief, and to distinguish between what he has accepted on authority only and what he has appropriated in thought and experience. But he must recognize that it is only in the fellowship and worship of the community that he can come fully to appreciate and accept."²² Lest this seem too liberal, coming from the leadership of William Temple, a quotation from the Catholic wing of Anglicanism is significant: "The final appeal is to the spir-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

itual, intellectual, and historical content of divine revelation, *as verifiable at the three-fold bar of history, reason and spiritual experience.*"²³

We have interpreted classical Protestantism according to Anglican formularies and authorities. It is true that Anglicanism partakes more deeply of the Catholic and Renaissance traditions, but all of Protestantism shares to some degree in this approach. Both freedom and authority are subsumed under the concept of loyalty to the living God and to the Christian community. Where there is commitment to the God revealed in Jesus Christ, a consecrated reason may safely examine the inherited doctrines of the Church and the historical foundations of faith. Thus authority and freedom are blended together in the worshiping community which has its roots in the historical revelation of God in Christ.

VI

The authority of Scripture as found in classical Protestantism provides an answer to the dilemma of the relation of Scripture to Tradition as found in the Orthodox and Roman communions. It also avoids the fundamentalist error of believing in inerrant authority and of inability to provide for development. It limits the uncontrolled freedom of the left-wing groups. Freedom under authority, with the historical revelation of God in Christ as the center, with the Church equally under the same authority of Scripture, and with genuine development in line with the acts of God in history, supplies a sane and balanced view of the place of Scripture in the world today. Classical Protestants are persuaded, both the ministers and the lay people in their God-given freedom, that "the Holy Scriptures contain all doctrine required as necessary to salvation through faith in Jesus Christ."

²³ *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 95. Cf. Ferris, *Episcopalians United*, for a similar treatment of this last section.

The Military Establishment in a Democracy

ROBERT E. FITCH

IN CASE WAR COMES, do we fight or not? If we mean to fight, then with what sort of military establishment do we prepare to fight?

These are two questions that confront Americans today with a cruel urgency. They are questions we do not like to answer. We prefer to conduct our national affairs on the assumption that such questions are irrelevant, or, at the very worst, a transitory impertinence. The two questions, of course, are on two different levels. If you give a negative answer to the first, then there is no need to consider the second. If you answer the first question in the affirmative, then you must consider the second. The answer to the first question involves a decision in terms of fundamental Christian principles. The answer to the second question involves initially a decision about techniques. And matters of principle involved in the second question must be considered on a comparative rather than on an absolute basis.

At present all that is clear about our thinking concerning these affairs is the confusion of that thinking. This essay is an attempt to fight a way out of that confusion. First of all I should like to document that confusion, so that we may be contrite in the certainty that it exists. Then I should like to consider the various alternatives. There is the pacifist alternative. There are the several alternative military establishments. There are the alternatives in detail in a judgment of the character of the emergency, in a calculation of the long-range impact of this or of that policy. It is unlikely that I can present these alternatives without revealing my own prejudices. But I do not expect everyone to concur in these prejudices. What I do expect, what I am sure of, is that the Christian conscience in America must confront those alternatives, and make some kind of honest and unequivocal choice among them.

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I. AREAS OF CONFUSION

Right now the only clear thing about us is that we are confused. We are confused about policy. We are confused about facts. Confusions about policy exist both in military circles and in church circles. Confusions about facts are a common property of the general population.

The recently defeated bill for universal military training is a good example of confusion in the military mind. The first practical judgment to be made about the bill was that it was militarily worthless. Any amateur of modern warfare knows that six months of military training will not prepare a man to fight anybody or anything. And no amount of reserve training, stretched out over several years, can compensate for that deficiency. One is compelled to believe that it was the military politicians who sponsored the bill, in the hope that it would be an entering wedge for something better. One is also compelled to believe that none of the high command in the Pentagon could possibly have had any respect for such a bill. In a rational society this bill would have been opposed by the military as worthless, and in a rational society it might even have been championed by some shrewd opponents precisely because it was worthless. We were treated, however, to the extraordinary spectacle of the military authorities' defending a militarily worthless program of military training, while the only people who pointed out the military inefficiency of the program were those pacifists who prepared the excellent report on the bill for the American Friends Service Committee.

The confusion about policy in the churches is illustrated by conflicting pronouncements on the use of the atom bomb. The first commission on the church in relationship to the war under the Federal Council, meeting soon after Hiroshima, ruled unanimously against the atom bomb. I happened to be a member of that commission, but was serving as a navy chaplain in the Pacific during these particular deliberations. When the report was submitted to me, I wired Professor Calhoun that I could not concur in its findings, but that I was unwilling to stand in the way of the otherwise unanimous opinion of my colleagues. Shortly thereafter an English commission, dealing with the same problem, published its findings, which were in harmony with my own, and which disagreed with the American commission. But then some five years later another American commission, under the National Council, including in its membership several persons who were on the first commission, considered the matter again, and reversed the original judgment, giving a qualified approval to the use of the atom bomb under certain circumstances.

I do not cite this as evidence that, given time enough, other people can finally arrive at the wisdom which I myself originally had. My confidence in my wisdom on this matter is not so cocksure as that. But it is evidence of uncertainty somewhere. Viewed in a bad light, it may be taken as evidence that the leadership of the American churches has finally betrayed its Christian conscience to military expediency. Viewed in a good light, it may be taken as evidence that our leadership has at last overcome a reluctance to face an unpleasant problem, and has now arrived at honesty and integrity. But viewed in any light it is evidence of vacillation and confusion.

The confusion about matters of fact may seem more debatable to some persons than these obvious confusions in policy. I shall argue, however, that one serious confusion about fact has to do with whether or not military service corrupts the morals of our youth. My interest in the matter derives not only from my having been a chaplain in the service—a chaplain first to the WAVES, and then a chaplain on an attack transport where I ministered to men in the army and in the marines as well as in the navy—but also from my having been a college chaplain before the war and a college dean in the same institution right after the war. It is not enough just to observe the men in the service. It is necessary to observe the *same* men *before* service, *in* the service, and *after* service. My own judgment of the issue is best expressed by a veteran who told me his belief that the military experience simply “sharpens” the moral tendencies of a man. If a man entered the service with no real moral and religious undergirding, he probably went from bad to worse. If he entered the service with an initial strength of character, he probably went from good to better. Most of the young men I had a chance to observe both *before* and *after* the experience fell into the latter category.

The trouble is that we have been entertaining a stereotype of the military man. We have systematically taught ourselves that anyone who goes off to war and comes back again must be, at the least, an incipient neurotic, a rapist, a drunkard, a gambler, a blasphemer, with a permanent taint of blood lust in his bones. The record of our American veterans after World War II is an almost total contradiction of this stereotype. I know how some of them behaved in the service. But when I have talked to other military chaplains, more tenderhearted than myself, and listened to their lamentations about the vices of the serviceman, I have wondered if these same chaplains, in service at home, ever got outside the smug and cozy little coterie of their own churches to see how other civilians disport themselves

in their peacetime recreations. Personally I have lived in lumber camps, in industrial communities, and in rural areas where the vices of our peace-loving civilians would have made the men on my ship in the navy look like models of Christian decorum and decency. If there is a moral frailty somewhere—and I am sure there is—then it lies in something we are failing to do in the ordinary civilian conditions of life.

The second confusion about fact has to do with whether or not military service indoctrinates American youth with the military mind. Does military service create a militarist? There is an easy way to check up on this question. Go into any army camp, talk to any representative group of veterans—not a veterans' organization, because most veterans are not in any such organization—and suggest to them that they are being, or have been, indoctrinated with a love of things military. Of course you won't do any such thing unless you fancy yourself as a comic, and want to play it for laughs. Because there is no question about the practically unanimous response you will get. Most Americans in military service hate military life. They hate it whether they are in for one year or for four years. They hate it worse in peacetime than they do in wartime. This does not mean that they will not serve when necessary. They will, dutifully, courageously, and honorably. But certainly they do not love it. They do not love it because military life is a contradiction, even a destruction, of too many of the values they have learned to cherish in a civilian democracy. In this issue, as in the previous one, the heart of the affair lies in our civilian mores. If these are as strong as they should be, then come war, or depression, or inflation, or world leadership, we are still strong. If these are not strong, then do not blame our weakness on the military.

Let this suffice as an effort to document our confusion. I do not expect everyone to agree with my own analyses. Right now it will be a step in advance if we merely consent to face issues squarely, to respect the facts, to declare our real principles, and to think clearly and honestly under the discipline of a Christian conscience.

II. THE PACIFIST ALTERNATIVE

Let us, then, with some measure of humility and contrition, return to the fundamental question. If war comes, do we fight or not? There will be many Christians who answer this with a categorical "No! We do not fight. Not under any circumstances."

One thing to be said about this kind of decision, whether we agree with it or not, is that it must be accepted at the least as a historic Christian

witness. At the present moment it is not the sort of judgment which is decisive in political action. But there always have been Christians who have held to this view, and there doubtless always will be. They may hold to it absolutely for national policy, or they may hold to it as Elton Trueblood does in his essay on "Vocational Christian Pacifism."¹ Whether or not this view ever becomes the controlling view of a majority in politics remains to be seen. Meanwhile it must be cherished by those who believe in it, and respected by those who do not.

In the second place, on a more pragmatic level, the pacifist witness can make other important contributions to our world. It can do so, that is, if, more than a mere fixation on peace, it signifies a creative program of Christian love. Other Christians, who are not pacifist, are apt to be pluralists in their strategy. They believe in military preparedness, but they also believe in other devices, political, economic, psychological, and technological. Nevertheless, the military device is the obvious device. There is always the danger that, as the crisis sharpens, we will neglect the other expedients, and focus all our energies on the military. A creative Christian pacifism will emphasize a Point Four program, economic aid to other countries, and exchanges in trade and in culture, and will be alert to explore every possibility of reconciliation through peaceful intercourse as well as through sacrificial love.

There is one point, however, where it seems to me that the pacifist is peculiarly out of place. This is in the discussion of the second question, which has to do with the sort of military establishment we mean to maintain when we do fight. The pacifist is out of place at this point because he has already answered the first question, "Do we fight at all?" with a resounding negative. It is hardly conceivable, then, that he can enter wholeheartedly into a discussion of the means to be used in fighting. If it is a simple question of free speech, I cannot deny the right of the pacifist to speak on this or on any other matter. But if it is a question of the rational and moral authority behind our speech, then I hold to my objection. Indeed, I can't help remarking that, whenever the pacifist enters into this second type of discussion, he invariably comes out in favor of the most inefficient type of armament.

Obviously this sort of judgment on the part of the pacifist is a part of his instinctive loyalty to his own principles. But the injection of it into a discussion on the second level hardly helps to clarify issues. If you are opposed to fighting, it may be shrewd strategy to recommend to those

¹ *Christianity and Crisis*, November 3, 1941.

who will fight that they use the most inefficient means possible. But if you have decided you will fight, you do not want inefficiency, you want the maximum efficiency. In the comparative application of Christian principles on this second level, it is by no means certain that the most inefficient way of fighting will turn out to be the relatively more humane way of fighting. The probabilities may be in the other direction. More specifically, in the case of the atom bomb, to rule out this as the most terrible and efficient weapon is, in effect, to deliver the democracies into the hands of the massed man power of the totalitarian states.

My suggestion is simply that the pacifist refrain from also setting himself up as an authority on the ethical merits of comparative armaments. That is not exactly his trade. His own calling is an important one, and it would be unfortunate for all of us if he were diverted from it. Let him speak his Christian witness to peace, and let him bear his Christian witness to reconciling and sacrificial love by opening up to us the avenues for constructive action in a world of strife.

III. THE MILITARY ALTERNATIVES

Those who answer in the affirmative the first question, "Do we fight?" must consider the second question which has to do with the means of fighting. In a sense all of us as citizens must face this second question, because the second question defines the point where as a nation we now are.

Historically there are five alternatives which appear. There is the volunteer army of citizens. There is the army of mercenaries. There is the large, standing, professional army. There is the device of the draft. There is the device of universal military training. So far the American people have employed only two of these alternatives. They fought the Revolution with a volunteer, citizen army. They fought the Civil War and the two World Wars by means of conscription.

Two of these devices may be dismissed at once as having only a theoretical relevance to the present situation. An army of citizen volunteers is impossible under modern conditions of warfare. There is not enough of it; it is not ready when needed; it is not properly trained nor disciplined. Also, for a democracy, an army of mercenaries is inconceivable. Machiavelli actually held such an army to be undesirable under any circumstances.

Among the three remaining alternatives it is quite clear to me which is the worst. It is the large, standing, professional army which really imperils a democracy. This is the sort of army Germany had under the Kaisers and Russia had under the Tzars. That is what really creates a

military caste, with its inevitable tendency to meddle in politics, to influence economic policy, and to usurp social prestige. This is the sort of army which is most immune to civilian considerations. Most of its personnel, from private to general, think of the military career as a lifetime occupation, and tend to glorify fighting as the most honorable activity of man. On the other hand, an army of citizens, serving for from one to three years, retains the civilian categories of thought. The member of such an army is temporarily a fighting man. He does not really like it; he is just doing his duty. He looks forward to the time when he will return to normal, and resume his function as carpenter, or doctor, or clerical worker, or businessman. But the professional fighting man, when he has enough to keep him company, learns to despise civilian values, and to think of himself as belonging to the class of the elect for which all other classes exist in subservience.

Whatever kind of army we want, we do not want a large, standing, professional army. And as we accept or reject other alternatives, let us be sure that our negative action does not finally force the country to adopt this alternative.

IV. THE RIGHTS OF THE SERVICEMAN

In the two alternatives that are left, the draft and universal military training, let us recognize that we require a core of trained professional soldiers to handle the business. But it is important that most of the men under them are civilians at heart. The choice between these two alternatives is not a matter of economics: the wrong choice will always be the more costly in the end. It is not a matter of the danger of indoctrination into militarism. It is a matter of a practical judgment, and also of a point of principle.

The first thing we need to decide is whether the situation we confront is a temporary emergency, or whether it may endure for another ten or twenty years. If it really is a temporary emergency, then the draft is adequate, and is the only sane device to be employed. On the other hand, if we judge it to be a long-range situation, we may as well face the prospect of some kind of universal military training.

There is, moreover, an important reason in Christian ethics why some form of universal military training is preferable in a long-run situation. This has to do with our regard, on this relative plane, for the person of the individual serviceman. This fellow, who is the real victim of our schemes, is entitled to certain rights:

1. *The right to plan his life.* Under the draft our young men find it impossible to plan their lives. They live under perpetual tension, in endless emotional insecurity. At a given moment there may be arrangements that let them plan as far as one year ahead. But if the emergency intensifies, those arrangements are revoked, and the young man is back in his state of uncertainty. Under a pattern of universal military training the young man can plan his life. He can know when he will serve and for how long, and he can plan his studies and his career accordingly.

2. *The right to be prepared.* Since conscription, at the beginning of a conflict, is always an emergency device, it is improbable that the first conscripts will be adequately trained before they are sent to the firing line. If American conscripts have had this privilege in previous world wars, it was because we simply let our allies do the fighting until we were good and ready. That circumstance will not obtain again. When the fighting is fierce, and fresh reserves are needed, our youth will be called up to the front whether they are ready or not. Universal military training would help to obviate that.

3. *The right to rotation.* So far as we are fighting a restricted war in a localized area, the soldier has a right to go home after he has taken his turn. When we are fighting a big war, on an unlimited scale, it is a military necessity that the soldier be retired to rest barracks from time to time. Under ordinary circumstances a draft will never create an adequate reserve to meet this requirement. Universal military training will.

Now I know that many people will not like the conclusion to which this points. I don't like it myself. But I am clear about one thing. In terms of its effect on the youth of our nation, the draft is the most cruel device that could ever be adopted by an allegedly humanitarian people. I have twice been in a situation where I could watch the impact of the draft on some hundreds of young people whom I knew personally and intimately. And I find it ironical that we should be so high-mindedly engaged in protecting our young men from a mythical indoctrination into the spirit of militarism, and from an alleged corruption of morals in the service that really has its roots in our civilian life, while we tear their personalities apart in a prolonged and tantalizing insecurity of plan and of purpose.

V. THE IMPERATIVE OF CHOICE

An exhaustive consideration of alternatives might point to the idea of an international police force. To some extent there are the makings of such a force in Korea and under the NATO command. But we have no

right to call it a police force as long as the world is divided into two great camps between the democracies and the dictatorships. We may feel that there is ethical justification for our side. But the fact is we are dealing with armies on a gigantic scale, and that what we are fighting is a war, either locally or, if it should come to pass, on a world scale again. There remain, then, three alternatives:

1. There is the pacifist alternative. We can refuse to fight. We can refuse to prepare to fight. We can pour all our energies and resources boldly and imaginatively into every course of action, political, economic, psychological, legal, spiritual, which may make for healing and for reconciliation. All Christians will share in the positive parts of this program. The majority of them, apparently, will not now go along with the negative restriction.

2. We can decide that we are willing to fight, but that the necessity of fighting is tied up with an emergency situation of relatively short duration. If so, we shall use the draft as an emergency measure, in spite of its obvious inconveniences. But if it is only an emergency we are in, we have a responsibility to get out of it, or to terminate it, or else to face frankly the fact that we are dealing with a long-range situation.

3. We can decide now that we are up against a long-range military threat, and we can adopt universal military training as a device to meet it. Such a program of training would have to be devised with more military efficiency and with more intelligent use of the educational and technical resources of the nation than have been illustrated in any recently proposed program. It would also be in order to put a time limit of six years, or ten years, or twelve years on such a program, so that it would automatically come to an end unless renewed by act of Congress.

In any case, we must choose. Somehow or other we must muster up the moral honesty to confront the facts and to make the necessary decision in the light of our Christian consciences. It is time that we should be done with the evasions, the dishonesties, the reluctant acceptance of reality, the halfhearted affirmation of principle that characterize our present course of action. We cannot afford any longer the luxury of our present confusions: That somehow we can insinuate into the laws a program for military training, which will not really train anybody for anything, but which will be sugar-coated enough to delude the sentimentalists. That we can give ourselves to pacifist principles, and yet offer helpful advice on the merits of comparative armaments. That we mean to be prepared to fight a war, but that we prefer, on moral grounds, to be inefficiently prepared to fight it.

That we are up against a short-range military emergency, although all the facts point to the contrary. That our chief concern is to protect the morals of our youth from infection by the army, while the most virulent sources of infection lie about us in our civilian life. That we want to protect the nation from succumbing to the spirit of militarism, although our main action should be directed to making our democratic mores so powerful that the military mind would succumb, or remain subservient to it.

And the reason we must choose now and choose honestly is a simple one. It is that the persons concerning whom we pretend to have the most solicitude, but who are at present the helpless victims of our confusions and our evasions, these are the youth of the nation.

Plagiarism and the Development of Originality

WEBB B. GARRISON

ANY MINISTER can consistently produce original sermons. Yet there is a steady stream of instances in which plagiarism is detected in published works. Many more cases go undetected, especially among sermons that are preached but never published. This study presents a brief history and a positive solution to the problem of plagiarism in preaching and in writing.

ANCIENT, AND ONCE HONORABLE

No one knows what writer first borrowed from another without permission or acknowledgment. This technique was in wide use at least as early as 405 B.C., however, for Aristophanes satirized it in *The Frogs*. At this period, there seems to have been no standard name for the writer with light fingers. Nearly three centuries passed before Martial termed such a person *plagiarius*—a title formerly reserved for the abductor of a child or slave. As an apt designation for the kidnaper of one's brain-child, the name stuck. It entered sixteenth-century English as *plagiarist*, and was given currency by Ben Jonson in his *Poetaster*.

At this period, there was almost complete lack of scruples concerning use of another's work. Literary rights, as such, had not existed before the invention of printing. Only when mass production was developed did it become possible to treat a story or treatise as a profitable piece of property. There were no copyright laws. Writers and publishers, eager to exploit the market for all it was worth, were shameless in their tactics.

It was inevitable that this attitude should affect the pulpit.

Relatively few original sermons were produced until the Reformation began to bear fruit. For many generations, priests had tended to follow the advice of Gregory I and read the homilies of the Fathers from the pulpit. But the flowering of dissent brought new interest in the Bible as the basis of authority. In order that the people might understand Scripture,

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it was necessary that portions of it be expounded on every Lord's Day. And the doctrines of the Reformers had to be interpreted.

Consequently, the pulpit assumed an importance it had not known in the medieval church. Ministers were not only expected to preach; increasingly, congregations demanded original sermons. James I, of England, required his divines to deliver four sermons each month—and stipulated that at least one should be written for the occasion. Charles I frowned on the reading of classic sermons by any preacher, and actually forbade it among the doctors at the universities.

Strong pressure for original sermons produced a crisis in clerical circles. It was made more acute by the scarcity of well-educated preachers. If the brilliant Jeremy Taylor was forced to borrow from Europeans, how could the average country parson hope to stand on his own feet?

Remember that this was a period when few persons hesitated to claim borrowed material as their own. Confronted with a demand which they felt incapable of meeting, preachers began to beg, borrow, and steal sermons. Printers and Grub Street hacks saw their opportunity and quickly seized it. "Would you think it, gentlemen," says such a fellow in Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World*, "I have actually written last week sixteen prayers, twelve bawdy jests, and three sermons, all at the rate of sixpence apiece."

No less a person than the great Samuel Johnson wrote numerous sermons for sale. And Milton became so alarmed that he denounced "the multitude of sermons ready printed and piled up, on every text that is not difficult . . . (Printers) have not within their hallowed limits more vendible ware of all sorts ready made."¹

This trade flourished throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1769, the Rev. Dr. John Trusler achieved a record, of sorts. He sent a notice to ministers throughout Great Britain, offering a series of 150 sermons. Priced at one shilling each, they were printed in script type that imitated handwriting. Though one enlightened critic pronounced this clerical almanac to be "the most unspeakable trash that can be conceived," it seems to have met considerable success. It was Trusler, incidentally, who anticipated Dale Carnegie by a century and a half with *The Way to Be Rich and Respectable*—which passed through seven editions.

Extent of the commerce in sermons is indicated by an advertisement in the *London Courier*, May 9, 1807. Printed in Latin so that the laity could not read the piece, it offered a set of sixty sermons printed in a new type which was described as "an accurate imitation of handwriting." Sixty

¹ Milton, John, *Areopagitica* (1644). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917, p. 41.

years later, *St. Paul's Magazine* devoted a long article to the flourishing trade in sermons. By that time, publishers were promising that no duplicates would be sent to towns. In return, the purchaser was expected to refrain from preaching any of his purchases outside his own parish. According to the author of the study, which was limited to the Church of England, some 1,200 bought sermons were being preached every Sunday.

A few enterprising publishers even saved the cost of employing sermon writers. They sent clerks into the churches of prominent preachers and had them take down their messages. Known to the trade as "cat's meat sermons," they were produced in such quantity that a purchaser could find almost any type discourse he wanted. As an added attraction, many of them were advertised as "beautifully written and legible to the weakest eyes."

Modern copyright laws, enacted late in the nineteenth century, gradually brought an end to the open theft and sale of religious discourses. Meanwhile, the literary conscience had become much more sensitive. By 1900, it was generally acknowledged that extensive use of another person's ideas and/or language, without permission or acknowledgement, is best described by the blunt word, *theft*.

A MATTER OF CONSCIENCE

Except in very rare instances, however, plagiarism is a matter for the conscience rather than the courts. Even in cases of overt violation of copyright, few publishers of sermons will take action. (That is not true of such literary properties as short stories, novels, motion pictures, stage plays, radio and television plays.)

There are no hard and fast rules by which to govern one's use of material from printed sources. Courts have consistently held to a policy of judging each case on its own merits. "Fair usage" is the rule of thumb.

Oral delivery of copyrighted material seldom involves legal rights, no matter how flagrant the violation of ethics. And in the case of material prepared for publication, two simple steps will prevent the possibility of an embarrassing situation. Simply give credit where credit is due, and in the case of long or especially vivid quotations, write for permission before using them.

How long must a quotation be in order to require a letter of permission? In preaching, such permission is seldom needed. However, there have been some recent cases in which sermons published posthumously were attacked by authors whose rights were violated. So even in preparing

manuscripts for one's own pulpit, it is well to make notations concerning sources used. And in writing for publication, it is routine to secure permission to use any quotation of more than two or three sentences. If a copyright notice reads, "No part of this work may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing," it is necessary to secure permission for even a one-sentence quotation. Most publishers and other copyright owners readily grant permission to make reasonable use of their material.

Part of our modern dilemma arises from false ideas concerning originality and its worth. There seems to be a widespread opinion among ministers that one who borrows from others is somehow guilty. This feeling is vague and undefined, but real.

It fails to take into account the true meaning of originality. Major General J. G. Harbord, chairman of the board, Radio Corporation of America, has defined originality as "the ability to put two things together, not to make a third thing equal to the sum of the other two, but superior to the sum."² Note that this entire definition rests upon putting together materials and ideas taken from others. There are few really new ideas. It has been estimated that if the Cinderella story were to be excised from the literature of the world, "more than fifty per cent of dramatic literature would be wiped out with it."³

If originality were defined as the creation of entirely new products or ideas, without dependence upon the work of others, few if any of the world's masterpieces could be termed original. Sterne borrowed most of the best passages in *Tristram Shandy*; he imitated Rabelais and took material bodily from Pope and Swift. According to Alfred Einstein, Handel leaned heavily upon Erba, Urlo, Stradella, and numerous others.⁴ In forming his theory of relativity, Albert Einstein created no new concepts—he merely combined space, time, matter and force so that unsuspected relationships became plain. Shakespeare boldly appropriated ideas from Chaucer, Boccaccio, North, Holinshed, Lodge, and no one knows how many others.

Disraeli was perpetually borrowing; his famous funeral oration over Wellington was taken almost entirely from an article by Theirs. *Faust*, especially in its first part, has been described as "a patchwork of plagiarisms."⁵ And when Jack London sued the Biography Company for alleged theft of his story *Just Meat*, said to have been used in producing the picture

² *American Magazine*, February, 1937, p. 168.

³ Newman, Levy, "They've Stolen My Plot!" *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1949, p. 76.

⁴ Einstein, Alfred, *Greatness in Music*. London: Oxford Press, 1941, p. 127.

⁵ Moore, Charles L., "The Highest Type of Originality in Literature." *Current Literature*, Vol. 50; January, 1911, p. 100.

Love of Gold, the learned judge handed down a significant decision. He pointed out that both plots rested upon Kipling's *The King's Ankus*, which was adapted from Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale*. Chaucer, said the jurist, probably got the idea from a long line of Oriental tales.

An obscure contemporary of Shakespeare attacked him for alleged borrowing from him, and described the bard of Avon as "an upstart crow beautified with our feathers that with his Tyger's heart wrapt in a player's hide supposes he is as well able to bumbast out a blank verse as the best of you."⁶ Shakespeare may have borrowed from Robert Greene, as he certainly did from many others. But, says E. R. Richardson, "he was not a plagiarist, for by subtle alchemy ideas passed through him and were converted into gold that was his own."⁷ Einstein points out that neither Bach nor Mozart nor Handel was really original; then he adds: "Handel *made* something out of his thefts . . . even where he copied, so to speak, word for word, the copy became *in* and *through* the new context, his property."⁸ Kipling, bolder than most who commit words to paper, put it like this:

When 'Omer smote 'is bloomin' lyre,
He'd 'eard men sing by land an' sea;
An' what he thought 'e might require,
'E went an' took—the same as me!⁹

In that saucy verse we may discover a positive approach to the problem. No man need be ashamed of giving credit to those from whom he has gained ideas or other material. But any man is rightly ashamed when he is detected preening himself before an admiring audience, adorned with feathers which he claims are his own, but are not.

Few congregations will think less of a minister who frankly states that the outline of a sermon was adapted from Wesley, or one of its major points from Spurgeon. Failure to make such acknowledgment is a way of claiming complete originality. And when a supposedly original sermon is found in a book, the minister does indeed descend in the estimation of his people.

Sydney Smith frankly announced that he preached Channing's sermon on war in St. Paul's. "I thought I could not write anything half as good," he said, "so I preached Channing."¹⁰ Robert Southey advised James

⁶ *Plays and Poems of Robert Greene*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905; Vol. I, p. 49.

⁷ Richardson, E. R., "The Ubiquitous Plagiarist." *Bookman*, Vol. 73; June, 1931, p. 19.

⁸ Einstein, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁹ From "When 'Omer smote 'is bloomin' lyre," from *The Seven Seas* by Rudyard Kipling. Copyright 1896 by Rudyard Kipling, reprinted by permission of Mrs. George Bambridge and Doubleday & Company, Inc.

¹⁰ Lady Holland, *A Memoir of the Rev. Sydney Smith*. New York, 1855, Vol. II, p. 528.

White, a young minister, to adapt the best sermons of pulpit giants to his own congregation. Addison put it even more bluntly: "I could heartily wish that more of our clergy (would read sermons of others) and instead of wasting their spirits in laborious compositions of their own, preach those penned by great masters."¹¹

Such advice may or may not appeal to the modern preacher. Certainly, he will wish to be honest with himself and his congregation if he follows it. But if he decides to produce most or all of his own sermons, he can develop originality to such a degree that he does not need to stoop to plagiarism. There are only three aspects to the enhancement of one's creative power: work, time, and vital concern.

NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SPADE WORK

After a long period of active association with writers of many types, George H. Doran concluded that intellectual indolence is the chief cause of "assimilation or plagiarism."¹²

Several investigators have reached independent conclusions that echo such a verdict. After spending years in analysis of Shakespeare's creative genius, Edward Armstrong concluded: "Inspiration frequently comes suddenly and unexpectedly, but not gratuitously. Those who seek, find; their reward is usually the outcome of much travail."¹³ Basing his judgment upon study of numerous great inventors, Ribot declares that "Invention is prepared for by accumulating as much material as possible, living in it, and preparing one's self for psychological unity by great efforts of analysis and synthesis."¹⁴ Henri Poincaré, James H. Leuba, and Joseph Montmasson reached similar conclusions in their study of originality.

Many ministers are under pressure to prepare two sermons a week. Even under the best circumstances, it is all but impossible to maintain high quality with such an output. Since much corn that goes into the grist mill of the mind is reduced to chaff and lost, it is always necessary to put in more than one expects to get out. A high level of productivity demands an even greater rate of intake. For ministers, this means reading widely and making careful use of some system of taking notes.

A major factor contributing to sermonic dishonesty is, without doubt, extensive reading of published sermons. These volumes, however noble they may be, resemble precooked baby food, from which all lumps have been

¹¹ *The Spectator*, No. 106.

¹² Doran, George H., *Chronicles of Barabbas*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935, p. 121.

¹³ Armstrong, Edward A., *Shakespeare's Imagination*. London: Lindsay Drummond, Ltd., 1946, p. 174.

¹⁴ Ribot, Th., *Essay on the Creative Imagination*. Chicago: Open Court, 1906, p. 338.

carefully removed. Such food requires no chewing. One may ingest it almost without effort, and digest it with equal ease.

James W. Bridges declares, "All that is necessary for creative imagination is past experience and the ability to make new combinations."¹⁵ Obviously, the richer and more varied one's mental and spiritual experiences, the more dynamic his new combinations will be.

Creativity demands mental exercise; it never comes until one begins to stretch the muscles of his mind. Hence comparatively difficult books will yield richer results than easy ones. Effective and original sermons grow from reading history, theology, philosophy, biography, psychology, and allied works. Biography and history are of course especially fruitful in illustrative materials. Every minister should spend several hours a week in the company of the early Fathers, the saints, and the Reformers. Great souls and keen minds necessarily affect all who touch them, however remotely.

Narrow specialization should be avoided. Ideas transplanted from one field to another frequently take root and bear rich fruit. So, without attempting to be an amateur commentator on the advance of science, the minister's reading should touch such fields as physics, biology, astronomy, geology, and related disciplines.

Unless your memory is phenomenal, you will find it best not to rely too heavily on it. Read with a pencil in hand. If a volume is your own, do not hesitate to mark it frequently. Should it be borrowed, make notes as you read and copy significant passages when you have completed the book. (In making such extracts, be sure to note the source.) Should you be struck by an idea or statement from which you have a flash of insight, take care to note its application; hours or days later you may prod your memory in vain—the particular combination of circumstances under which the inspiration came cannot be duplicated.

As with reading, so with thinking, playing, eating, traveling—and almost every other activity in which you engage. Creative giants have testified to the importance of a notebook or sketchbook in which to record flashes of inspiration. In the midst of a conversation, Mozart would sometimes hold up his hand for silence. "Do not speak to me," he would say. "Do not disturb me. There is a song in my ears. I must set it down."¹⁶ No matter how fresh and vivid a thought may be, it can be lost unless it is *immediately* committed to writing, even though in sketchy form. Modern

¹⁵ Bridges, James W., *Psychology, Normal and Abnormal*. Toronto: Isaac Pitman & Sons, n.d., p. 237.

¹⁶ Voronoff, Serge, *From Cretin to Genius*. New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1941, p. 44.

literature has no more vivid expression of this psychological phenomenon than that which Lewis Carroll places on the lips of the Queen:

"The horror of that moment," the King went on, "I shall never, *never* forget."
 "You will, though," the Queen said, "if you don't make a memorandum of it."

Once you have accumulated a quantity of notes, from your reading and observation of life; they must be arranged in such fashion that you can find the material you want when you want it. There are many different systems, based upon files, scrapbooks, and notebooks. Any system is of value if it works. Enriched by a quantity of diverse material, one may find the bones of a sermon in a published work; placing new flesh upon the skeleton, it emerges so stalwart and vigorous that it deserves to be called your own.

FROM INCUBATION TO ILLUMINATION

Ideas tend to be more like oaks than gourds. With rare exceptions, they do not mature fully until they are given a considerable period for unhurried growth. Psychologists are generally of the opinion that the subconscious mind—whatever that may be!—is a significant, even an essential factor in true creativity.

"A good subconscious that has handled ideas long enough emits them in forms that their parents can scarcely recognize," says a literary analyst.¹⁷ Voronoff points out that there is often "a kind of collaboration between the conscious and the subconscious . . . (and) subconscious work is usually produced only after a long period of conscious incubation."¹⁸ Basing his conclusion upon the matchless mind of Shakespeare, Armstrong says, "Memory is so allied with other functions that it does more than record . . . its products can become so changed from what they were when registered that in comparison they may be described as imaginative."¹⁹

When ideas emerge from the subconscious, they are likely to startle the mind. Ancient poets, feeling themselves incapable of having produced their own verse, attributed their work to the Muses. Emerson testified to his conviction that his mind "could not possibly be the source of the ideas that came to him in his creative moments." Robert Louis Stevenson credited his most brilliant work to "the brownies." Joel Chandler Harris repeatedly said he had no literary skill, and that his "other fellow" did the work while he got the credit for it.

"Unconscious rumination" was deliberately practiced by such diverse

¹⁷ Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

¹⁸ Voronoff, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

¹⁹ Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

craftsmen as Lafcadio Hearn, Holmes, Tolstoy, Schopenhauer, Condorcet, Coleridge. Goethe depended heavily upon "the subconscious activity within us, which unites in a free understanding with our consciousness, in such a way as to produce a unity which surprises the world."²⁰ When Haydn found himself unable to produce, he would slip into the chapel with his rosary, turn his mind from his work and say a prayer. "Immediately ideas came to me," he testified.

Scientific discoveries tend to be more clear-cut in their originality than most literary works. Hence it is in this field that we find the most spectacular evidence concerning the value of committing ideas to the mind in order that they may be mellowed by time.

Many of Newton's mathematical discoveries actually came to him during his sleep or immediately upon awakening. August Kekule solved the problem of the constitution of the benzene molecule while drowsing before a fire. Frederick Banting discovered insulin as a direct result of a "hunch" that awakened him at 2:00 A. M. on October 30, 1920. It is significant that he had read two medical works, apparently unrelated, before going to bed. He saw no connection between the data in the two studies—but his mind continued to work on the problem after he fell asleep.

Examination of one or two literary case histories will reveal that this mysterious "illumination" is not limited to scientists and mathematicians. Gilbert Chesterton's *Ballad of the White Horse*, considered by many to be his greatest work, was on his mind for five years. When it finally took form in 1911, large sections of the verse came to him in his sleep. Longfellow's diary gives a brief account of the birth of *The Wreck of the Hesperus*. After an evening of routine work, he sat by the fire until midnight. He went to bed, but was unable to sleep because the poem was forcing itself into his mind. "It hardly cost me an effort," he noted. "It did not come into my mind by lines, but by stanzas."²¹

Beecher once preached a new sermon daily for eighteen months. He did it by keeping numerous themes in his thinking; several days ahead, he would select one, work on it, then put it aside. On the morning he expected to use it, he would produce the finished version very rapidly. It is significant that those who make best use of the subconscious have been men of high productivity. Working on many ideas concurrently, such a person takes out each when it "ripens" and puts it in finished form.

In the present state of psychology, there is no precise understanding

²⁰ Voronoff, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

²¹ Longfellow, H. W., *Complete Poetical Works of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1893, p. 13.

of the mechanics of inspiration. There is evidence that the process is related to such experiences as that of Paul on the road to Damascus, Luther climbing the stairs on his knees, and Wesley in the prayer meeting on Aldersgate Street. William H. Easton concludes that it is "evoked by intense deliberate thinking, which forms new combinations of ideas after the thinking has ceased." He hastens to add that "Illumination is not incited by easy-going thinking, but it prepares for action whenever the mind struggles with some obstacle."²²

This process is not without its dangers; the history of religion is replete with trances and visions which proved barren. And even in the field of science, at least one observer has noted that inspiration does not necessarily lead to the work being outstanding, "for it may even result in the production of illusory values which for others are not values at all."²³

Consequently, the seeker for originality must be aware of the dangers associated with "inspiration." He must recognize that knowledge of the process is too limited to provide any precise directions by which it may be found. At the same time, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that there is no true originality without some degree of illumination. An alert mind confronted with a problem, supplied with materials more or less vitally related to it, and given ample time to do its work, is likely to yield something quite fresh.

DYNAMIC POWER OF GREAT DEVOTION

Hard work, stretched over a long period of time, does not always result in creativity. There is at least a third element which in some respects is more difficult to analyze than the first two. If that element must bear a label, the most suitable is "devotion."

Perhaps a physical analogy will make the role of devotion clear. Suppose you are given iron filings and powdered sulphur; from these raw materials you must create something new. You get an adequate supply, mix the substances thoroughly, and let the mixture stand for an indefinite time. At intervals you look to see whether anything new will be produced. Despairing, you place the unchanged mixture into a spoon and expose it to a flame. Under the impact of heat, the ingredients become iron sulphide. Nothing remains of the original ingredients; a new product has been formed. Its qualities could not possibly be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of iron and sulphur.

²² Easton, William H., "Illumination—Reserve Mental Power." *Science Digest*, December, 1946, p. 37.

²³ Lange-Eichbaum, Wilhelm, *The Problem of Genius*; Eden and Cedar Paul, trans. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932, p. 88.

Intense emotion frequently causes raw materials in the mind to unite in a totally unpredictable fashion. Shakespeare's imagination was undoubtedly affected by emotional factors. In the process of making a notable discovery, Newton sometimes "felt a sense of ecstasy—a wave of emotion so intense that he was forced to stop for a time."²⁴ Voronoff points out that Wagner's love for Mathilda Wesendonck was the flame that fused gross ingredients into *Tristan and Isolde*. He shows that Dante's adoration of Beatrice resulted in the *Divine Comedy*, and concludes that Goethe's *Faust* was thirty years in the writing because it had to be sustained by "various and violent passions."²⁵

Lange-Eichbaum goes so far as to declare that creative activity cannot result from intellectual effort alone. "It is, rather," he says, "intimately connected with feelings, moods, affects, impulses, conations. It is permeated by these, and, indeed, receives its first impetus from them."²⁶

If passions of the flesh are an element in the creativity of secular writers, how much more can pure love of God contribute to the originality of the preacher! It is perhaps at this very point that the heaviest casualties occur. Absorbed with the material and the secular, one *cannot* achieve a kindling passion that is pure and undefiled. Augustine warns that

There is, finally, a third class of studies that enfeeble the soul, inflicting on it a grievous wound; for to employ the sense of smell and taste in the dainty appraisal of food, to know how to tell from what lake a fish was hooked or from what vintage a wine was made, is surely a deplorable cultivation of the soul. Such training . . . merely shrivels the mind and dilates the senses, and must be said, therefore, to produce in the soul nothing else than a tumor or a case of mental rickets.²⁷

It was holy love, no less than zealous cultivation of the mind, that produced the originality of St. Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and their fellows. To the degree that the modern minister succeeds in finding such a passion, he will enhance his development of originality.

SUMMARY

Ministerial plagiarism developed as a by-product of the Reformation, and still flourishes widely. It has been fostered by a strong, but perhaps unjustified demand for "complete originality." More important as a matter of conscience than of law, it may be completely eliminated by common-sense application of two rules: (1) give credit where credit is due; (2) secure

²⁴ Hyslop, T. B., *The Great Abnormals*. London: Philip Allan & Co., 1925, p. 221.

²⁵ Voronoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-15.

²⁶ Lange-Eichbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

²⁷ *The Magnitude of the Soul*; John J. McMahon, trans. In *The Fathers of the Church*; New York: Cima Pub. Co., 1947. Vol. II, p. 96. Used by permission.

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Originality may be cultivated through intensive and extensive reading, careful observation, unhurried assimilation of ideas and problems, and zealous attention to spiritual health. Here are a few specific suggestions:

1. Read the Scriptures regularly, with an open mind. It is preferable to devote the last waking hour of each day to this discipline, in order that great ideas of the faith may permeate the subconscious mind.

2. Read much; hunt, fish, and play golf in moderation—if at all. Pay great attention to history, biography, philosophy, devotional classics, and the humanities in general. Do not neglect the physical sciences; avoid excessive reading of contemporary sermons.

3. Keep your ideas, problems, and homiletical gear in such form that nothing will be permanently lost. Read with pencil in hand; carry a notebook at all times.

4. Never force the development of an idea. Give it time to mature, with the certainty that you will receive insight and the possibility that you will be given inspiration.

Karl Barth and the Jews

MARIA FUERTH SULZBACH

“THERE ARE only two subjects in the world which make for interesting conversation. One is sex, the other is the Jews.” The late Lady Oxford and Asquith has been credited with this remark, which correctly reflects the tremendous fascination that the Jewish problem has always had for non-Jewish people.

Anti-Semitism has followed the Jewish people as the shadow follows the body. But its causes are by no means easily understood. There have been innumerable attempts to explain the hatred which the mere existence of the Jews engenders. It has been pointed out that the Jews are strangers in every land and that strangers are always distrusted; that they have been everywhere a minority group; that they are overshrewd and all too eager to make money; that they are clannish and unpatriotic; that they have bad manners, etc., etc. Only recently have some eminent theologians and historians drawn attention to the role that the Christian churches have played in forming the Christian concept of the Jewish character and destiny; and these scholars have shown that the Christian concept of the Jew which was well-nigh universally accepted before the Enlightenment period, has survived in a secularized form other medieval creeds which have long been abandoned as superstitions.

The modern anti-Semite does not, of course, as did the churches, blame the Jews for having rejected and crucified Jesus. But he concurs with the medieval attitude in that he considers the Jews an entirely unique minority. In America, Negroes and Orientals are disliked and discriminated against. So at one time were Protestants in Catholic countries, Catholics in Protestant countries, and the Poles in Germany. But never have otherwise intelligent people believed that the Negroes or the Protestants or the Poles are the instigators of an immensely powerful and dangerous conspiracy against the human race. Only because the Jews were involved could a hoax as absurd as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* be taken seriously all over the world. This unique attitude toward the Jews alone

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among the peoples of the globe is the result of their unique historical role in the life of Jesus and the origins of Christianity. It is the result of the conclusions which first the Catholic Church and later Martin Luther and other prominent Protestants found fit to draw from the fact that the Jews had rejected the Savior. For a Christian can be a Christian without ever having heard a thing about Buddhism or Islam or the Chinese or the Negroes. But he cannot understand Christianity at all unless he has heard the story of Jesus Christ which is the story of his life and death among the Jewish people, and he cannot understand it well without knowing the "sacred history" which includes both Old and New Testaments.

In our time a new Christian doctrine of the Jew has been presented which, if it is eventually accepted by the Christian world to whom it is addressed, should provide a tremendous setback to anti-Semitism at its very roots.

The originator of this doctrine is not just a Protestant theologian. He is the most powerful mind among the Protestant thinkers of our generation and one of the most learned, astute, and prolific writers of all times on Christian doctrine. Karl Barth is known in America only in professional circles. But in Europe his audience is great and growing. Unfortunately, only a small part of his writings has been translated into English. The most important of these, the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, of which eight volumes have been published with possibly as many more to follow, is so voluminous and hard on the reader that American publishers are afraid to handle it. But as far as the Christian concept of the Jew is concerned it is one of the most important books of the twentieth century.

Karl Barth, now over sixty, is a Swiss theologian who teaches at the University of Basel. He was a professor at the German University of Bonn when Hitler came to power. Barth immediately stood up against the Nazis. He took issue with the so-called "German Christians" who taught that Christianity was not at all connected with Judaism or based on the Old Testament; and that Hitler had been sent by God to free the Germans from their Jewish and other enemies and exploiters. He wrote the often quoted words that it would be better for the church to return to the catacombs than to make any concessions to Nazi theology. Since such was his attitude he was forced to give up his professorship at Bonn and returned to his native Switzerland.

According to Barth, the Christian Church should not confess Jesus Christ as Savior *although* he was a Jew, but *because* he was one of necessity; in his own words:

The remarkable theological importance, the extraordinary spiritual and sacred significance of the National Socialism that now lies behind us is that right from its roots it was anti-Semitic; that in this movement it was realized with a simply demonic clarity, that the enemy is the Jew. . . . For in this Jewish nation there really lives to this day the extraordinariness of the revelation of God.

The principle, "Salvation is of the Jews," is for Barth the keystone for his interpretation of the Christian *Heilsgeschichte*. We shall see presently that Barth's interpretation of the Bible lets him speak of "a special existence of Israel . . . a sending, a mission, an apostolate, a community, a people in God's service." "This people is God's commissioner. It has to proclaim his word; that is its prophetic mission."

I

From the first centuries on, the attitude of the Church toward the Jews has always been ambiguous. On the one hand there were terrible persecutions of the Jews, in which members of the clergy took part and frequently assumed the leadership; on the other hand there were the proclamations of numerous Popes that no Christian was permitted to take the life of a single Jew. Consequently there is ample historical material to prove that the Church persecuted the Jews, and there is other material to prove that she protected them. But neither of these two attitudes was coincidental. Their mutual conflict was not the result of a reversal of previously accepted doctrines or of the change of personalities throughout the Middle Ages. For both procedures, persecution and protection, were rooted in the same basic conviction, that the Jews should suffer and be miserable because they had rejected and crucified Christ; they should suffer, but they should at the same time stay alive and propagate their race; for otherwise they would not be able to see the light and believe in their "Savior" at some future time.

As long as the earliest Christian communities were still members of the Synagogue, the controversy between Christian and Jew concerned mainly the Law. But when Jews and Christians became separately organized the emphasis shifted. As a Jewish sect, Christians could share the Old Testament with other Jews; as a separate religion, they came more and more to demand the exclusive ownership of the Old Testament. The earliest enterprise of Christian thinkers was their research in the Old Testament. They wanted to discover which Scriptures had particular relevance to the facts described in the gospel. Certain definable portions of the Old Testament were therefore used as "testimonies" to the gospel.

All this happened at a time when the Jews had lost their Temple and

Holy City and the Jewish Christians had practically vanished from the scene.

The Christians outside of Palestine were then entirely convinced that the holy books of the Jews had passed on to them. In their eyes the remaining Jews had outlived their mission and the latter had passed on to the Church. For in the application of *testimonia* from the Old Testament it was a fundamental postulate that the Church was the true and ultimate people of God, the heir of the divinely guided history of Israel. By rejecting the Messiah, Judaism had shrunk, according to Ignatius, to "nothing but funeral monuments and tombstones of the dead." By claiming the whole of divine history for themselves the Church Fathers even went so far as to *antedate the rejection of the Jews to the beginning of revealed history*, by emphasizing that Abraham was the father of many nations of whom only the one which coincided with the Church was chosen.

After the Church had become predominantly Gentile it was considered by the Christians not only unnecessary but positively harmful to observe the Law. The emphasis of early Christian theology was placed on the Church as the true and ultimate people of God, the heir of Israel, the new "Israel of God." The Law was considered obliterated and was readily left to the Jews. The Christians had the Messiah.

According to Tertullian, the only issue between the two religions was whether the Messiah had appeared. If the Christians were right, he had; and since the Jews were still waiting for him, it was obvious that what they really were longing for was the appearance of the Antichrist.

The destruction of the Temple, the dispersion of the Jews, and all the misery the Jews had to endure was in Christian eyes the punishment for their sins and the proof that everything had actually happened as related in the Gospels. Said Hippolytus:

Hear my words, and give heed, thou Jew. Many a time dost thou boast thyself that thou didst condemn Jesus of Nazareth to death, and thou didst give him vinegar and gall to drink. . . . Come therefore and let us consider . . . whether that small portion of vinegar and gall has not brought down this fearful threatening upon thee, and whether this is not the cause of thy present condition.

In evaluating this attitude it should be remembered that the principle of corporate responsibility was universally accepted in the Middle Ages. Taxes were levied on corporations as units, punishments for the offense of a member were exacted of the entire community.

The crime the Jews had supposedly committed was considered, if possible, even graver when the Church decided to classify them as heretics.

It did that at least in some instances. The heretics were considered to be even worse than the followers of non-Christian religions. There was a tendency to treat the Jews as a people who were aware of the truth but insisted on rejecting it. The Jew as he is encountered in Christian writings from the fourth century on can hardly be called a human being. To quote James Parkes: "He is rarely charged with human crime, and little evidence against him is drawn from contemporary behaviour, or his action in contemporary events. He is as unreal as the 'Boche' created by the Allied press during the war from 1914 to 1918, and far more abstract." The Jewish record was—in the eyes of the Christians—one of perpetual disobedience to God, and their ultimate rejection was what they had deserved. The very word "Jew" became a term of abuse. It is still so used today. To "jew" someone down means to cheat him.

Yet the Church did not desire the Jews to be obliterated, let alone be killed, by fanatical Christians. The Jews should be homeless, powerless, and insecure. But they should continue to exist, for only if they did so would they be able finally to embrace the Christian doctrine—and that was supposed to happen at the time of the second coming of Christ, of Christ's *parousia*. It was God's plan that the Jews were to remain unfaithful until all the Gentiles were gathered in. Then Israel itself would be saved. Thus in the sixth century Pope Gregory, though he never tired of denouncing their diabolical perversity, yet always insisted that the Jews could only be won over by love and charity and that they must be treated with justice. Pope Innocent III declared in 1199: "Although the Jewish perfidy is in every way worthy of condemnation, nevertheless, because through them the truth of our own faith is proved, they are not to be severely oppressed by the faithful." A king of Bohemia decreed in 1268:

Because of the crime which once their fathers committed against our Lord Jesus Christ, the Jews are deprived of the protection of their natural rights and condemned to eternal misery for their sins. Although they resemble us in human form, we differ from them by our holy Christian faith. Therefore (!) Christian goodness teaches us to cast off our harshness, and protect our faith from them; but we must respect their humanity, and not their unbelief.

II

In the later nineteenth century a liberalized Christianity, reinforced by modern biblical research on both sides, began to underline the unity of the Jewish-Christian tradition. Klausner and Montefiore have influenced Protestant interpretation, and in recent years Martin Buber's *The Two Faiths* and Bultmann's *Jesus and the Word* show mutual appreciation.

What, then, is Karl Barth's distinctive contribution, and what is the essential difference between the theology of Barth and the long-standing tradition of the Church? It is first and foremost a different understanding of *Israel's mission*, which, says Barth, has not been superseded by the Church. In Barth's own words:

The divine fellowship demonstrates in its Israelitic form what God has elected for himself, in choosing through eternal predestination, fellowship with men. He chose for himself the unworthy and undeserving. . . . Israel has to pay a high price for being God's chosen people. . . . For the very reason that this people experiences this abysmal misery, God has not been reluctant to step down to its level, for he entered an *eternal* covenant with man.

These words express the basic difference between the attitude of the Church and that of Barth regarding the historical function and the mission of Israel. The Church claims that Israel as the chosen community came first and that thereafter the Church, the "New Israel," replaced it. Since the appearance of Christ there is no longer a task which the Jews are called to fulfill, except that their existence is a proof of the truth of the New Testament and that their conversion will be an important event of that part of the *Heilsgeschichte* which is eschatological. Barth teaches that the decisive fact is not that Jewish history preceded Christian history. For, regardless of time and historical sequence, Israel is the mirror of humanity. Israel disobeys God; but so does man everywhere and at all times. God is merciful toward Israel and forgives its sins not because Israel has deserved compassion and mercy, but because God has decided to bestow his grace on man. The same holds true for the whole of humanity. In conformity with the Old Testament's prophetic faith, the Church should preach that man himself can achieve nothing; that whatever he is and has he owes solely to the mercy and grace of God. "It remains true that this man of Israel belongs to God and again and again not by nature, but by the miracle of grace; Israel really is the presentation of God's free grace."

The student of the thought of Karl Barth must, of course, be aware at all times that he is listening to a Christian theologian who accepts Jesus as the Christ, as the Messiah, and considers Christ's message the decisive event in recorded history. Barth is a Protestant; as such he goes back to the Bible. What the Church Fathers taught and what subsequent Popes have decreed has no significance for him. His understanding of the mission of the Church and his conception of Israel's relationship to the Church is mainly founded on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

According to Barth it is the Argument of *Christian* anti-Semitism that,

because the Jews have crucified Christ, the Jews have ceased to be God's chosen people, "the holy people of God," that in fact Israel's role is ended; that Israel has become a figure of the past and the Church has become the "New Israel."

But, as Barth points out, Christian anti-Semitism completely overlooks Christ's *resurrection*. It is the meaning of the Resurrection that God is no longer concerned with what the Jews have done. They are therefore no longer rejected on account of the Crucifixion. God has accepted Israel anew. The Jews are, as they always have been, God's chosen people, even though they do not as yet believe in Christ as the Messiah.

By its very act of disobedience toward God, Israel confirms that it is still the same people to whom Isaiah spoke. Its disobedience was foreseen by the prophet, who asked God to have mercy with his people. Thus Israel's very guilt confirms that it is God's chosen people.

"The very nation that has disobeyed the Gospel and thereby was faithless towards its election was and is the chosen people since Israel is the natural root of the Church with whom God has been merciful and whom God has called and awakened to faith."

"The testimony of the Church on Jesus Christ and the future life which he promises could not be enunciated without the background of the message of Israel, whose Messiah is the Crucified. Without Israel, without remembrance of man's transitoriness, without understanding and acceptance of divine mercy . . . , the Church would not be able to speak with meaning and vigor about the eternal life that has been promised to man; this knowledge is essential, for without it the Church would not be able to exist as such for a moment."

According to St. Paul, as interpreted by Karl Barth, *Israel is still the chosen people*. It is so despite its sins; and God has not changed his plans and ultimate intentions with Israel. The Jews cannot change the fact that a Savior lives for them. Israel "can suffer what it must suffer on account of its choice; but it cannot suffer endlessly." "By no rabbinical orthodoxy or liberalism or indifference can the Jews achieve *not* to be the brethren of Jesus Christ. They are marked as such, more than by anything else."

Barth interprets St. Paul as follows: St. Paul believes that Jesus' message cannot be taken away from the Jews. They are still the ones for whom this message is meant in the first place. The Gentiles are the trustees for the heritage of Israel and the Jews themselves will finally desire to accept "their own special heritage which has passed into the hands of the Gentiles." God desires his people to accept Christ's death and resurrection. He uses the Gentiles as a means to achieve his purpose.

The Jews are hallowed by God, "hallowed as the ancestors and rela-

tives of the Holy One in Israel, such as no Gentile, not even the best among them, is hallowed by nature, and in a way in which the non-Jewish Christians, even the best among them, even though they belong to the Church, are not hallowed." The non-Jewish Christians have temporarily taken the place of the Jews. In a way, they live where the latter should live. "They live in their houses, use their tools, administer their estates. Yet, they are merely strangers; for the people whose place they occupy are not dead. The final mutual relationship between the Jews and the Gentiles has yet to be settled."

St. Paul understood his service as the apostle to the Gentiles as consisting in the service he was performing to his own "flesh," to his "relatives in the flesh." It is they whom he wants to rouse, whom he wants to make jealous in order that they too may join the Church. The only justification for his mission to the Gentiles and their church is his service to Israel. Paul has no idea of organizing or preparing the conversion of the Jews. Such an idea is modern and alien to the apostle. "The mission to the Gentiles and the existence of the Church of Jews and Gentiles is the real mission to the Jews." Barth even asserts that if God really had forsaken Israel, the Gentiles too would be forsaken. The Gentiles who condemn the Jews create a deeper chasm between themselves and God than the Jews could ever create; for the Gentiles are not by nature God-chosen.

"Without being Jews . . . the Gentiles submit to the same conceited illusion which made the Jews reject Jesus of Nazareth. They reject him once more by rejecting the Jews, his ancestors and relatives and by denying the Messiah."

"From whom should the Church and the world learn by whom and for whom Jesus Christ was crucified . . . if not from the Synagogue which hears God's word, and yet continues to remain faithless? Even the stubbornness and the gloom of the Jews, their whims and rambling, even the Jewish cemetery at Prague—all of these are connected with the hearing of the word of God; and though it be a barren hearing it contains objectively and factually more of the genuine gospel than does all the irreligious wisdom of the Goyim and a good deal of supposedly religious Christian theory and practice as well."

It is a fact that Christian nations who lose their faith become the victims of a brutalization and a loss of human substance that would be impossible for the Jews.

The Church has no right to consider the Jewish problem as a matter of eschatology and to leave it to God and to the unforeseeable future! Her responsibility toward Israel begins right here and now. Every Gentile should at all times show the greatest sympathy to every Jew. Anti-Semitism

is absolutely incompatible with the Christian religion, and the Christian who as much as contemplates an anti-Jewish attitude should be admonished. In the words of Barth, "the good vine is not dried up. For God planted it and what God has done to it and given to it, is decisive."

III

Summing up, we may say that Karl Barth's and the traditional Christian interpretation of the role of the Jews in "sacred history" differ mainly on three points:

1. There is no Christian Church without the mission of Israel. The Church has forgotten this fact many a time in the past; but when it does so, it is no longer the Christian Church.

2. The Jews serve as a mirror for all mankind. They are, according to Barth, the symbol of human existence. Anti-Semitism is the expression of Christian unconscious self-hatred and self-disgust. The Jewish insecurity throughout history reflects the insecurity of human existence. It demonstrates what it means to live by and through God's grace.

3. The true Christian has to see in the Jew God's chosen people. The covenant God made with Israel is an unescapable covenant, it is binding until the end of time. Therefore the Christian has always to keep in mind that he and his community are but guests in the Jewish house; and that the Christian community, as far as it is Christian, exists in the same way as Israel, only by and through God's grace. Anti-Semitism, which is directed against the Jews, will in the end be directed against the Christian community. "It is Jesus the Christ who at the same time separates the Jew from and unites the Jew with the Christian."

Building New Nations in Africa

CECIL NORTHCOTT

AFRICA is the continent of new nations. In all parts of the continent new peoples are coming to maturity in government and national awareness. In the Union of South Africa the issue is whether that country can be great enough to achieve the creation of a multiracial nation, or whether South Africa is to be the scene of the white man's last stand to maintain a dominance which is already outmoded. In Central and East Africa the same issue has to be faced, and the proposals now being considered for a Central Africa Federation are one way of trying to create a "nation" out of very diverse elements in which Africans, Indians, and European races mingle. In West Africa this "nation-making" process has gone a long way, and is relatively more simple than in other areas because only "black" Africans are concerned. In some ways what happens in West Africa will be a guide to the rest of the continent.

I

Dr. Malan and his Afrikaner groups in South Africa watch the West Africa developments with close attention: if they were to fail the power of the Afrikaner would be greatly increased. To understand the South African situation the following population figures need always to be borne in mind:

European	2,372,690
African	7,805,592
Colored	928,484
Asiatic	285,260

For Europeans, both those of English descent and of Dutch descent (the Afrikaans-speaking people), those figures spell *fear*. And that primitive experience is at the root of all that is happening in South Africa. It is fear of being overwhelmed by a tide of black that impels the white Afrikaans-speaking people to support Dr. Malan's policy of *apartheid*—

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separation, or segregation of the races. Politically this means that there must be separate electoral rolls (the point now at issue in South Africa); economically it means, logically, that the white man can no longer depend on cheap black labor, and socially, that the races cannot mix at any point. It would also mean redrawing the map of the Union of South Africa, with areas for the "whites," areas for the "blacks," and areas for the "coloreds." *Apartheid* is a stern and terrifying gospel, and its high priest, Dr. Malan, is a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church whose granitelike Calvinism and biblicism form a powerful amalgam.

In a concise study of the South African problem,¹ the Rev. E. W. Grant asks:

Is there in the minds of those who so obstinately pursue this chimera, leading their country towards disaster, some strange conception of race which makes them blind to the claims of simple justice, deaf to world opinion, and heedless of the lessons of history and the dictates of humanity? There is such a conception. Strange to say, it has a religious origin. Those independent and self-reliant Dutch pioneers of earlier days cherished a creed strongly Calvinistic in nature and fundamentally predestinarian. As they encountered and overcame hardship and opposition, destroying the heathen power and entering into possession of their land of promise, the idea of "election" was extended from the individual to the community, the nation, the race. Clearly their divine destiny, they held, was to rule the non-white people. The heathen were their inheritance. It was not difficult for a people whose stern religion drew its inspiration largely from the Old Testament to interpret as applying to themselves incidents from the struggles and conquests of the hosts of Israel. This they did, and this many of their descendants continue to do.

South Africa is following racial superiority as the guiding star of her nation-making. On that outmoded doctrine she is attempting to live in the modern world which has already rejected that theory in the bloody struggles of the last thirty years. The policy is condemned by world opinion, and as one South African senator has said, "Apartheid is the lie in the soul of those who proclaim it." To be fair to its present advocates it must be remembered that this policy has been in South African life from its early days, and that during the last fifty years of South Africa's independent government the policy has gradually hardened. Dr. Malan and his party are being logical and forthright in carrying out a policy which they both inherit and fervently believe in.

The witness of the Christian Church in South Africa is unfortunately divided. The Dutch Reformed Church, the church of the Afrikaans-speaking people and by far the strongest church, is lined up on the side of Dr. Malan, although there are signs that many in its ranks believe it

¹ *South Africa: What of the Church?* London, Edinburgh House Press.

has become too politically minded because of its alliance with the ruling political party. The Christian Council of South Africa representing all the other Christian churches has been active and uncompromising in its statement of the Christian faith:

To all in our own land [says its most important statement on the race issue] who profess the faith of Christ crucified we say, in all solemnity, that there are conditions prevailing in South African social life which make it difficult, if not impossible, for many of our brethren to develop fullness of personality. Arising from our deliberations we affirm that the fundamental truths we shall neglect at our peril include:

1. God has created all men in His image. Consequently beyond all differences remains the essential unity.
2. Individuals who have progressed from a primitive social structure to one more advanced should share in the responsibilities and rights of their new status.
3. The real need of South Africa is not "Apartheid" but "Eendrag" (unity through team work).
4. Citizenship involves participation in responsible government. The franchise should be accorded to all capable of exercising it.
5. Every child should have the opportunity of receiving the best education that the community can give, and for which the child has the capacity.
6. Every man has the right to work in that sphere in which he can make the best use of his abilities for the common good.

As a practical expression of this our faith we extend to our brethren of the Dutch Reformed Church, at present unhappily not associated with us, a cordial invitation to join with us in discussion of the practical implementation of these principles in the ordinary affairs of our daily life. In this open invitation we declare without reserve that we are conscious of our own shortcomings, but coupled with this is our profound belief that God the Holy Spirit can—and, if we are faithful, will—lead us into all truth, and that truth shall make us free.

It is one of the tragedies of South Africa that in her isolation she imagines that she is able to settle this problem by herself. But forces are afoot in Africa which render this hope quite illusory, and the chief of them is African nationalism, the irresistible movement of Africa's native races toward some kind of government where their part in government shall be as desired and respected as anybody else's. South Africa is not putting the clock back, because there is no known point in time when the ideal of *apartheid* was achieved. She is trying to stop the clock altogether.

As Alan Paton says:

Will the Nationalists continue to hold power? And will they succeed with their separation policies? They will probably continue to hold power. The removal of the three white representatives of the Africans, who always voted anti-Nationalist, will strengthen the Nationalists. The removal to a separate roll of the "coloured people," who largely voted anti-Nationalist, might give them several additional seats.

Will they succeed with their separation policies? Some of them say they will need a hundred years to perfect their separation program. Who can suppose that they will be given a hundred years? We are watching a great drama, where two of the chief actors are Will-to-Survival and Conscience, but outside the theater the very world is breaking and shaking, and may burst through the walls at any moment. And if not the world then Africa itself, in which the African people and the European powers in Africa have more to say than ourselves. Will we in the Union be able to persuade these others either to follow our example or to leave us alone? I cannot believe it.²

II

A very different "national" situation is seen in West Africa, where in the Gold Coast (a little less than the size of Oregon) and Nigeria (just less than Texas and New Mexico put together) two all-African nations are coming to birth. Both territories have been under British rule for very short spaces of time—the Gold Coast for about a hundred years, and Nigeria for about fifty. It is still extremely difficult to talk of Nigeria as one country, separated as it is into three enormous regions peopled by strongly individualistic tribes who only since 1914 have had before them the notion of being a nation. Nigeria, which has just struggled through a complicated maze of elections with primaries and electoral colleges, is more regionally conscious than "national," and its ultimate form of government is almost bound to be some sort of federal system. The Gold Coast however is becoming a centralized democracy after the parliamentary pattern practiced in the British Commonwealth:

The movement toward self-government in West Africa is of course part of the sweep of nationalism round the world, and there are many contributory causes for it. But in the main the impetus comes from men's natural desire to be free in their own country; free to rule themselves; free to make decisions and take risks. One newspaper in the Gold Coast prints every day on its front page: "We prefer self-government with danger to servitude with tranquillity," a slogan that most aptly sums up the general attitude. Nationalism in West Africa is a bloodless revolt against the white man's paternalism, his desire to "do things" for Africa and the African—oftentimes most laudable and beneficial, but still paternal.

Under this paternal sway these nations in embryo have gradually grown to a maturity which, while far from being fully developed, is full of promise. As I stood in the cabinet room in Accra, high above the Atlantic surf, I realized as never before what amazing political progress has been made in this part of Africa. Deep below that lovely cool room

² *South Africa Today* (Public Affairs Pamphlet, No. 175).

are the dark dungeons in which slave-traders, just over a hundred years ago, locked up their slaves before starting them off on that ghastly journey across the Atlantic to the West Indies and the American mainland. Today men of the same race are in the seat of government with one of their number, Dr. Nkrumah, already the first all-African Prime Minister. Only four British civil servants remain in the Cabinet as representatives of the old order of colonialism.

This onward sweep to political self-government has dangers in the speed of its movement, and in the belief that material progress alone will make a nation. The Gold Coast has been warned very strikingly of this danger by a young Christian leader, Dr. K. A. Busia, in an article in the *Gold Coast Presbyterian Christian Messenger*. He says:

More and more people seem to have accepted it as a fact that what we needed to make this country great and happy to live in is material progress: more roads, more hospitals, more and better houses, more goods at cheaper prices, electricity and power for every town and village—in short, the extension of all the trappings of modern civilization. Accordingly, we have all set our goal towards the acquisition of these things for ourselves and for our country. They are, of course, good things; but they are good only because they are useful to men, and serve their needs. Men and women are more important. The abundance of goods does not necessarily make good societies; it is good men that make good societies.

. . . Our country today is in much greater danger than many people realize; superficially, we seem to be making progress, socially, economically, and politically; but those who can see beneath the surface can see that our foundations are tottering; our moral standards are low whichever way you look—in truth-telling, social discipline, honesty in business and public life, in the home, or in the relations of men and women. We do not seem to expect or demand high standards and high quality either from ourselves, or from others.

At the moment, we are in danger of having a third-rate country because men are afraid to speak the truth and to stand against evil. But there is all history to warn us that that is the way to destruction.

Our present condition is a challenge to all Christians, for the Gold Coast is in sore need of a moral revolution. Without such a revolution, our superficial progress rests on sand, for no country which has tolerated low moral standards and wrong values has escaped collapse.

Another reason for the rapid moves toward self-government in West Africa is the rebellion against racialism. Africa is now conscious of her own powers, and will no longer endure white superiority because it is white, or because it is traditional. I was made aware of this when I was at the famous Achimota School in the Gold Coast, always to be associated with the genius of J. K. Aggrey, now "number one" amongst Gold Coast national heroes. Above the doorway is the crest Aggrey designed for the school—the black and white notes of a piano playing in harmony.

I asked an African friend whether the harmony of the black and white could be expected to go on in the future. "Well," he said, "it depends on who plays the piano: the white man has been on the piano stool a long time; now it's the black man's turn to play the tune."

The third revolt I noticed in West Africa is the revolt against economic domination. The African suspects that he is expected to keep to farming and rural life because he is not thought to be clever enough to manage factories and machines. He is in revolt against any presumption of that kind. He wants all that this world has to give, and is eager to show that his hands and brains are as clever as anybody else's. He is also convinced that the white man gets rich at his expense. He sees big business in operation, he hears of fabulous profits in mines and commerce, and he becomes resentful and frustrated when he is kept out of sharing in the management and direction of the natural resources of his own country.

Two other factors have also contributed to the rise of these new nations. One is a negative one. The white man (principally the British) has never settled permanently in the Gold Coast or Nigeria. He has gone there for "gold, god, or government," and having done his service he has departed. Unlike South Africa, the Rhodesias, or East Africa, these lands have no "white colony," and consequently no multiracial problem arises to impede the progress of an all-African nationalism. The other factor is the economic prosperity of the two territories of Gold Coast and Nigeria. Between them they provide every second chocolate in the world's chocolate boxes, which makes them important dollar earners. In addition the wealth from the palm kernel, the ground nut, and cotton plantation, and now bauxite and aluminum, makes these two territories of vast potential wealth upon which a successful economic life may be built.

How far are the nationalist movements in West Africa influenced by Communist propaganda? There is little or no evidence that the present moves toward "self-government" are instigated by Communism, which is hardly interested in the type of democratic self-government inspired by the ideas implanted by the British connection with West Africa, and tutored by a political gradualism. The revolution in West Africa is a "home-made" one, drawing, it appears, little from outside doctrinaire sources, but most from those genuine desires of the human spirit—a revolt against paternal government, however good, and a powerful will to manage one's own affairs.

The following facts seem to work against the growth of Communism in West Africa:

1. There is a "prosperous" peasantry. The strong family system sees that no one starves.

2. The African communal way of life plus a complicated land tenure system are tough bulwarks against change. They may, however, be *too* resistant to change, and therefore fruitful ground for a Communist revolution.

3. At the moment there are no idle energies available for the study of Communism, and no one seems to be in training as a leader. The movement toward self-government absorbs the attention of all politicians. According to an observer in the university college at Ibadan, no Nigerian of standing has really studied the doctrines of Marx and applied them to African life.

4. The standards, discipline, and demands of Communism are (in some people's opinion) too high for the African.

5. All political groups have declared their nonconnection with Communism, and resent the suggestion that they are linked in any way.

6. In discussing their political hopes and dreams with twenty organized groups of Africans only, I found little or no interest in Communism, and nearly always had to raise the subject myself. In the universities there is no evidence of interest in Communism.

All this sounds as if the attitude of West Africa is the dangerous one of "it can't happen here." The following factors appear to me to be *favorable* to Communism's growth in West Africa:

1. The achievement of self-government will most certainly open the door to a flood of domestic discontents within each territory, and prepare a suitable soil for Communism.

2. Ironically enough the official Public Relations Offices are actively distributing information about Communism which elevates it into the status of "White Man's Bogey No. 1" and therefore possibly a good thing for the black man.

3. Students get some Communist contacts in Britain, and scholarships are awarded to some to study in the Eastern Zone of Germany. (As an influence on African life, however, this can easily be exaggerated.)

4. There is distribution of literature which some observers say is "causing the greatest anxiety to the authorities." I went into every bookshop I could see in West Africa, and can only report that I did not see lavish displays of Communist literature, nor did I see much of it in African homes.

5. The influence of the French territories which surround the Gold Coast and Nigeria may well be an important factor in Communist penetra-

tion. Those territories are in direct touch with the Communist machine in France.

6. It would be foolishly dangerous to assume that two such countries as Gold Coast and Nigeria are not on the propaganda lists of the Communist authorities. One can only conclude that the weight of influences against Communism is at least equal to those in its favor—but then, we are dealing with Communism!

III

What chances are there of these new nations being Christian, at least in their cultural and ethical basis? The Christian occupation of Gold Coast and Nigeria is widespread in geographical content if not in depth, and all the possible dangers to its future are the result of its success. Anglican, Presbyterian, and Methodist missions of Britain and America have done a mighty job in West Africa which has resulted in a group of competent and self-governing churches. Christianity is remarkably free too, in West Africa, from the stigma of being "the white man's religion." It belongs to the people of the land, and is thoroughly acclimatized. But it faces some penetrating dangers. One of them is the danger of "nationalism" within the church itself, with the possible equation of Christian ideas with national aspirations. I sense this particularly in Nigeria where the desire to "have things African" may even affect church doctrine in relation to marriage and the home. There is also a belief in some Christian quarters that "politics is a dirty game" and therefore Christians should keep out of it. This passive, quietist attitude was illustrated by the remark of a Gold Coast minister who, when I said that I hoped to see something of the life of the church in his town, asked, "How many Sundays will you be here?" To counter this attitude the Christian Councils of the Gold Coast and Nigeria have issued some wise statements on the Christian conception of a nation, and of the duty of Christians to play their part in the running of their country.

The spirit of Gold Coast Christianity can be sensed in this statement by a leading group of Christians on the part that Christianity should play in the political development of their country.

Good government requires that there should be sufficient men of ability and integrity for the control of the administration at the top and for the execution of its orders at other levels. The spirit of impartial service for all, which is the special product of Christianity, should be the mark of all public servants. Bribery and corruption should be banished by the vigilance of the authorities, the influence of the Church, and the absolute refusal of all citizens to take or offer bribes. Good government requires the understanding co-operation of the governed and their confidence in the integrity of those who are set over them.

All races are equal before God and have the right to the same respect and to fair and just treatment. The Law of Christ condemns all racial or colour discrimination whether aimed against Africans or non-Africans. Minorities such as Asiatics, Europeans, Liberians and Yorubas will accept the authority of the State, which will in return safeguard their freedom in all respects. All racial pride and arrogance in dealing with Africans or non-Africans, all bitterness and contempt, all exploitation of strangers, the weak and ignorant are condemned both by the law of Justice and of Charity.

The Church contains people of good will who hold different views on the affairs of their country and support different political, economic and social programmes. The Church therefore cannot become identified with any particular party or programme. She does not condemn any party so long as its object is in accordance with Christian principles and the means employed to reach that end are honest and good. Such a party needs the help of Christians who share its views, but the question of joining it must be left to the conscience of the individual.

In education these new nations owe almost everything to Christian schools and colleges. For a hundred years church and missions have been practically the sole providers of education, a fact which means that public life and administration have at least a tincture of Christian practice, integrity, and righteousness. Behind it all, of course, still lie many of the superstitions, the *ju-jus* and corruption of an unreformed society. Now that in the Gold Coast the Christian church is about to be relieved, by the state, of the burden of primary education, it has a magnificent opportunity to pioneer in new ways of teaching the nation how to live, and of evangelizing public and private life. Being relieved of teaching the three R's, it should devote its energies and resources to a more adequate ministry in adult and public life.

That it will need to do this is obvious to any visitor, and for one overwhelming reason; that reason is Islam. All through West Africa Islam is an ominous and powerful factor. Two thirds of Nigeria is irrevocably Islamic and still, for all the democratic façade, under the control of a group of Moslem Emirs. Islam penetrates or infiltrates silently into the Christian areas: its mosques go up in a score of towns. In Ibadan—now the educational and cultural capital of Nigeria—there are 169 mosques and more to come. Pessimistic observers say that in twenty years time West Africa will be a new Islamic empire. Whatever the time limit may be, Christianity has a big task in front of it. But it is not a hopeless one. Its gifts to West Africa have been so creative and fruitful during the last hundred years that it is difficult to believe that the vein of venture is worked out, and that the faith which gave these nations birth has not more wonder and miracle yet to provide.

The Use of the Bible in Public Schools

ZELDA JEANNE RYAN

WHETHER THE BIBLE has a place in our public schools has become more than an academic problem. It is even more than a religious problem, for, although it is of religious concern, it becomes also a matter of state laws, court decisions, and various legal pronouncements. Into all this confusion, we now try to inject sectarianism, biblical interpretation, if not the question which Bible should be used.

I

In the last three hundred years we have gone from a total emphasis on the study of the Bible in the curriculum of the colonial schools, to no emphasis, or practically none, in our own day. However, whether history repeats itself or not, we do find here and there efforts being made to include the Bible in some form in our curriculums. American colonial colleges had precise religious objectives and offered formal courses in religion. Harvard College, for instance, founded in 1636 to provide for a literate ministry, required each student to "know God and Jesus Christ which is eternal life;"¹ and that knowledge was to be gained largely from daily reading of the Bible.

Although in a book as recent as *The Individual and His Religion*² the author can say, "Among modern intellectuals—especially in the universities—the subject of religion seems to have gone into hiding," courses in religion offered by colleges and universities are becoming numerous. "By 1940 all church-related colleges, 85 per cent of the independent colleges, and 30 per cent of the state institutions had departments of religion."³ It may be that once again it will work down from the top, and we shall have the Bible and religion stressed in our public schools.

By 1650, the purpose of education was stated in the following words:

¹ As quoted in Moehlman, C. H., *The Church As Educator*. New York: Hinds, Hayden & Eldredge, 1947, p. 67.

² Allport, G. W., *The Individual and His Religion*. The Macmillan Company, 1950, p. 1.

³ Corwin, V., "The Teaching of Religion," in Wilder, A. N., ed., *Liberal Learning and Religion*. Harper & Brothers, 1951, pp. 169-170.

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"To educate youth in knowledge and Godliness."⁴ Yale in 1701 accomplished this purpose by emphasizing "our present religious govt." Since 1947, Yale has again strengthened its religious emphasis.

In the mid-eighteenth century, although education broadened its base, theology was still one of the principal subjects. In an account of King's College, now Columbia, we find this idea concerning the teaching of religion in that college: "There is no intention to impress on the scholars the peculiar tenets of any particular sect of Christians."⁵ By 1951, when the Report of the New York State Citizens' Committee for Children and Youth was published in *The Four Million*, the Advisory Committee suggested: "Religion must form an integral part of a child's training; it must enter into his daily life. . . . The due practice of religion is necessary to the spiritual development of the child . . . some form of prayer should be a daily practice from the first dawning of reason."⁶ Is history repeating itself? Shall we find a growing interest in religion and spiritual values? Those values were once included in the child's and in the youth's education.

The public school law of 1642 in Massachusetts is another example of the tie between education and religion, for it requires that each child must be able "to read and understand the principles of religion and the capital laws of the country."⁷ As a result of this law and others similar to it, religion was the dominant chord in whatever type of school provided, and wherever the public school went, the Bible followed, for it was considered then, as it is now in some circles, essential in public education. The Catechism was the central text in many schools, and next to the Bible, it served the minister as a basis of preaching and teaching for Christian membership. *The New England Primer*, the standard book for the colonial schools, was made up primarily of Bible names, Bible verses, and Bible facts. "Pray to God," "Love God," "Serve God," and "Fear God" were among the lessons in the *Primer*.

In contrast to the religious zeal of the New Englanders and their belief in schools as educational institutions, Sir William Berkeley, Governor of Virginia, said, "I thank God there are no schools nor printing . . . for learning has brought disobedience and heresy and sects into the world. . . . God keep us from both."⁸ But it appears that Berkeley's was a minority opinion, for schools were set up in the South and were attended by many.

⁴ Mochlman, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *The Four Million*, New York State Citizens' Committee of One Hundred for Children and Youth, 1951, p. iii.

⁷ As quoted in Fleming, W. S., *God in Our Public Schools*, p. 36.

⁸ Mochlman, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

The Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and 1787 are important documents in supporting the historical view of religious education, for the former ordinance encouraged schools for teaching religion, morality, and knowledge, and the latter set aside Section 29 in each township for religious purposes.

Returning to Massachusetts a few years later, we find that in 1789 the law for moral instruction was based on the Judeo-Christian tradition. The law declared that schools should teach piety, truth, benevolence, frugality, and temperance through the Bible, Psalter, and New Testament. By 1827, no books were used in Massachusetts favoring any particular religious sect.

Horace Mann, the father of public education, won approval for the doctrine of teaching morality in a nonsectarian religious manner. He said that moral education was based on the "common elements of Christianity to which all Christian sects would agree or to which they would take no exception."⁹ Mann included in his educational plans reading the Bible, which contains the common elements, with no comments so as not to introduce sectarian biases. Mann's conviction was so strong and his labors so persistent that not even the coming of the Catholics to Massachusetts between 1820 and 1860 and their subsequent efforts to oust the Protestant "nonsectarian" instruction, including Bible reading, from the public schools succeeded.

We see how far-reaching Mann's opinions and labors have been when we turn to *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools*, a 1951 publication of the Educational Policies Commission.

America was founded by a God-fearing people [this Commission reports]. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights clearly recognize the existence of religious ideals, while guaranteeing to each person freedom to worship God according to the mandate of his own religious convictions. Rejection of a state religion or of state religions is not the same thing as rejection of religion itself. The public schools of the United States, like the government of the United States, stand firmly for freedom of religious belief.¹⁰

Likewise, when Mann wrote in his report of 1847, "The use of the Bible in the schools is not expressly enjoined by law, but both its letter and its spirit are consonant with that use. . . ." ¹¹ he became a forerunner of the recent growing emphasis on "General Education" and "Core Curriculums." For state-supported teachers colleges which have reconstructed their curricula around general education, such as South Dakota and Iowa,

⁹ Butts, R. F., *The American Tradition in Religion and Education*. Beacon Press, 1950, p. 117.

¹⁰ *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools*. The National Education Association, Washington, D. C., 1951, pp. 5-6.

¹¹ As quoted by Fleming, p. 29.

require a semester or more of Bible study. Obviously if teacher-preparing institutions find the Bible a necessary discipline in general education, they do not find anything in the law of the land with which the letter and the spirit of the Bible do not agree.

Mann was most certainly sincere when he wrote in the conclusion of his 1847 report, "Had the Board required me to exclude either the Bible or religious instruction from the schools, I should certainly have given them the earliest opportunity to appoint my successor."¹² Notice, also, that Mann says the exclusion of either "the Bible or religious instruction." He must have thought both should be included, and while he says nothing about "which" Bible to use, nor anything about "with" or "without comment" by the teacher, he doubtless had in mind the prevailing custom of the time. Apparently state superintendents of our own time are as determined as Mann was, for four years after the highly controversial decision in the Champaign, Illinois, case, we find released-time programs are coming back, and new ones have been started.

When the Free School Society of New York became the Public School society in 1826, it threw its emphasis on educating all the children, not the poor only. It based its moral instruction on the common elements of Protestant Christianity and Bible reading with no comment. As was to be expected, by 1840-41 the Catholics raised a controversy charging that the schools taught Protestant Christianity and that such instruction was wholly unacceptable to the Catholics. This controversy resulted in the Act of 1842, which stated that no funds were to be distributed to schools teaching sectarian religious doctrines. However, in 1844, a New York State law was enacted forbidding the exclusion of the Bible on sectarian grounds. This law, still in effect, reads, "Nothing herein contained shall authorize the Board of Education to exclude the Holy Scriptures, without note or comment, or any selection therefrom, from any of the schools provided for in this act."¹³ In 1853, an act was passed whereby no prayers were required in the schools, and where the King James Version of the Bible was read, Catholics were not required to be present or to memorize any parts of it. This spring the Supreme Court of the United States denied the appeal of the New Jersey citizens to overrule the decision of the State Supreme Court, which means that the New Jersey law requiring the reading of at least five verses of the Bible daily in the public schools still holds. The court also upheld the constitutionality of the released-time programs in New York State.

¹² As quoted by Fleming, p. 29.

¹³ Fleming, *op. cit.*, as quoted on p. 46.

Even previous to the Supreme Court's decision, New York's Board of Regents had been urging the state's public schools to begin every school day with prayer. This prayer is to be inoffensive to all religious beliefs.

Letting the examples of state action by these two states, New York and Massachusetts, suffice, we turn to a more general survey of other states. Other states did follow the examples of New York and Massachusetts, and passed similar laws in the mid- and late-nineteenth century. For instance, we find action taken by Iowa in 1858; by Indiana in 1865; by West Virginia in 1866; Florida in 1869; and Mississippi in 1870. A Mr. Cameron, one of the Illinois representatives to the State Constitution Convention, in pleading for Bible education in the public schools, said, "custom has generally established the Bible in our public schools."¹⁴ The state of Illinois passed this legislation in 1848. Apparently some of those involved in the Champaign Case of four years ago did not agree with Mr. Cameron.

Nor should it be concluded that all state governments have favored religious instruction and Bible reading in the public schools; not even that the same governments have retained the same opinion over the years. An annotation of Wisconsin's statutes in 1898 asserted that the constitutional prohibitions against sectarian teaching applied only to religious doctrines believed in or rejected by different religious groups. This same annotation asserted that it is not sectarian to teach the existence of a Supreme Being. However, in the years 1902, 1919, and 1915, the supreme courts of Nebraska, Illinois, and Louisiana forbade reading the Bible on the grounds that Bible reading and hymn singing were sectarian instruction. A Nebraska teacher reported recently that some Jewish families in her community objected to her having a Christmas program at the school. The Cincinnati School Board permitted Bible reading in 1829, but forbade it in 1872.

On the national scene, we find that in 1875, since there was such great opposition to religious instruction in school, President Grant proposed an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, forbidding the teaching of religious tenets and the granting of school funds or taxes by legislatures, municipal, or other authorities for aiding any religious sect or denomination. This proposal was taken up by James G. Blaine, leader of the House, who introduced a resolution to amend the Constitution by adding to the First Amendment a specific and detailed statement that "no funds of the United States, any state, territory, district, or municipality shall be used for the support of any school or other institution 'under the control of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination.'"¹⁵ Blaine affixed

¹⁴ Fleming, *op. cit.*, quoted p. 29.

¹⁵ Butts, *op. cit.*, as quoted on pp. 142-3.

this important statement to the resolution: "This article shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution," Despite the protective measure, doubtless inspired by Protestant feeling, the measure was lost in the Senate.

II

Always intricately involved in any discussion or controversy over Bible and religious instruction in the public schools is the factor of separation of church and state, which by the turn of the present century most states had accepted. Just how did this principle develop? Thomas Jefferson, who was one of our greatest exponents of religious liberty and the separation of church and state, had religion taught in his school in Virginia on a non-sectarian basis. Later in his life, however, Jefferson came to agree with James Madison, who said that the "true protection for equal rights of conscience requires that *all* religious instruction be eliminated from the public schools."¹⁶ However wise the dictum, the result has been, in the minds of many, at best a mixed blessing.

After Canon Bernard I. Bell, Episcopalian rector at the University of Chicago, attacked the public schools and blamed Protestants for the "wall of separation" between the church and the schools, a writer in *The Christian Century* answered Bell's attack.¹⁷ This writer thinks the "principle of separation of church and state is a principle of health for both," for mingling of the functions of the church and state would destroy American democracy. But the writer disagrees with Bell in his claim that Protestantism has caused all the fracas, and has been instrumental in bringing discredit upon the public schools.

Citing Elwood P. Cubberley as his authority, the writer says "the elimination of sectarianism from education . . . came about by decision of the whole people," therefore Bell's thesis is historically untrue.¹⁸ Cubberley goes on to say in his book, *Public Education in the United States*,¹⁹ that it was largely through the demands of the Catholics that one of the most interesting fights in the process of secularizing public education in America was precipitated in New York, for the New York City School Board ruled that no portion of the school funds would be given to any school where religious sectarian doctrines were taught or practiced. A

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁷ "For Whom This Bell Tolls." *The Christian Century*, LXVII (Nov. 1, 1950), p. 1287f.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Cubberley, E. P., *Public Education in the United States*. Rev. Ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

similar situation was found in Massachusetts, when the Catholics initiated the Amendment of 1855, which was promoted by Horace Mann. This same condition followed in state after state. To blame the American Protestants now for lack of religion in education, says Cubberley, is about as convincing as the North Koreans' accusation that South Korea was the aggressor.

If "elimination of sectarianism from education . . . came about by the decision of the whole people," obviously some of our modern Protestants are determined that religion shall not be denied our children. Erwin L. Shaver, Executive Director, National Council of Churches, writing recently makes this statement: "But should weekday religious education be denied and the spiritual values taught in the public schools be those 'with no explicit or necessary reference to religious or divine authority or sanction,' as some of its proponents advocate, a more extensive development of parochial education is both certain and understandable."²⁰

But the Report of the New York State Citizens' Committee, referred to earlier, does make reference to "religious or divine authority or sanction," and with no reservations.²¹ A subcommittee recommends "an intensive campaign urging parents to have their children participate in the religious education of their faith." Furthermore, this same subcommittee reports: "The subcommittee studied released time as an instrument of religious education. The majority favor its continuance."²²

In the light of the cosmopolitan character of the personnel of this Committee, it would seem that the "wall of separation," to use Canon Bell's terminology, is not bothering them greatly.

Religion, for all intents and purposes, and the Bible left the schools in the 1870's; however, "The Book did not leave the schools by the will of the people."²³ This fact is especially true in the West, for Washington, Utah, and Arizona have constitutional bars against the Book in tax-supported schools; no such law exists in the East, to my knowledge. Despite the three examples of constitutional bars against the use of the Bible, the Book was not legislated out, so much as it was quietly crowded out by alien influences and possibly indifference.

The popular belief that state and national laws prevent religious instruction in our public schools is fallacious. On the contrary, many states require a limited amount of Bible reading without comment, and the practice

²⁰ "Released-Time Recovery." *Adult Teacher*, February, 1952, p. 16.

²¹ *The Four Million*, p. iii.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 194.

²³ Fleming, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

is apparently on the increase. For that reason the decision of the Supreme Court in the New Jersey Case is important.

In the District of Columbia, since 1866, by law, religious exercises, Bible reading, the repeating of the Lord's Prayer, and hymn singing have been the daily custom in all the schoolrooms. Five states have provisions that the Bible may be read without comment, but they exclude all other religious training. The constitutions of twelve states prohibit sectarian instruction in public schools. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. On the other hand, however, no constitution explicitly prohibits reading the Bible as such and "decision as to whether Bible reading is or is not sectarian instruction has been left to the courts."²⁴ For example, the Mississippi Constitution states that the rights of religious liberty do not exclude the Holy Bible from use in the state.

State laws are more confusing than constitutional provisions, for the laws vary more from state to state. Twenty-four state laws prohibit sectarian instruction in public schools, and in half the states a clear statement of general principle is found. In 1913, it was found that only two states had retained the mandatory provision for reading the Bible in public schools. Since then twelve states have passed laws requiring that the Bible be read in public schools; six more permit Bible reading although there is statutory prohibition against sectarian instruction.

In the twelve states requiring Bible reading, opening exercises are held in the schools beginning with prayer, and including hymns, a passage from the Bible, and a short illustrative story. Such a program takes about ten minutes a day. But it does retain a foothold.

The National Education Association surveyed the spread of the custom and actual practice of Bible reading and found that in addition to the twelve states requiring Bible reading, it is permitted in twenty-five other states by lay interpretation of courts, attorney-general, and local custom. Hence, Bible reading is required or permitted in thirty-seven states in the nation.

III

Over three centuries, therefore, we find the Bible has had some place in our educational system. Sometimes it has been prominent; in recent years, excepting the colleges and universities with departments or schools of religion, it has been almost outmoded. The battle is not lost; far from it. In fact, these are hopeful times. Aside from the report of the colleges

²⁴ Butts, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

and universities, we find a most hopeful sign in the revision of curriculums in our teacher-preparing institutions in which all students are required to take one or more semesters in Bible study. Even in what is called "practice teaching," students are required to work with Sunday school classes, the "Y's," and other religious groups.

The Education Section of the New York Report, already referred to, recommends that, "greater recognition be given to the spiritual foundation of all education" (p. 37). The same report says that the developing of ideals in children and youth is a joint responsibility of the home, church, and community.

Despite the fact that some writers have said that the church helped take the Bible out of our schools, the schools now call on the church, along with the other educational elements in the community, to bring spiritual values to our children, and once again give spiritual foundations to all our education. And the church has not shown any reluctance insofar as it has been legally possible.

Although earlier references on this subject specified Bible reading and/or religious instruction in the schools, more recent references apparently assume that religious instruction will rest upon the Bible, for these references almost uniformly speak in terms of religious education, and seldom mention the Bible. Court decisions, state regulations, and such official documents may refer to the Bible and/or religious instruction, but writers on released time and related subjects speak in terms of religious instruction.

What started as an assumed part of education, if not the real purpose of schools, in time became more than a religious problem, more than a political problem. Unfortunately, it has become a sectarian battle in some instances; in others, a political fight. Our danger, we must realize, is that in an effort to win our point we may lose sight of a larger, a more worthy reason. For it remains true, as Dr. Russell J. Compton told the Chicago meeting of the National Association of Biblical Instructors in January 1951: "Without knowledge of the Hebrew Prophets, the Sermon on the Mount, the personality of Christ, and their impact upon man in the Western world we cannot achieve the highest sense of moral and personal values."²⁵ And that information is in the Bible.

In recent years children's literature has included so many religious books that are apparently accepted without question, there is no reason why they should not be used with primary children. There are Bibles for

²⁵ "Christian Heritage in Humanities Courses," *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), p. 20.

just about all ages. There are picture books of the Story of Creation, of the Flood, of the Bible characters, and of the forms of worship. Schools use these books because of their interest and appeal to little children. Truly "there is no law against their use." They will give children a background on which to build their later religious instruction. They do not bring in religion by the back door, nor do they immunize children against it. What they have done in more than one instance is to send parents back to the Bible to answer their children's questions.

While we may have some argument that we should respect this "wall of separation," it was never erected, in the first place, to keep God out of the public schools, nor, in the second to arm a few parents with the power to keep religious instruction and Bible knowledge from the children of those parents who want them to have that instruction.

As a result of this "wall," and the power it gives a minority, we find such an inconsistency existing in our high schools as requiring students to study Shakespeare, Milton, Tennyson, and Browning, whose writings are steeped with religious values and biblical allusions, but not allowing these youth to study the Bible itself. The "wall" does not prevent the study of Greek and Roman gods and goddesses, but it minimizes the study of the true God. If "the Great Book has ceased to be read in the American home," as it has been said, then where will the men and women of tomorrow "achieve the highest sense of moral and personal values"?

Book Reviews

The Irony of American History. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. xi-174 pp. \$2.50.

There is evidence already that *The Irony of American History* will be one of Reinhold Niebuhr's most widely read books. *Life* magazine made it the subject of a lead editorial. *Time* magazine paraphrased it at length. And any number of journals, religious and secular, from *Advance* to the *New Yorker*, whipped out full-length reviews of it within a few weeks after its appearance on the market.

There are good reasons why this book should be widely read. First is its timeliness. It deals directly with the critical situation in which the American people now find themselves, and brings the resources of history to focus sharply on the contemporary scene. A second reason is its readability. Maybe this readability is one of the relativities of literature. But it seems to me that the style of writing and the order of exposition in this book make it more available to the intelligent layman than are some of Niebuhr's other productions. Another reason is that, in spite of his being a Christian theologian, Niebuhr has finally won recognition from many secular scholars. So far as I know, it is only the philosophers who are still resisting his influence. They are too much under the sway of positivism, and of something they sincerely believe to be empiricism, to consent to be diverted from their lucubrations by these prophetic insights. Nevertheless, there are increasing numbers of social scientists and of natural scientists who are eager students of this theologian.

The reader may take this book on two levels of interest. First there is the analysis of the situation in which we as a nation find ourselves. This gives us a stacking up of the ironies—ironies of failure, and ironies of success—which Niebuhr ferrets out with a profusion that almost overwhelms, and yet with a precision and an appositeness that stab our darkness with light. Chapters II-V concentrate on the domestic scene; chapter VI deals with the international picture; chapter VII looks to the American future. There are the ironies of innocence that becomes guilt, of power that turns to weakness, of the foolishness that is better than wisdom, of the evil in the foe which is an exaggeration of the evil in ourselves, of the faith in God's providence which yields more power to man than man's faith in himself. But it is unjust to the book to pretend to abstract its essence in this manner. Niebuhr's analyses are specific, concrete, and to the point in contemporary affairs. Any reviewer can recite the ritual of his categories. Only the author can apply them, and only the careful reader will have the satisfaction of profiting from them.

A second level of interest may have to do with the general theory of irony in human experience. This is elaborated in the preface, in chapter I, and in chapter VIII. These writings should be combined with chapter VII of *Discerning the Signs of the Times* on "Humor and Faith," and with chapter VIII of *Beyond Tragedy* on "Christianity and Tragedy," to get the full development of Niebuhr's thought in this area. Niebuhr makes significant distinctions between pathos, tragedy, and irony, and in this latest book suggests that for the Christian faith the ironic view of human evil in history must be the normative one. I have a notion that anyone who takes pains to explore this whole discussion may find that he is getting at the heart of Niebuhr's perspective on life.

The kind of criticism that this book is in for is already illustrated with classical

purity by Anthony West's review in the *New Yorker* (May 3, 1952). First there is the allegation of incompetence in historical scholarship. This gives Mr. West an opportunity to put on a considerable parade of irrelevant erudition. The evidence of careful research that lies in the book itself and Niebuhr's personal associations with men like Perry Miller and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., invite us to wonder what kind of pudding is being proved. It turns out that what actually offends Mr. West is not Niebuhr's scholarship but Niebuhr's point of view. It is the clash between the prophetic perspective and the secular perspective that makes for disagreement. What seems important in Mr. West's perspective is trivial in Niebuhr's perspective. What is important in Niebuhr's perspective is nonexistent in Mr. West's perspective.

The second kind of criticism involves a direct attack on Niebuhr's assumptions about human nature. Thus Mr. West, who doesn't care for original sin, speaks of Niebuhr's "rejection of reason" and "lack of confidence in men," scores his "defeatism" and his "pallid pessimist declarations"—"he offers moral justifications for taking the easy and timid way out"—and decides that Niebuhr leaves us "helpless" in the face of the challenge of the future. All this is quite in order from the humanist who doesn't know that the Christian doctrine of sin is linked with the Christian doctrine of redemption, that the awareness of the frailty of man and of the limits of man's reason is set off against the power and the providence of God. Anyway, it is a pleasant irony that the *New Yorker*, which delights us with its own perceptions of the ironies of life, should turn rabid and supercilious before the ironies of a Reinhold Niebuhr. Yet surely this is what must happen when the irony of the "civilized" man is confronted by the irony of the Christian man.

Now I am not suggesting that Niebuhr is infallible in his scholarship, or that he is absolutely just and complete in his list of ironies. There may be critics—and I could be one of them—who feel that *The Irony of American History* leaves out part of the story. There is also a glory in American history: let us not be ashamed to say so! And there is a power in American history which is not altogether converted into weakness, a wisdom which is not altogether turned to foolishness. But even while I venture to say these things I am a bit apprehensive about my motives in saying them. Just recently I read of a distinguished mortician in southern California who commissioned several Italian artists to compete in painting a portrait of a smiling Christ. It seems that half of the portraits submitted did not smile at all, and that the rest had but sickly grins. They were all rejected for the grand prize, for, remarked the mortician, "I want an American-faced Christ." And I can't help wondering if my own uneasiness before the pronouncements of this prophet of the Lord who writes about our national history may be due to my wanting Christ, or to my wanting Christ with an American face.

In any case, the *New Yorker* which, willy-nilly, finds Niebuhr deserving of a leading review, *Time* magazine which paraphrases him reverently, *Life* magazine which builds him up big and then patriotically knocks out a few chips, and this critic who is startled, enlightened, disturbed, and stimulated by his experience but feels that somehow he ought to make a few reservations about something—we are all agreed on one thing: the book is to be read. If you have never read any Niebuhr, then this is a good place to begin. If you have read much of Niebuhr, then this helps to bring matters to a focus. If you are just a bewildered American citizen who wants to understand what goes on in this complex and challenging world, then here is a prophet who can speak to your condition.

Indeed, this book does for the here and the now of the present moment what *Reflections on the End of an Era* did for an earlier critical moment in American history. And regardless of the disturbing quality of some of its insights, it reveals not defeatism but perseverance, not helplessness but strength, not pallor but the power of one who stands firm with his feet planted on the rock of Christian reality.

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Modern Poetry and the Christian Tradition. By AMOS N. WILDER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. xvi-287 pp. \$3.00.

Poetry, Religion, and the Spiritual Life. By GEORGE F. THOMAS. Houston: The Elsevier Press, 1951. 113 pp. \$2.00.

Dr. Wilder's *Modern Poetry and the Christian Tradition* received the decennial prize of the Bross Foundation. Dr. Thomas' three lectures under the general title, *Poetry, Religion, and the Spiritual Life*, were delivered at the Rice Institute in the annual Rockwell lecture series. Although the titles might lead us to expect viewpoints on the same subject, the books, as a matter of fact, do not belong to the same genre.

Dr. Thomas' lectures are properly to be classified as sermons on the general theme of the human imagination and the disciplines of the imagination. They make eloquent and pleasant reading marked by a gift for easily remembered although not highly original statement, as, for instance (p. 71), "Common sense cannot help us here because it is largely the product of the society it is called upon to criticize," and (p. 76), "poetry offers us, not a system of truth, but materials for such a system."

To support his term *poetry*, however, Dr. Thomas does not reach beyond brief familiar allusions to Homer, Lucretius, Dante, Shakespeare, Blake, and half a dozen British poets of the nineteenth century. His thesis that (p. 79) the "poetic gift is in no sense a substitute for religion and philosophy" is a valid thesis but, in the context he provides, tends to distorted emphasis. He does not make wholly clear that poetry, although not a substitute for, is a necessary corollary to religious and philosophic thought.

Dr. Wilder, as his title announces, presents a book concerned primarily with poets of the most recent fifty years. Nevertheless, his range through the history of the varied relations of poetry and religion in the Western world is rich in reference and lively in perception. His is an original and persuasive contribution to the record, which is as old as mankind, of the interdependence of religious and poetic insights.

By contrast, a large part of what Dr. Thomas has to say is based on generalizations about education, literature, religion, and philosophy which, if roughly true from about 1910 to about 1930, do not take into account rapid changes in emphasis since about 1930. His comments on poetry tend to confirm the illusions of those who talk about "modern" poetry without reading it and accordingly further the persistent folk rumor that current poetry is both irrelevant and irresponsible.

Fortunately for poets and their readers, Amos Wilder's study disposes thoroughly and justly of the notion that the majority of contemporary poets are religiously irresponsible. The persuasiveness of his book resides not only in the breadth of his sympathies but also in his apt use of many literary, philosophical, and theological resources. He demonstrates in himself the function of the advice remembered (p. 21)

from T. E. Hulme, "carrying a library of a thousand years in mind as a balancing pole against the prejudice of the contemporary."

Wilder avoids both the clichés of the older literary historians and the arbitrariness and special prejudices of several current schools of literary criticism. Early in the book he discusses the complex factors in writers usually pigeonholed as puritans or romantics. Later he explores the complex of orthodox and heterodox Christian attitudes in several of the most frequently discussed modern poets along with a few of the markedly poetic novelists, such as Joyce and Kafka. The grace of Wilder's style reflects both his position as a thorough student of the New Testament understood in its doctrine of responsible freedom and his gift for apt image and analogy as himself a practicing poet.

Following his opening essay with its summary of the large and necessary position of poetry not only in the Old Testament but also in the strophic character of the sayings of Jesus and the prosody of Luke and of John of the Fourth Gospel, Wilder turns to his survey of poetry in English and in French during the past one hundred years. His survey of nineteenth-century America is centered on the statement (p. 34), "In both Melville and Hawthorne the insights of primary Protestantism are asserted against the shallower elations and intoxications of the time." He sees the world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the world of (p. 54) "troglodytes in the artificial caverns of the machine age and the megalopolis." But he also sees that this moment of what appears to be, from one viewpoint, cultural zero is also the moment when (p. 55) "efforts at reintegration take their rise and can be understood."

He then proceeds to compare the poetry of the traditionalists—those who personally have not been affected by the disintegration—with the work of the innovators who, having participated in the cultural wasteland, have also found the way through and beyond it. Here, as always, Wilder makes no narrow judgment for or against either group of poets, giving to each type their due as sincere and esthetically competent "makers" in terms of the world they have experienced.

Wilder gives major space to Hopkins, Péguy, and Auden. He gathers and expands the major points made by Nathan A. Scott, Jr., and Lionel Trilling with regard to Eliot's particular theological biases and limitations. Wilder's liberal quotations from Marianne Moore's *In Distrust of Merits*, from Edith Sitwell's *Still Falls the Rain*, and from Delmore Schwartz's *Starlight Like Intuition Pierced the Twelve*, as well as the notes in passing on the evolving metaphysic in the more recent among Wallace Stevens' poems, add to the value of the work for those who may be using Wilder's survey as an introduction to wider reading in contemporary poetry.

From the viewpoint of readers specifically interested in the intellectual history of the churches, probably the most striking conclusion in Wilder's book is his perception that French unchurched or heterodox Roman Catholics and moderately Protestant Anglicans or Episcopalians seem to be at particular advantage as poets, having both the symbolic resources of a venerable tradition without its rigidities and the freedom of secular experience without its rootlessness. He also makes a point of the fact that the wariness toward the churches on the part of several philosophically Christian but unchurched poets has its cause not in the history of the Christ but in the obscurantism and ascetic bigotries of some types of church and sect dogma.

Throughout, Wilder urges that churchmen respect the poets if they are rightly to hear and share (p. 260) "what the spirit says to the churches, speaking through

the laity and the disaffected, and even through the apostates and the Gentiles." His theme is that (p. 244) "the blood of the heretics is often the seed of the church" and that the particular images of creation and chaos in contemporary poetry are part of the revivifying and necessary spring of language from which comes new baptizing in renewed understanding of the one Resurrection.

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The Conduct of Life. By LEWIS MUMFORD. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1951. 342 pp. \$5.00.

Lewis Mumford's profound and comprehensive studies of the human situation have been brought to a climax in the present book which serves both as summary and as preface to the whole series. He has here stated his ultimate faith and his proposal for man's renewal. It is a powerful, beautifully written expression of his point of view.

Mumford's philosophy could be called "organic humanism." He is scientific without falling into the trap of scientism; he appreciates the historic religions, yet commits himself to no one of them; he is optimistic without neglecting the darker side of human nature; sensitive to the high arts and symbols of our culture, yet capable of a searching analysis of the perils of civilization; morally earnest without surrendering the ideal of the balanced life.

Man's fate is in his own hands, according to this philosophy. If we are to survive we must make a radical reorientation of our life which will place the person in the central position of concern. This means an "axial change" in our specialized, impersonalized, often brutalized culture. The agent of the change is the individual person, moving out to express his faith in the life of the group. The goal of the change is, in Mumford's words, the following: "The new personality will round out the discipline of the impersonal with the fullest expression of sympathy and empathy, with the most exquisite responsiveness to all modes of being, with a readiness to embrace life in its unity and wholeness, its uniqueness and its freedom and endless creativity." (p. 231)

This book elaborates such an ideal, and calls for its realization through personal decisions made by individuals throughout the world who will break with the stultifying habits and dissipations of contemporary life. Mumford outlines in general terms a discipline of mediation, inner renewal, and affirmation of love which moves toward the integrated life. He writes in a mood of somewhat restrained hopefulness. He believes that such a radical transformation may be in the making in this very time.

This humanism draws inspiration from the traditional religions; but it seeks to transcend them all in a universal synthesis. Christianity, Mumford believes, has understood the evil in man, and the need for renewal. Other religions have their insights and techniques for inspiring the human pilgrimage. But he looks for a more universal faith to be expressed both in religion and in a world political order which will embrace all humanity in one community.

No one can read this book, and Mumford's other studies which support it, without being guided toward a saner, more constructive understanding of human problems. He supplies an excellent balance to the frantic, the despairing, and the

sentimental moods of modern life. Yet his plea for moral renewal, while it will convince some, may appear to many more as curiously ineffective. Why is it that this plea, "come now, and let us renew ourselves," comes so dangerously close to sheer bathos and moralistic uplift? Different critics could give different answers to that question. Some will surely say with reason that the general appeal to moral decision apart from a more factual consideration of our actual political, economic, and social problems has left Mumford with an unrealistic picture of human history.

The present reviewer will acknowledge his own bias in stating that he thinks much of the weakness in Mumford's view lies in his "theology." Mumford must resort to this exhortation for moral effort, because he cannot find God at work in the present situation with all its tragedy. Further, he is so concerned with the problem of universal faith and culture that he never finally comes to grips with the ultimate decisions in the realm of faith which are forced upon us if we are to have any religion at all.

On the first point, Mumford sees God only at the end of the cosmic process. He is the final emergent, the goal of the life struggle. But this leaves man on his own resources to drive himself forward. That plea of "effort" always finally betrays its gnawing uncertainty. Man is a dependent being in a strange cosmos. If he cannot find a healing power at work in his midst, his energies finally flag and his faith withers. Dozens of times in this book Mumford does speak of faith in "life," and in powers of balance and self-righting which man discovers in nature. He is so very close to seeing God at work in the present! The discovery of the actual and acting God would relieve these moralistic exhortations of their unnatural strain, and give them a sustaining foundation in spite of the tragic aspect of history.

The other problem of the basis for universal culture is one of the most perplexing with which any religion or philosophy must deal. But Mumford's program for spiritual advance seems ineffective just at the point at which he tries to put a general philosophy in place of any specific commitment or choice between Christianity (for example) and other religions. The Christian understanding of man's sin may be true or false; but if you discard its major premise, that man stands in a relation to God as well as to himself, then you change the whole meaning of sin. That is a decision of faith which is just as particular as any other. I do not know of any modern book which more clearly, though unintentionally, makes a case for the significance in history of a community of committed believers, bearing their witness to the world, willing to accept the scandal of particularity, than does this present book. For Mumford's passionate plea to "rally round" and affirm a new faith in the person, needs the support of a going community in history, consisting of those who understand, accept, and live by that faith. In short, he needs a theory of the church. And will it be a church whose faith depends on God's action primarily, or upon man's? Some decision must ultimately be made between those two faiths.

These questions are raised in a spirit of deepest appreciation of Mumford's work, and a desire to understand the significance of his mature wisdom. The insight, moral passion, and original imagination which glow on every page of his writing should be known wherever men think and work and hope.

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Time and Eternity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion. By W. T. STACE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. vii-169 pp. \$3.00.

Religious Beliefs of American Scientists. By EDWARD LEROY LONG, JR. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952. 168 pp. \$3.00.

The heart of Dr. Stace's book is its central chapter, which has the same title as the book itself. One paragraph from this chapter is fairly representative of the thought of the whole. "We may say also that, from the standpoint of time, God is in relation to the world. He is omnipresent in it. But from the standpoint of the eternal, which is the inner view of the divine moment, God has no relations either within Himself or with other beings, or with the world."

The "divine moment" is the moment of ecstasy of the mystic who at that instant experiences God intuitively but finds the occasion indescribable, ineffable, and incomprehensible. Hence he must use these words along with others like Silence, and even Nothing, to describe God. The paradoxical structure, the balancing of contradicting statements in this paragraph is also typical of the entire book.

The underlying assumption is that there are two orders, that of the world of nature subject to strict cause-and-effect relations, and that of the infinite eternal God subject to no relations, each of which are self-contained and neither of which has anything to do with the other. The entire book is self-consistent and follows from the postulate just stated. The reader may notice a similarity with some of the tenets of the long-forgotten Gnostics who flourished between the first and sixth centuries, but who were finally suppressed as heretics.

In the widely read article entitled "Man Against Darkness" in the September, 1947, issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, we find Stace a strict naturalist, announcing the death of religion. In the present book he says he is defending religion; at least he is permitting the existence of a God who cannot be the object of logical thought and can be known only through the intuition. That is, Stace still maintains his naturalist position *in toto*. But, in chapter eight, he says that religious intuitions are capable of being refined and educated (p. 145). It thus seems possible that there is hope of growth, and we may find in the future a synthesis of the two at present incommensurable orders out of which will emerge a more useful (and more familiar) God.

This reviewer feels that Stace makes two slips, both mathematical, each of which vitiates a basic statement in his underlying assumption. One of these is concerned with the relations between finitude and infinity, and the other with the rigor of cause-and-effect relations in the natural order.

On p. 59, Stace says that anything with the properties of infinity cannot change. "But that which changes cannot be infinite." Stated in mathematical language Stace is saying that the derivatives of all functions at infinity must be equated to zero, which of course is just not so. Thus Stace is adopting unjustified rules about infinity which will suit his purpose. If God is infinite, why not at least give him as much latitude as we would a mathematical function that has both finite and infinite values, and admit that all God's activities need not be at infinity? Thus an infinite God may be active both at finite times and places as well as at infinite times and places and even in multidimensional times and places both finite and infinite. It is going to be difficult to reduce such a God to Nothingness in any sense of the word.

The other misstatement consists in the use of the word "every" in the nineteenth

line of p. 112. The statement refers to "the maxim of science that for every natural fact a natural cause must be found." Stace is also bothered by this, because on p. 87 in a footnote he says, "We may ignore as irrelevant the alleged non-causality of electrons," and ridicules attempts to include this factor in philosophy. He also pays his respects to "the new physics" on the first page of the preface and again on p. 148.

Actually the effect of the Heisenberg principle, announced in 1927, was to make the cause-and-effect relations of large- and medium-scale physics purely statistical, and in sufficiently small-scale physics to do away with cause-and-effect relations altogether. There is no break between small-scale and large-scale physics. In atomic phenomena we have to invent probability functions which obey differential equations and let our subatomic particles run wild so long as they obey these probability laws. But "obeying a probability law" is very different from obeying a cause-and-effect relation. A bullet shot at a target can hit that target at any distance from the bull's-eye and still obey a probability law.

It will be seen that these two errors destroy Stace's entire major premise, that is, that God is so infinite that he can have nothing to do with the finite natural order and that the natural order is so limited by cause-and-effect relations that it has no room for God.

Dr. Stace has a cleverness with words that captivates and, possibly, tends to ensnare the too-willing reader. But one must keep in mind the fact that his thesis here is based on his own arbitrary division of the universe into mutually exclusive parts, i.e., the "natural order" and the "eternal order." It is necessary to accept this division in order to accept his conclusion.

All of this is interesting as a mental exercise; and perhaps, too, through its introduction of an old Gnostic approach in modern times we may find something new to think about. The author's claim that his book gives now a basis for what we know as religion cannot satisfy the many who have their own experience of God.

To turn to *Religious Beliefs of American Scientists*, Mr. Long's conclusions are that scientists hold no religious views uniquely their own. He discusses a group of natural scientists (limited to Americans) who have written books expressing thoughts on religion during the past fifty years.

In his first part he takes one scientist after another, the order depending on the religious views of the man in question. Starting with Einstein, David Starr Jordan, and Reuter Dahl, who think of God as cosmic structure, he continues with Arthur Compton, Heber D. Curtis, Anthony Standen, William North Rice, Henry Fairfield Osborn, Robert Andrew Millikan, Lecomte du Nouy, Michael Pupin, Kirtley Mather, Carl Wallace Miller, Edwin Grant Conklin, and Donald Dooley, as Christian theists, all with somewhat different emphases such as growth, human aspects of religion, and harmony with experimental science. Another group including Vannevar Bush, Percy W. Bridgman, and Philipp Frank are distinctly nontheistic; and finally Long includes two men merely on account of their "enthusiasm for science and invention," namely, Karl Taylor Compton and Charles F. Kettering.

In Part Two, another list of scientists is presented who very definitely start with a religious bias and tend to question scientific theories which serve to oppose this bias. E. Ralph Hooper and Frank Lewis Marsh question evolutionary theory; Louis Trenchard More accepts evolution as a theory but rejects it as a basis for metaphysical interpretation of reality. A group of members of The American Scientific

Affiliation and also Howard Atwood Kelly, Charles M. A. Stine, Frederick J. Pack, Charles E. deM. Sajous, Henry Higgins Lane, William Louis Poteat, Hugh S. Taylor, and Igor Sikorsky are quoted in connection with the relationships of various physical sciences to biblical material.

Mr. Long at the end comments on how few of the credos, contained either in Part One or Part Two, measure up to a simple criterion that competent science handle scientific matters, competent religion handle religious matters, and competent philosophy make the attempt to relate both to a total world view. Only when this criterion is accepted will a true reconciliation between science and religion result.

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Church Music: Illusion and Reality. By ARCHIBALD T. DAVISON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. ix-148 pp. \$3.25.

Dr. Archibald T. Davison, since 1940 James Edward Ditson Professor of Music, Harvard University, has written another book on church music. Following a preface and introduction, he discusses (1) The Nature of Music and of Church Music; (2) Technical Differences Between Sacred and Secular Music; (3) The Present State of Church Music; (4) Church Music and Reality; (5) The Music of Humility and of Confidence; (6) Church Music and Imagination. There is an Appendix in which he cites the manner in which the *Kyrie Eleison* is treated, respectively, by Palestrina, Lotti, Haydn, Rossini, and Liszt; a Selected List of Anthems; an Index.

Professor Davison's style is brilliant; he has an extraordinary command of words; he overindulges in sarcasm; his comparisons are extreme. Some of the statements that will provoke dissent may, with profit, be mentioned.

While it is averred the book "is in no sense a history of church music," there is more than "the occasional introduction of historic material." In a footnote it is said the book is "designed for the general reader." That statement may well be questioned. The musical purist, the highbrow, could read it with profit and approval—perhaps. The middlebrows, to which category the great majority of church musicians belong, will probably shrug their shoulders in irritation. The lowbrows (who haven't the slightest idea what the *Kyrie Eleison* is, who never have heard Bach's *Third Brandenburg Concerto*) will simply give it no consideration whatever, for it will probably never get into their hands.

In his preface Professor Davison says some of his "cynical friends" lifted their eyebrows when he announced his intention of writing another book on church music: "Worship music, these friends assure me, is in nearly all respects exactly what it was in 1933" (when his *Protestant Church Music in America* appeared). He says further, "in an age that is ardently reform-minded, in which old beliefs and old procedures are toppling like ninepins, while the older order—political, moral, economic, social, and even artistic—is being forcefully challenged, we face the phenomena of a church music that is utterly static." Perhaps that is true concerning the music in the churches which the "cynical friends" attend, but it certainly is not true of the situation generally. Admittedly, and fortunately, changes in church music are not as fantastic as in other media of artistic expression, but to say there have been none is an overexaggeration. He does admit that "the gradual displacement of a poor (hymn) tune by a good one, set to the same text, does occasionally occur." A com-

parison of the many hymnals issued by various denominations since 1930 with those which appeared shortly after the turn of the century shows that there has been a marked improvement in their musical content and that changes occur more often than occasionally.

The author makes unjustly discriminating comparisons. For example, "There is a vast gulf between the aristocratic chromaticism of Wagner . . . and the trite alterations in what is known as barber shop harmony." Of course there is; but is there nothing worth while between these extremes? The book is replete with extravagant statements. "If in the hymn . . . the worshipper is to express himself naturally and fervently, then the music must be cast in an idiom which is not strange to him. So the hymn-book editors supply him with a dozen or fifteen texts set to the same tune which, except for superficial differences, is like 90 per cent of the other tunes of identical meter, all of them made up of well-worn harmonic, melodic, chromatic, and rhythmic formulas." In the latest edition of *The Hymnal 1940* (Protestant Episcopal) in three instances a tune has been used four times; in *The Presbyterian Hymnal* four are used four times; in *The Methodist Hymnal* two five times; in *The Pilgrim Hymnal* (Congregational) two are used seven times, one six, and two five; and in *The Lutheran Hymnal* (Evangelical Lutheran Synodical Conference) four are used seven times and an equal number six times. That is not a dozen or fifteen! Again: ". . . hosts of worshippers all over the country listen of a Sunday to ('The Rosary') set to ('The holy hour')." The writer of this review has traveled extensively over the United States during the last few years, has attended scores of services in churches of various denominations, and he has not heard it sung a single time.

As might be expected, Professor Davison refers to the gospel song in his most sarcastic vein. I hold no brief for the gospel song, but feel that to say "the silly, wooden-legged mock minuet that is the music of 'Blessed Assurance'" doesn't aid in bettering the quality of church music; it simply wounds and antagonizes many good people. "They (gospel songs) still hold a nostalgic place in the affections of a vanishing generation, but in the services of enlightened churches they are never heard." There are a dozen or more gospel songs in *The Hymnal 1940*; but, perhaps, the Protestant Episcopal churches are not "enlightened."

To say, as does Professor Davison, that the musical offerings of thousands of sincere, God-fearing choir leaders throughout our country are an "affront to God" is quite unfair and unjust. One wonders if it would not be better to let God be the judge of what is acceptable to him. Professor Davison says he can admit of no compromise in the matter, but then contradicts himself by saying, "Assumed omniscience in matters musical is so common that we accept it as one of the painful phenomena of our society, but the assumption of an omniscience that blandly makes God's decisions for him is a rarer though not uncommon attitude . . ." "Anyone who feels competent to do God's thinking for him is not going to be backward in passing judgment on musical values." Although it may be granted that Professor Davison is competent to pass judgment on musical values, he might be reminded of what Virgil Thompson, quoted in *Church Music*, says, "God does not necessarily judge acts of worship by professional standards, since sincerity, in his eyes, may well make up for technical inefficiencies."

While the author grants that many of the texts of anthems and hymns are acceptable, he insists the music to which they are set must be beautiful; no matter

what the text, he contends, the combination cannot be real, and worshipful, if the music is not beautiful. May not the music he criticizes be beautiful to those who use it? In esthetics, says Webster, beauty is "that perfection in the sensuous order, and, by extension, in the spiritual order, which excites admiration or delight for itself rather than for its uses . . ." The question naturally arises as to whether or not worship music has other functions than to excite admiration and delight for itself.

Professor Davison's position may be criticized in that he admits of no middle ground in the realm of worship music. In effect he says: if you do not accept the validity of my position and use only music styled after that of the Golden Age of the sixteenth century, or of the chorale, do not use any at all. Too few of our thoroughly trained, highly privileged church musicians give thought to the fact that the vast majority of the twenty-seven Protestant churches affiliated with the National Council of Churches of Christ in America, enrolling some 147,000 local churches with more than 33,000,000 members, are churches with limited membership and resources. They fail to take into consideration the problems of such churches and the need of the communicants. It is all very well for one to have an ideal and to hold to it, but if the ideal is unattainable for the great majority of Christian worshipers, what then? Only a very small percentage of them have had the opportunities and background which the musical purists have had. Will the purist then say that if his ideal is impossible of attainment the worshiper may have no other form of expression? Surely he has read the parable of the widow: "she of her want did cast in all that she had." According to Pope's *Essay on Man*:

To Him, no high, no low, no great, no small;
He fills, He bounds, connects and equals.

The lights and shades, whose well-accorded strife
Gives all the strength and colour to our life . . .
All spread their charms, but charm not all alike;
On diff'rent senses diff'rent objects strike.

Why cannot the purists, most of them leaders in our church music program, be more reasonable and adapt a conciliatory attitude, one of kindness, sympathy, and patience toward those who have not had their cultural and educational advantages? And, as leaders, why cannot the musically privileged and enlightened follow sound educational practices, seeking out and building upon what there is that is good? Could not more progress be made if he became aware of the fact that what he does by way of helping people help themselves counts for the most? Perhaps in this way the musically unenlightened would listen more sympathetically and be more readily influenced in appreciation of the point of view of the more privileged. The interest of the purist should be as spiritual as that of the more conservative is earnest.

Books such as *Church Music* do little, if anything, to elevate standards for church music. George Macdonald's statement concerning his disagreement with Cardinal Newman's point of view expresses tersely the embarrassment I have faced in reviewing this book: "I am perfectly aware of the difficulty, almost impossibility, of doing justice to men from some of whose forms of thought I am so greatly repelled."

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The Mystery of Being, Vol. II. Faith and Reality. By GABRIEL MARCEL. The Second Series of Gifford Lectures; translated by René Hague. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951. viii-188 pp. \$3.75.

Homo Viator. By GABRIEL MARCEL. Translated by Emma Craufurd. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951. 270 pp. \$3.50.

In the second volume of *The Mystery of Being*, Gabriel Marcel continues to attempt to develop an existential metaphysics which characterized the first volume, and which has, indeed, been the chief preoccupation of his entire philosophical career.

Modern existentialism began, with Kierkegaard, by completely renouncing metaphysics; but in twentieth-century discussions the nature of Being has crept back as a central problem for such widely diversified writers as Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers, and Berdyaev. Some of these writers are systematic, others are highly unsystematic; but all of them attempt to keep directly in touch with such momentous human problems as anxiety, despair, conscience, temporality, and death.

Marcel is one of those who is highly unsystematic. His distinctive place in contemporary existentialism is connected with three factors: (1) He is a devout Roman Catholic, though he gives free rein to his reflections and does not seem to be overly concerned about whether they conform to the positions ordinarily maintained by other Catholic philosophers; (2) he is a dramatist and a musician, and he draws continually upon his artistic interests in attempting to interpret the metaphysical and theological significance of creativity; (3) although he is acutely aware of the spiritual disintegration of our age, and devotes considerable attention to such problems as the depersonalization of man, despair, nihilism and death, his main emphasis is on such *positive* themes as hope, fidelity, testimony, immortality, and grace.

Marcel began his own "researches" after becoming dissatisfied with his training in academic philosophy, before the first World War. The method he chose was that of keeping a metaphysical journal in which he would enter reflections and queries as they occurred to him. Since they begin with concrete human situations, they tend to be as complicated as life itself; and what he seeks through such reflection is not a complete analysis, but an intuitive penetration and heightened sensitivity.

He is convinced that the great philosophical questions are not "problems," in the sense that they can be solved by means of adequate factual information and correct reasoning, but "mysteries," in the sense that they all lead to the point where man is in touch with "transcendence" (God). Hence these questions are to be dealt with, not by finding intellectual answers, but by an inward recovery of man so that he can give himself, in response, to the creative and redemptive forces which offer themselves to him. In a word, his method might be called "spiritual free-association around given themes"; and since he does not try to build up a cumulative argument, moving from one demonstrated position to the next, it is quite impossible to summarize the content of any of his books. To do so, one must abstract from the inner situations of individual men which, for Marcel, *are* reality.

One can only indicate that in the second volume of *The Mystery of Being*, he continues to take the intersubjective bond (as he did in Volume I) as the main clue to the structure of Being within which we find ourselves. By "intersubjective" he means to indicate that the existence of every person is constituted by participation in and togetherness with the lives of other men, the existence of nature, and the reality of God. Participation is to be understood in contrast with the intellectual methods

whereby I try to grasp, by means of concepts, something which is supposedly sundered from me. It should also be noted at this point that Marcel protects himself against a defect which has often characterized existentialism; in turning away from objective knowledge he does not turn to *private* subjectivity. On the contrary, he contends that I cannot be shut off from others without also being shut off from myself.

This method proved to be extremely fruitful in Volume I; but it must be said quite frankly that in Volume II it tends to trail off into rather wearisome variations on the same theme. He tries to show the applicability of his method to such ancient metaphysical problems as the *ens realissimum*, the question as to whether human individuals are merely modes of a metaphysical Absolute, the problem of evil, the problem of freedom, and belief in immortality. He succeeds in *suggesting* an ontology in which God is not thought of as either an all-engulfing Absolute or as like an ego externally related to the world. But his method makes it extremely difficult to pin down what he does mean, and even a sympathetic reader is likely to become irked.

For example, Marcel is on the one hand profoundly aware of the intimate relationship between the self and the body; on the other hand, he declares that if we love another person it is impossible to say that after death the person (as contrasted with the bodily mechanism) no longer exists; yet he makes no more than passing references to the belief in Resurrection which (alone?) explains how he holds the two statements together.

Against such a criticism must be set the fact, however, that Marcel's discussions of grace and freedom are among the most illuminating to be found anywhere. Here his experience as an artist is especially enriching, as he seeks to show that all life and all creativity are gifts (grace), but gifts to which we can open ourselves or from which we can turn away. Thus he avoids both Sartre's mistake of defining freedom as a sheerly autonomous characteristic of man, and the opposite mistake of determinism.

Homo Viator is a collection of essays and lectures which were produced during the second World War. The most substantial chapter is "A Metaphysic of Hope," and it must be read as a penetrating religious message addressed to people who were at the moment in the midst of defeat, despair, and bondage. The book also includes a devastating review of Sartre's long philosophical book, *L'Être et le Néant*, and another chapter where Marcel comes to grips with the nihilism of George Bataille and Albert Camus. Two chapters are specifically devoted to family relations; here Marcel deals sensitively with the whole problem of how to re-establish unity in the family without falling into forms of authoritarianism which suffocate the child or adolescent, and he also has some excellent things to say about love between the sexes; but when it comes to the matter of birth control he is surprisingly reactionary and blind. The volume concludes with two essays on Rilke where Marcel's gifts are seen at their very best.

At two points especially, *Homo Viator* (and all of Marcel's writings) deserves careful attention from Protestant readers. In the first place, he is seeking to re-discover points of connection between Christian faith and whatever spiritual resources there are in secular society which can be brought into a common struggle against the collectivization of man and the "functionalization" of the individual person. This motive reflects, in a general way, the traditional Roman Catholic position with regard to "natural (i.e., moral) law" in relation to revelation; but Marcel's approach is entirely free from the rigidities of scholasticism. He tries to get inside the frame of mind of the egoist, the nihilist, and the skeptic, in the hope that one who really under-

stands their reactions may have a better chance of helping them find a way out than one who issues dogmatic statements from a closed citadel of theological conviction.

In the second place, he offers a corrective, not only against the subjectivism of much modern existentialism, but also against the uprootedness and isolation of modern life in all its forms, by means of his stress on *community* (the intersubjective bond). Much that he says at this point can be incorporated, without strain or re-touching, by Protestants, into a revitalized conception of the church.

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Ecumenical Foundations. A History of the International Missionary Council and Its Nineteenth-Century Background. By WILLIAM RICHEY HOGG. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. xi-466 pp. \$5.00.

If the late Archbishop Temple's judgment is right—and nobody has so far seriously challenged it—that the greatest single event in the history of contemporary Christianity is the development of the ecumenical conscience and ties of the church, then very few titles in the stream of Christian literature today may claim the same importance as Dr. Hogg's book.

Not many people would be interested in a mere history of an organization as such, no matter how distinguished its institutional standing and how worthy of appreciation its work may be. Witness the number of volumes, containing official records and reports, with which the shelves of libraries and offices are packed, only once in a while to be disturbed in their dusty slumber of decades, by an occasional scholar, executive or committee member, if by anybody at all! But in this case, let the reader be not misled into indifference by the fact that the book is indeed the history of an organization. For it is, by no means, a mere history of it.

It seems to me that at least on three counts Dr. Hogg's book may well be considered as the book of the year in its line. First, because of the painstaking work and skillful scholarship that have gone into it. It represents a thorough job in research, and in the selection, organization, and interpretation of the material. A distinguished student and collaborator of that great scholar and historian of missions, Dr. Kenneth Scott Latourette, and then a brilliant investigator in his own right, Dr. Hogg is admirably equipped for the performance of such an excellent task as he has accomplished. Without becoming voluminous and tediously massive with the accumulation of data and quotations, he has given just enough of it to make his book factual, accurate, and authoritative.

Secondly, he has given a life-pulsating (shall we say, *existential*?), soul-searching interpretation of the International Missionary Council. He has not yielded to that common temptation of the public relations officer of a great organization—severing it from its background, lifting it out of its proper context, in order to enhance its own merits. He takes the International Missionary Council only as one of the outstanding organized expressions in modern times of something that transcends any one organization, the essentially ecumenical spirit of true Christianity. He shows its background. He traces the roots of the inspiration which made its birth and development possible, back to the various movements in nineteenth-century missionary co-operation, withholding no credits to the pioneering of national and regional mis-

sionary assemblies, international student movements, and other world bodies. And in appraising the place and achievements of the Council in this great ecumenical stream, he fails not to acknowledge, with sympathetic frankness, its problems and limitations.

And, thirdly, Dr. Hogg has accomplished something which for a writer dealing with a subject such as this, seems to be extremely difficult—he has produced a very readable book. Even at points where matters of record tend to become dry and monotonous, the reader's interest is retained by a swift-moving style, a warm undertone of earnestness, a remarkable skill in getting to the core of things, and a felicitous blending of personal references to and biographical sketches of the leading figures in the Council and the ecumenical movement at large.

For all this, and much more, Dr. Hogg's work must be placed among the indispensable sources for all those who really wish to understand the relevance and outreach of the ecumenical movement as illustrated by the International Missionary Council.

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What Is the Best New Testament? By ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952. vii-128 pp. \$3.00.

This small book is intended "to make the scholarly lore" of New Testament textual criticism "intelligible to the layman," and this it does with dramatic vividness. In a minimum of technical language it deals mainly with basic concrete facts and not with complex and cloudy speculations. It increases the already ample evidence that Dr. Colwell is intimately at home in this field of study.

The introductory chapter calls attention to the great variety of present-day New Testaments, and indicates the real need for the production of a truly new New Testament. Chapters II and III trace the origin and history of the "Received Text" from 1500 to 1831. The story shows how scholars were led to go behind the then "Common Version" (the Latin Vulgate) in search of the correct text in the original language of the New Testament, shows the prejudices these scholars had to overcome, the inadequacies of the materials used by them, and the methods they employed. The account given of the two pioneer Greek Testaments—that of Erasmus and the Complutensian of Ximenez—is concrete and stimulating. The Erasmus text, though not the better of the two, received the larger following and was repeatedly reprinted. In the edition of it which the Elzevir brothers published in 1633 they boldly declared, "Textum ergo habes, nunc ab omnibus receptum": "you therefore have [here] the text now accepted by all." In the two centuries following—1633 to 1831—this "publishers' blurb" became so nearly final that even the greatest scholars, Walton, Mill, Wettstein, Bengel, Griesbach, when they found what they believed to be a better reading for any given passage, did not feel free to correct the "received text" but recorded the preferred reading in a marginal note. Chapters IV and V review the work of the great ones—Lachmann, Tischendorf, Westcott, and Hort—who from 1831 to 1880(81) led in careful critical researches to determine and formulate the fundamental principles for finding the best New Testament text then possible. The significant contributions of each of these scholars

are described, and the criticisms which they severally received and which the two last named explicitly sought. Hort gave the "*coup de grâce* to the Received Text," and its reign was concluded. Evaluation is given to the work of more recent leaders in the field—Von Soden, Caspar René Gregory, Sir Frederic Kenyon, B. H. Streeter, and E. J. Goodspeed.

The story of the discovery of recent New Testament materials is recounted in chapter VI. The most important of these discoveries is the Chester Beatty Papyri, bought in Cairo in 1928, published in photostat in 1936, and now judged by scholars to have originated in Egypt about A.D. 200. Chapters VII and VIII give a living sketch of the vast variety of variants found in the known manuscripts, and the consequent judgment that "the best New Testament must be chosen verse by verse." In chapter IX numerous illustrations are given of the way in which seventeen recent translations agree or disagree with the text of Westcott and Hort and/or the Textus Receptus.

In the closing (tenth) chapter we are told that "the best is yet to be": that in 1949 there was launched in Chicago a movement which is steadily going ahead, to associate a number of scholars in the critical study of all available new materials for the purpose of assembling all the manuscript evidence in a new "critical apparatus" looking toward the construction and finally the publication of the now best possible Greek New Testament. An exciting enterprise this!

Any layman who is interested in the effort of scholars to provide for him the "best New Testament" now possible will find in these 128 pages a vivid, compelling story.

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By the Way: An Autobiography. By FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. 286 pp. \$3.50.

Bishop McConnell has finally been prodded into writing his autobiography. The resultant work is characteristically as unique and creative as his innumerable contributions to social and ecumenical Christianity. This is not an autobiography of the formal type and should not be so evaluated. Neither is it pedantic nor pedagogical in the traditional sense. It wasn't meant to be. In the words of the Bishop, his life has been "like a journey in a car" and the book merely reveals some of the things he has seen through the car window. Very seldom does he look squarely into his rear-view mirror to get a glimpse of himself. He is absorbed by the people passing "by the way." Therein lies the passion of his life, an interest in people. They constitute the important element in his life.

Since this work is more a series of front-porch reminiscences than a methodical account emanating from the pastor's study, some chronological confusion is to be expected. English titles of nobility are confused in the person of the late King of England prior to his reign. Similarly Bishop Bradford is made to visit Theodore Roosevelt at the White House at a time when Woodrow Wilson was actually President. But such errors are summarily forgiven. When one is in the company of Bishop McConnell he doesn't spend much time gnat-straining. There are too many camel-size experiences to be related and examined. Revolutions in Mexico,

car-chasing tigers in India, and steel-strike negotiations in this country are not the usual fare of the Methodist episcopacy, but they reflect the breadth and richness of the life of Bishop McConnell.

By the Way is basically an album of word portraits of religious and political dignitaries at home and abroad whom Bishop McConnell has encountered in his ministry. His casual reflections, whether upon the personality of Gandhi in India, of a revolutionary militarist in Mexico, or of a pioneering circuit rider in Wyoming are equally fascinating and illuminating. Gandhi's revolutionary attitude, for example, is seen as best expressed in "his willingness to relax the Hindu inflexibility in the emphasis on the sacredness of animal life" rather than his concern for the untouchables. All are framed in the well-known McConnell humor. The oft-quoted experience of the legendary Brother Van who was saved from robbery of some missionary funds by a highwayman when it was discovered that both were fellow-Methodists—a story Van used to tell as a tribute to Methodist influences—is interpreted by Bishop McConnell as more likely a simple "exchange of professional courtesies." So goes the book.

The Bishop's almost complete absorption in describing the notables that have crossed his life path and in acknowledging their individual contributions to the world will be disappointing to some. Those readers who have devoured Bishop McConnell's heavier theoretical works on a variety of subjects and anticipate this book as the culmination and integration of the kaleidoscopic facets of his great mind will go away, not hungry, but unfilled.

Little attention is given by the Bishop to the development of his own thought. Actually this apparent "lack" might be a key to understanding the greatness of Bishop McConnell; namely, his concern for others. Concern for others and selflessness are two sides of the same coin. Social psychologists claim that the self-conscious individual can only achieve his potential to the extent that in any particular situation he can stop thinking about himself and concentrate on others in the group or on the situation itself. Bishop McConnell has been doing precisely that all of his life. By forgetting about himself and by giving his complete attention in any political or social crisis to the problems and persons involved, he has been able to penetrate meaningfully the fathomless depths of human experience with such success that many denominational leaders look upon him today as the most influential Christian leader this century has produced.

By the Way will contribute immeasurably to an understanding not only of Bishop McConnell himself but also of recent American church history. Bishop McConnell closes his autobiography with a tribute to the "mighty procession" of American Methodism and the joy he personally has had in marching in it. That is an understatement. Many will insist that his has been a place at the head of it.

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Psychology, Religion and Healing. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. 543 pp. \$5.00.

The contributions of Leslie Weatherhead to *pastoralia* are particularly valuable because, unlike some writers in this field, he is himself a successful practitioner of pastoral care as well as being a competent student of psychology and religion.

At first glance this oversized volume, subtitled "A Survey of the Methods of Healing Through Psychology and Religion," appears to be a "book to end all books" in the field of religion and health. In both size and content it constitutes the author's *magnum opus*. Divided into seven sections (made up of 34 very brief chapters), it rightly begins with a historical approach, somewhat sketchy, treating Christ's healing miracles, those of the early church, and such modern phenomena as Lourdes, Christian Science, and other healing movements. Then he tackles "modern psychology," its methods and attitudes (for there are several) toward religion: Freud, Adler, Jung, MacDougall, the behaviorists. Next the author examines modern healing methods of religion (i.e. Christianity) and their obvious (to Weatherhead) dependence upon modern psychological insights. Much of this material was originally presented in the Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale in 1949.

Then follow six appendices, three of which are clinical presentations of "alleged" (the author's word) healings. There is also a helpful chapter on "The Common Neuroses and Psychoses," a suggested form of service for the laying on of hands, and an interview form for securing a life history. There are two excellent indices, one of proper names and the other of subjects.

It is apparent from the very beginning that Dr. Weatherhead has effected a synthesis between psychology and religion, which was anticipated but never actually achieved in his earlier books. He holds that the chief cause of neurotic illnesses is the deprivation of love, especially in early childhood, and that this fact gives both the Christian minister and lay church groups a real opportunity to contribute to their cure. Accepting fully the psychoanalytical concept of personality, he explains effectively the role of repression and the degree to which experience and feelings can be "buried" in the unconscious, where they hide and continue to plague their host. "If emotion is neither expressed in its appropriate action nor even admitted to consciousness, it will have its revenge by setting up some form of mental or physical distress" (p. 359).

The physiology of emotions is expounded with obvious appreciation and rare understanding. Again and again relevant clinical illustrations are used effectively. The author offers realistic and practicable suggestions for sound interprofessional relationships. He believes that the clergyman has an important role, provided that he has had some special training and avoids becoming an *ersatz* psychologist. To avoid therapeutic involvement, a maximum of six pastoral interviews is recommended.

In his chapter, "Is Religious Experience Itself a Neurosis?" Dr. Weatherhead admits fully that often in practice Christian doctrine and experience are "misused to cover a flight from reality," or "to provide a false security," or "to buy escape from the results of sin," or "to produce a 'holiness' that is self-centered and narcissistic." "In such cases it is so poisoned by neurotic factors as to be worse than useless . . . it is not surprising that many psychologists look askance at their patient's 'faith' and feel that his 'religion' is manifesting his neurotic condition. In such a situation a psychotherapist may feel it his duty to discourage his patient from religious practices until he can view the matter more normally, see things in a right perspective, and rid his 'religion' of its neurotic distortion." (p. 419f.)

In his eagerness to see religion take its rightful place in the whole healing movement, the author is perhaps inclined to overidentify health with wholeness and with the Christian cause. In so doing the eternal destiny of man is blurred, and his temporal welfare is highlighted. It is interesting also to note that Dr. Weatherhead

is less favorably inclined toward the diagnostic and therapeutic use of hypnotism than he was in the late twenties. There appears to be no adequate recognition of the psychodynamics of bereavement, despite the fact that loss of interpersonal relationships constitutes one of the most common pastoral problems.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

Lecturer in Practical Theology, Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Counselor in Counseling. By SEWARD HILTNER. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952. 188 pp. \$2.50.

We used to be taught in chemistry that the addition of acid to alkali led to the production of "salt and water only." In theory this may have been true, but in practice, as I recall, it used to lead to the production of all sorts of noxious vapors and disturbing noises, not to mention signs of fear on the part of the experimenter, as well as the ill-concealed and obvious concern of those whose misfortune it was to be working on the same lab bench with him! These noises and smells and anxieties might be referred to as the "by-products or complications" of the chemical reaction. Labeling them thus, however, did not mean that they could be disregarded.

When two personalities meet it is as though a similar type of reaction were set up. The purpose of the meeting may be to solve the problems of one of them, but such an interpersonal relationship can never be a "pure reaction." Complications or by-products arise which are as numerous as the different personality traits of the two individuals who are interacting. This interaction or relationship becomes the basis of the therapeutic procedure and is the medium in which the therapeutic reaction operates.

Dr. Seward Hiltner has spent many years in training theological students and pastors in pastoral theology and pastoral psychology. The greater part of his work has consisted of helping pastors to understand people and the problems which beset such people in the course of their everyday lives. His book, *The Counselor in Counseling*—a practical version of his previous book, *Pastoral Counseling*—consists of an analysis of some of the more frequent complications and by-products which occur when pastor and parishioner meet, and some of the principles of counseling as they apply in the interview situation.

The book is divided into fourteen chapters, each chapter consisting of an initial discussion of one of the principles or complications which may be encountered in the counseling situation. Then follows a verbatim report of an interview between the pastor and the parishioner. The pastor's report and his analysis of the interview is also recorded. Dr. Hiltner concludes each chapter with a summary of the principle under discussion with his comments on the pastor's technique and suggestions as to how the latter could be modified or improved to provide a more satisfying experience for parishioner and pastor alike. The chapters are devoted to the practical principles of counseling and those thoughts and feelings which are most frequently encountered in pastor and parishioner in the interview situation. Activity and clarification are discussed as also are defenses and resistances, insecurity and inferiority feelings, transferences, dependence needs, as well as interpretations, and when these should be made. Such subjects as charm, embarrassment, friendship, hostility, empathy, and perspective are also considered.

Pastoral psychotherapy differs but little in principle from other forms of psycho-

therapy. One difference, however, is that the pastor probably has fewer interviews with his parishioner and sometimes these are confined to one or two contacts. In some of the interviews recorded, the pastor participated too exuberantly in the interview situation. I felt that he could have helped his parishioner more in many instances by assuming a role of minimal activity and maximal concentration in such therapeutic conversations. The pastoral counselor may achieve most by saying least.

The book is written with great clarity and in an attractive and easy style. It is a worthy successor to his earlier book, *Pastoral Counseling*, and his other works on this subject. While intended primarily for pastors and theological students, it will be helpful to all who are trying to understand themselves better in order that they may understand others better.

A. DIXON WEATHERHEAD

The Institute of Living, Hartford, Connecticut.

The Mystery of Love and Marriage. By DERRICK SHERWIN BAILEY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. 145 pp. \$2.00.

In recent years various writers have been attempting something long overdue: the development of a theology of sex. (Cf., for example, Otto Piper's *The Christian Interpretation of Sex*, Ch. 16 in my *Men, Women and Morals*, and an article in the September issue of *Pastoral Psychology*.) This book limits itself to the theology of the sex relationship within marriage.

The main thesis of the book is that the essence of Christian sex relationships within marriage is "union in one flesh" (*henosis*). By this is meant, not merely procreation, but the merger of two personalities in the sexual act. The theological basis of this sexual act consists largely in its symbolization of the union of God and man. The author was chaplain for Anglican students at Edinburgh, but is now central lecturer for the Moral Welfare Council of the Church of England.

The basis of the discussion is largely biblical. The scope attempted is unusual. Part I deals with Love. Part II comprises eleven brief chapters which include such topics as the relationship of sex to the resurrection of the dead, procreation and the family, divorce and second marriage. The appendix discusses "Love and Passion" and the New Testament doctrine of Subordination.

Despite some prominent endorsements, one is puzzled by what seem to be incredible omissions. No mention is anywhere made of the works of such men as Freud or Kinsey, and the author writes in apparent unawareness of an extensive volume of technical literature in the field of sex relations. If one objects that such are not relevant to a theological discussion of the subject, the reply is obvious. Unless the author is familiar with them, he is hardly in a position to determine relevancy. Secondly, he writes for a generation for which the scientific point of view is highly relevant to theology. It is as though one wrote a book on biology and completely ignored everything which Darwin and his successors have meant to the field.

Even more bewildering is the problem of scholarship. A man might write a valuable book on the Christian attitude toward sex without himself having any basic orientation in the field, just as he might write a book on the Christian attitude toward surgery without having himself any medical training. But such is not the case here. There are places where the author shows passable scholarship, as in Chapters IV and VI. But here the selection is astounding. Unknown third-raters are included. But the earthy and somewhat magnificent statements of Luther are omitted. Aquinas

and Basil are properly included. But why are most of the Church Fathers left out, including a spicy statement left discreetly untranslated? Why is Aristotle omitted, Plato limited to one incidental reference with no discussion of his basic challenge, which has been repeated by others over and over again? How can we regard a treatment as adequate which leaves out much of Catholicism and all the major figures of the Reformation?

Much of the discussion is of a modified cracker-barrel philosophy type. For example, in the discussion of love, the words *eros*, *agape*, and *philia* are assumed to represent the three types of love, and therefore other significant forms are omitted. The reader feels that he has here something akin to the older allegorical form of interpretation, in which the passages are made to mean anything which the interpreter cares to read into them. However much his work may impress those who are uninitiated in the technical problems of sex, it should, in the words of Hamlet, "make the judicious grieve."

SYLVANUS M. DUVAL

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Tensions Affecting International Understanding: A Survey of Research.

By OTTO KLINEBERG. Bull. 62, Social Science Research Council, 1950, pp. xi and 227. Cloth \$2.25, paper \$1.75.

Probably no area of social relations is more exposed to unscientific thinking than that of relations between nations. Emotion dominates our thinking and stereotypes and prejudices run riot. At the same time there is intrinsic difficulty in planning research in the field. Experimental designs are simply not easily come by.

In the face of this, the UNESCO General Conference, meeting in Mexico City in 1947, decided upon its "tensions project"—"The attempt to discover some of the most important factors underlying tensions among nations, and some of the techniques which might be applied to the reduction of such tensions." An obvious first step was to try to bring together such previous research as had bearing on the topic. Otto Klineberg, who had already done so much, both experimentally and observationally, to clarify Negro-white relations in this country, was asked to do this survey.

Klineberg was a fortunate choice, for he has brought together in this monograph materials from a vast area of research which have implications for the more specific objectives of the "tensions project." In chapter 2, for instance, he has brought together the research on personality which has implications for the understanding of international tensions. He reports on the techniques used for study in this field and makes suggestions as to their modification for the UNESCO project. In chapter 3 he reports on research on "stereotypes" and its implications for the project. Chapter 4 deals specifically with "attitudes and their modification"—an area in which American psychologists have been extremely active. He makes recommendations as to how the results of attitude studies within the different nations can (and should) be made more comparable.

In his fifth chapter he surveys the research on aggression itself and the influences making for aggression. Probably no other area of contemporary psychology is more controversial than this (witness the "frustration" hypothesis and the challenges it has received), yet no other area is more crucial. Does man have a basic need for aggression? This belief is widely held. If it be true, then James' "moral equivalent for war" is a basic necessity. If it be not true, we need to know why man so often

acts as if it were. Klineberg surveys the research here and brings it all together under a few headings.

The Social Science Research Council Bulletins are, by and large, designed to survey progress in specific fields for the specialist—that he may know what has been done and where the gaps in contemporary knowledge exist. They are genuinely “surveys of research.” This particular bulletin, however, should have the attention not only of the interested specialist but of all those who are in a position to influence attitudes toward other nations (teachers and ministers as well as politicians and statesmen). It should be known to all of these and might well be a part of their permanent professional libraries. It will be basic for several years to come and will ultimately be outmoded only by surveys of the research produced in the years following Klineberg’s survey. Any future surveys will have to rely heavily upon this.

W. EDGAR GREGORY

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Book Notices

Bible Key Words. By GERHARD KITTEL. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. ix-76 pp., viii-75 pp., vii-96 pp., viii-82pp. \$4.00.

The resurgence of theology in our day has called forth a renewed interest in the study of the Bible. This was to have been expected, for Protestantism is a religion of "the Book," and will not be content for long unless it is able to prove what it says by the Bible. In recognition of this necessity for a fresh examination of what the Bible has to say, in the 1930's the great German biblical scholar, Gerhard Kittel, began the monumental task of bringing the finest minds of German biblical scholarship to bear on the meaning of the theological words in the Bible.

This present volume represents the English translation of a selection of four of the most important words discussed in the German original. What, precisely, does the Bible mean when it speaks of Love? of the Church? of Sin? of Righteousness? Each of these words is carefully examined in the light of its origins and development through the long period of Old and New Testament history, and on into the era of the Early Church. Fruitful contrasts and comparisons are frequently made with similar words as they are understood from the Greek view of life.

This is not a book for idle skimming. There is Greek and Hebrew here, which will mean slow going for many American preachers; but the careful definitions will mean that this problem is reduced to the very minimum. The translations by J. R. Coates are fluent and smooth, so that reading is a pleasure. This is a volume that is meant for study. But it is study at the very fountainhead of faith, and will bless the preacher many times over for his pains in wrestling with it. The reward he finds in working through this first volume will make the reader eager to have the editor fulfill his promise that translations of other portions of the *Theologisches Wörterbuch* may be expected.

Gerhard Kittel died on July 11, 1948. But this truly creative study which he projected will endure for many years to come.

ROBERT ROY WRIGHT

The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

The Long Loneliness. By DOROTHY DAY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. 288 pp. \$3.50.

Some years ago Dorothy Day wrote the story of her conversion, *From Union Square to Rome*. In this present book she writes, in appealing style, her entire autobiography, revealing a life of both loneliness and overflowing love, anguished struggle and enduring joy. At a time when the confessions of ex-Communists are especially fascinating to the public at large, one wishes that this one too might be among the best-sellers—with its entirely different feeling for what Christianity means, its most effective answer to Communism, the stress on Christlike love for humanity.

Although she shows no lack of awareness of the inner life of the soul and its importance, the story of herself throughout is entangled with large numbers of other people. It was not out of maladjustment or personal frustration, it seems, that she became either a Communist or, later, a Catholic. Both as a young left-wing journalist and later in mothering the Catholic Worker movement, she genuinely cared for the poor and the oppressed. She came to Catholicism, ironically enough, through

the "natural happiness" she enjoyed with her common-law husband and their infant child; it was her joy and gratitude that drove her to God. But when she brought her daughter and herself into the Church, it meant separation from this happiness, since he refused to accept religion. Another sacrifice too was involved; she had to accept the Church simply for its religious truth, not yet knowing of the social teaching of its liberals or that some priests were devoted and humane in the realm of social concern.

Together with Peter Maurin, finally, the French "peasant of the pavements" who wanted to "build a new society within the shell of the old," a new "synthesis of cult, culture, and cultivation," she started the paper, *The Catholic Worker*, stressing "community and personalism" for the workers as against either capitalist or socialist collectivism. They also established centers in New York and various other cities, giving the destitute food and clothing, and obtained farms on which families were established, which in turn have helped support the city centers. The Catholic Worker movement, still existing on poverty, bold faith, and community (material, intellectual and spiritual), is after twenty years very much alive. "We have all known the long loneliness," she sums up, "and we have learned that the only solution is love and that love comes with community."

Medicine For a Sick World. By DAVID LEFKOWITZ. Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1952. xxii-238 pp. \$3.75.

This is a book of essays and sermons by Dr. Lefkowitz—born in Austria, in his youth a religious and humanitarian community leader in Dayton, Ohio, then Rabbi of Temple Emanu-El in Dallas till 1949. For the last thirty years he has been happily related to Southern Methodist University as chapel preacher and now visiting professor at the Perkins School of Theology, where he lectures on Contemporary Judaism. Several of the sermons in this book were given on his radio program, popular for many years. President Umphrey Lee writes the preface, and the present Rabbi at Temple Emanu-El, Levi A. Olan, a biographical introduction.

The book includes several addresses, including "The American Principle of the Separation of Church and State," "The Relation of Spinoza to Judaism," "Goethe at Aspen, Colorado, and his Disciples." The sermons are brief and pointed, with interesting titles: "The Hardened Heart or the Serene Soul—Which?" "God Spoke Amid the Tumult of the World," "The Flood, Dove, and Rainbow—and Another Bystander." Quotations taken at random are: "Man is the only discontented creation of God, and no doubt God intended to make him so." "The centuries as they come and go witness one eternal struggle, the fight against the false gods. . . . But it is well for man to learn what somehow the histories do not always give, that every fallen false god is a symbol of man's spiritual ascent, is the very step upon which he rises to a higher level for a truer and more exact survey of his world."

Dr. Lefkowitz' "medicine for a sick world" is the prophet Ezekiel's regenerating river, which has its healing power "because the waters thereof issue out of the sanctuary."

Alcohol, Culture, and Society. By CLARENCE H. PATRICK. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1952. xv-176 pp. \$3.00.

The author is Professor of Sociology at Wake Forest College, North Carolina. His approach puts the "familiar facts" about alcohol in an "unfamiliar context." "The special significance of this book lies in its demonstration that the problem of

alcohol must be studied in its cultural context if it is to be understood, and that any plan of control must be worked out in relation to that context if it is to be effective."

To illustrate what he means by cultural context, he surveys briefly the drinking customs of past civilizations, and points out the aggravation of the alcohol problem among our Saxon ancestors and by the medieval discovery of distillation. There are chapters on "Why Mankind Uses Alcoholic Beverages," the effects on the individual, the effects on society, and finally, "Toward Social Control." He analyzes the reasons for the failure of Prohibition, but holds that some sort of nation-wide control is imperative and states guiding principles for it. Healthy substitutes for alcoholic beverages which meet the relevant psychological needs should be more widely publicized. "No other substitute," he quotes, "does more than approach religious conversion in effectiveness."

The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God. A Study in the Theology of John Calvin. By T. H. L. PARKER. Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver & Boyd, Ltd., 1952. viii-120 pp. 10/6.

The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology. By EDWARD A. DOWEY, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952.

It is interesting that two books on this subject should be published, within a month of each other, on opposite sides of the ocean. The questions of the distinction made by Calvin between the knowledge of God the Creator and God the Redeemer, and the relation between natural and revealed theology, are relevant today in the light of the appeal to Calvin on the part of neo-orthodox theologians. Dr. Dowe's study, the longer of the two, was written as a Th.D. thesis at Zurich, and perhaps gives more attention to the contemporary discussions; but both books analyze with great care the teaching of *The Institutes*.

Africans on Safari. By LESLIE C. SAYRE. New York: Friendship Press, 1952. 162 pp. \$2.50 cloth, \$1.25 paper.

African Heritage. By EMORY ROSS. New York: Friendship Press, 1952. xii-145 pp. \$2.00 cloth, \$1.25 paper.

In the first book, "the people on safari are Christian Africans journeying hopefully through life, sure of their Guide and destination." This is issued by the Department of Adult Work, of the National Council's Joint Commission on Missionary Education, "to present certain of Africa's problems in personalized form," through the eyes of a former missionary to Africa and present executive in that department. It is highly readable, presenting typical pictures of missionary and African personalities.

The second book gives a more factual and analytical (but still readable) treatment of Africa by a veteran missionary and expert on African affairs, under the following chapter headings: "Human Rights in Africa," "The Christian Community and Mother Earth," "Widening Educational Needs," "Communism Versus Christian Community" (he holds that Communist ideas have significantly invaded Africa), "For a Strong, Free Church," "North America's Responsibility." The book will provide "a really mature view of a part of the world that is now far more important than ever before."

E. H. L.

INDEX—VOLUME XXI

- A**
Albright: The Bible After Twenty Years of Archeology, 537
 Authority, Scripture and Tradition: *Miller*, 551
- B**
Barth: Karl Barth and the Jews: Sulzback, 585
Bible After Twenty Years of Archeology, The: Albright, 537
Blackwood: Inside Missouri Synod, 252
Building New Nations in Africa: Northcott, 594
Bultmann: Two Great New Testament Interpreters: Johnson, 288
Bunting: Somerset Maugham and the Christian Preacher, 401
- C**
 Christian Faith and Existential Freedom: *Michalson*, 513
 Christian Faith and Psychotherapy, discussion: *Weatherhead, Hiltner, Outler*, 482
 Christian Hope, The, discussion: *Toynbee, Wilder, Lewis*, 3
 Church and Its Evangelistic Task, The: *Templeton, Coffin, Straton*, 323
 Church Unity and the Ministry to the Sick: *Richardson*, 65
Citron: Conversion and the Means of Grace, 367
Coffin: The Church and Its Evangelistic Task, discussion, 334
 Conversion and the Means of Grace: *Citron*, 367
 Creative Conflict, The: *Lewis*, 390
- D**
Davies: Light on the Ministry From the New Testament, 262
 Does Anybody Love God?: *Lowrie*, 411
 Dorothy Sayers and the Christian Synthesis: *Soper*, 117
- E**
 Economics, Technology, and the Grace of God: *Ingalls*, 45
- F**
 Faith and Reason as Living Issues: *Ferré*, 94
Ferré: Faith and Reason as Living Issues, 94
Fitch: The Military Establishment in a Democracy, 563
- G**
Garrison: Plagiarism and the Development of Originality, 573
Green, B.: The Practice of Evangelism, selection, 322
Green, O. F.: The Mark of a Liberal, 105
- H**
Harmon: The Miracles—Wings or Weight? 222
Haroutunian: Sin and Salvation, discussion, 195
Harvey: On Interpreting Christ to America, 527
Henrichsen: The Woman Minister, 275
Hiltner: Christian Faith and Psychotherapy, discussion, 492
 Holy Catholic Church, The: *Kennedy*, 433
- I**
 In God We Trust?: *Shackford*, 441
 Industrial Evangelism: *Thompson*, 356
Ingalls: Economics, Technology, and the Grace of God, 45
 Innocent Nation in an Innocent World, The: *Niebuhr*, 207
Inside Missouri Synod: Blackwood, 252
 Inward Cross, The, selection: *Kean*, 162
Irwin: Is Preaching an Art?, 241
Is Preaching an Art?: Irwin, 241
- J**
Johnson, S. E.: Two Great New Testament Interpreters, 288
- K**
Karl Barth and the Jews: Sulzback, 585
Kean: The Inward Cross, selection, 162
Kech: Liberal Evangelicalism, 453
Kennedy: The Holy Catholic Church, 433
Key: The Life and Death of the Devil, 73
King, A. R.: Sin and Salvation, discussion, 175
King, W. L.: Millennialism as a Social Ferment, 33
- L**
Lewis, C. S.: The Christian Hope, discussion, 20
Lewis, E.: The Creative Conflict, 390
 Liberal Evangelicalism: *Kech*, 453
 Life and Death of the Devil, The: *Key*, 73
 Life's Saving Tension, selection: *Luccock*, 482
 Light on the Ministry From the New Testament: *Davies*, 262
Lowrie: Does Anybody Love God? 411
Luccock: Life's Saving Tension, 482
Lynn: The Mass Media and the Kingdom of Evil, 229
- M**
MacLennan: The Unifying Word, 421
 Mark of a Liberal, The: *Green*, 105
 Mass Media and the Kingdom of Evil, The: *Lynn*, 229
 Maugham: Somerset Maugham and the Christian Preacher, *Bunting*, 401
Michalson: Christian Faith and Existential Freedom, 513
 Military Establishment in a Democracy, The: *Fitch*, 563
 Millennialism as a Social Ferment: *King*, 33
Miller, R. C.: Authority, Scripture and Tradition, 551
Miller, W.: A Theologically Biased View of Protestant Politics, 52
 Miracles, The—Wings or Weight?: *Harmon*, 222
- N**
Newton, J. F.: A Prayer for Christmas, 2
Niebuhr, Reinhold: The Innocent Nation in an Innocent World, 207
Northcott: Building New Nations in Africa, 594
- O**
 On a Certain Blindness in Secular Idealism: *Tigner*, 129
 On Interpreting Christ to America: *Harvey*, 527
 Our Secularist Age: *Spinka*, 380
Outler: Christian Faith and Psychotherapy, discussion, 502
- P**
 Plagiarism and the Development of Originality: *Garrison*, 573
 Practice of Evangelism, The, selection: *Green*, 322
 Prayer for Christmas, A: *Newton, J. F.*, 2
- R**
Rall: Sin and Salvation, discussion, 185
 Religion and the Public Schools: *Schisler*, 83
Richardson: Church Unity and the Ministry to the Sick, 65
Ryan: The Use of the Bible in Public Schools, 603
- S**
 Sayers: Dorothy Sayers and the Christian Synthesis: *Soper*, 117
Schisler: Religion and the Public Schools, 83
Shackford: In God We Trust? 441
 Sin and Salvation, discussion: *Sperry, A. R. King, Rall, Haroutunian*, 163
 Somerset Maugham and the Christian Preacher: *Bunting*, 401
Soper, D. W.: Dorothy Sayers and the Christian Synthesis, 117
Sperry: Sin and Salvation, discussion, 163

- Spinka*: Our Secularist Age, 380
Siraton: The Church and Its Evangelistic Task, discussion, 343
Sulsbach: Karl Barth and the Jews, 585

T

- Templeton*: The Church and Its Evangelistic Task, discussion, 323
Theologically Biased View of Protestant Politics, A: Miller, 52
Thompson: Industrial Evangelism, 356
Tigner: On a Certain Blindness in Secular Idealism, 129
Toynbee: The Christian Hope, discussion, 3

- Two Great New Testament Interpreters: *Johnson*, 288

U

- Unifying Word, The: *MacLennan*, 421
 Use of the Bible in Public Schools, The: *Ryan*, 603

W

- Weatherhead*: Christian Faith and Psychotherapy, discussion, 483
Wilder: The Christian Hope, discussion, 10
Windisch: Two Great New Testament Interpreters, *Johnson*, 288
 Woman Minister, The: *Henrichsen*, 275

BOOK REVIEWS

B

- Baez-Camargo*: Ecumenical Foundations, by Hogg, 626
Bailey: What Is the Best New Testament? by Colwell, 627
Baillie: Philosophy of Nature, by Maritain, 310
Brightman: Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian, by Wach, 463
Brown: The Christian Understanding of God, by Ferré, 469
Burned-Over District, The, by Cross: *Hudson*, 301
 By the Way, by McConnell: *Huber*, 628

C

- Cameron*: Democracy and the Churches, by Nichols, 307
Cannon: The Reformation in England, Vol. I, by Hughes, 309
 Christ and Culture, by Niebuhr: *Dawson*, 298
 Christ Victor, by Aulén: *Johanson*, 472
 Christian Faith and Practice, by Hodgson: *Hough*, 311
 Christian Understanding of God, The, by Ferré: *Brown*, 469
 Church Music: Illusion and Reality, by Davison: *McCutchan*, 621
Cialfi: The Mature Mind, by Overstreet, 143
 Conduct of Life, The, by Mumford: *D. D. Williams*, 617
 Counselor in Counseling, The, by Hiltner: *A. D. Weatherhead*, 631
Craig: The Structure of the Divine Society, by Dillstone, 314
Cully: A Protestant Manifesto, by Garrison, 474
 Cult and Culture, by Vogt: *Magee*, 476
 Culture and Faith, by Kroner: *Gloyn*, 460

D

- Dawson*: Christ and Culture, by Niebuhr, 298
 Democracy and the Churches, by Nichols: *Cameron*, 307
 Doctrine of the Atonement, The, by Hodgson: *Hough*, 311
Ducall: The Mystery of Love and Marriage, by Bailey, 632

E

- Ecumenical Foundations, by Hogg: *Baez-Camargo*, 626
 Ecumenical Movement, The, by Hodgson: *Hough*, 311
 Episcopal Church in the United States, 1759-1931, by Addison: *Sweet*, 153

F

- Fairbanks*: Psychology, Religion and Healing, by Weatherhead, 629
 Figure of Beatrice, The, by Williams: *Lantero*, 477
Fitch: The Irony of American History, by Niebuhr, 613
 From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, by Cragg: *Hedley*, 155
Frye: Religious Beliefs of American Scientists, by Long, 619
Frye: Time and Eternity, by Stace, 619

G

- Gloyn*: Culture and Faith, by Kroner, 460
 Gospel of God, The, by Nygren: *Penner*, 313

- Greene*: Systematic Theology, Vol. I, by Tillich, 137
Gregory: Tensions Affecting International Understanding, by Klineberg, 633

H

- Harkness*: The Venture of Prayer, by Northcott, 152
 He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of Sins, by Williams: *Lantero*, 477
Hedley: From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, by Cragg, 155
 History of the Cure of Souls, A, by McNeill: *Williams*, 140
 Homo Viator, by Marcel: *Roberts*, 624
Hough: Christian Faith and Practice, The Doctrine of the Atonement, The Ecumenical Movement, by Hodgson, 311
Huber: By the Way, by McConnell, 628
Hudson: The Burned-Over District, by Cross, 301
Hume: The Physicians, A Novel, by Lin, 315

I

- Ingalls*: Modern Poetry and the Christian Tradition, by Wilder, 615
Ingalls: Poetry, Religion, and the Spiritual Life, by Thomas, 615
Ingalls: War and Human Progress, by Nef (review-article), 45
 Irony of American History, The, by Niebuhr: *Fitch*, 613

J

- Johanson*: Christ Victor, by Aulén, 472
 John the Baptist, by Kraeling: *McCasland*, 304
Johnson: The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount, by Windisch, in review-article, 288
Johnson: Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, by Bultmann, in review-article, 288

K

- Kroner*: Way to Wisdom, by Jaspers, 467

L

- Lantero*: He Came Down From Heaven, The Forgiveness of Sins, and The Figure of Beatrice, by Williams, 477
Lewis: Some Tendencies in British Theology, by Mozley, 150
 Liberal Learning and Religion, ed. by Wilder: *Quilian*, 147

M

- Magee*: Cult and Culture, by Vogt, 476
 Man Is Not Alone, by Heschel: *Pfuetze*, 145
 Mature Mind, The, by Overstreet: *Cialfi*, 143
McCasland: John the Baptist, by Kraeling, 304
McCutchan: Church Music: Illusion and Reality, by Davison, 621
 Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount, The, by Windisch: *Johnson*, 288
Michalson: Way to Wisdom, by Jaspers, 465
 Modern Poetry and the Christian Tradition, by Wilder: *Ingalls*, 615
 Mystery of Being, The, II (Faith and Reality), by Marcel: *Roberts*, 624

- Mystery of Love and Marriage, The, by Bailey:
Duvall, 632
- O
- Old Testament, The, and Modern Study, ed. by
Rowley: *Pfeifer*, 305
- P
- Penner*: The Scandal of Christianity, by Brunner, 313
Penner: The Gospel of God, by Nygren, 313
Pfeifer: The Old Testament and Modern Study, ed.
by Rowley, 305
Pfueze: Man Is Not Alone, by Heschel, 145
Philosophy of Nature, by Maritain: *Baillie*, 310
Physicians, The, A Novel, by Lin: *Hume*, 315
Poetry, Religion, and the Spiritual Life, by Thomas:
Ingalls, 615
Protestant Manifesto, A, by Garrison: *Cully*, 474
Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Century, ed. by
Nash: *Wright*, 157
Psychology, Religion and Healing, by Weatherhead:
Fairbanks, 629
- Q
- Quillian*: The Teaching of Religion in American
Higher Education, ed. by Gauss, 147
Quillian: Liberal Learning and Religion, ed. by
Wilder, 147
- R
- Reformation in England, The, Vol. I, by Hughes:
Cannon, 309
Religious Beliefs of American Scientists, by Long:
Frye, 619
Roberts: Homo Viator and The Mystery of Being, II
(Faith and Reality), by Marcel, 624
- S
- Scandal of Christianity, The, by Brunner: *Penner*, 313
- Some Tendencies in British Theology, by Mozley:
Lewis, 150
Structure of the Divine Society, The, by Dillistone:
Craig, 314
Sweet: The Episcopal Church in the United States,
1759-1931, by Addison, 153
Systematic Theology, Vol. I, by Tillich: *Greene*, 137
- T
- Teaching of Religion in American Higher Education,
The, ed. by Gauss: *Quillian*, 147
Tensions Affecting International Understanding, by
Klineberg: *Gregory*, 633
Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, by Bult-
mann: *Johnson*, 288
Time and Eternity, by Stace: *Frye*, 619
Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-
Christian, by Wach: *Brightman*, 463
- V
- Venture of Prayer, The, by Northcott: *Harkness*, 152
- W
- War and Human Progress, by Nef: *Ingalls*, review-
article, 45
Way to Wisdom, by Jaspers: *Michalson*, 465, *Kroner*,
467
Weatherhead, A. D.: The Counselor in Counseling,
by Hiltner, 631
What Is the Best New Testament? by Colwell: *Bailey*,
627
Williams, D. D.: The Conduct of Life, by Mumford,
617
Williams, G. H.: A History of the Cure of Souls,
by McNeill, 140
Wright: Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, ed. by Nash, 157

BOOK NOTICES

- A
- Anderson, Rediscovering the Bible, 318
- B
- Briggs, Caird, Micklem, The Shorter Oxford Bible,
160
Butterfield, History and Human Relations, 479
- C
- Carrier, Free to Grow, 159
Citron, New Birth, 320
- D
- Day, The Long Loneliness, 635
Douglass, Mission to America, 158
Dowcy, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology,
637
- F
- Flewelling, Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures, 317
- G
- Greenough, ed., The Home Bible, 160
Guy, Windows of Faith: *Hough*, 316
- H
- Hedley, The Superstitions of the Irreligious, 318
Hiltner, Self-Understanding Through Psychology and
Religion, 159
Holloway, Religious Ethics and the Politics of Power,
320
Howard, We Americans: North and South, 158
Hubben, Four Prophets of Our Destiny, 480
- K
- Kittel, Bible Key Words: *Wright*, 635
- L
- Lefkowitz, Medicine for a Sick World, 636
Louthan, The Poetry of John Donne, 319
- N
- Niles, That They May Have Life, 158
- O
- Oxford, The Reader's Bible, 160
- P
- Parker, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 637
Patrick, Alcohol, Culture, and Society, 636
- R
- Ross, African Heritage, 637
- S
- Sayre, Africans on Safari, 637
Schweitzer, Paul and His Interpreters, 160
Siegfried, Nations Have Souls, 317
Spann, Pastoral Care, 320
- U
- Umbach, The Prayers of John Donne, 319
- W
- White, The Tudor Books of Private Devotion, 319
Williams, Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health,
159

